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Abstract 
 
In civil wars, innocent civilians live in the shadow of violence and destruction. 
This can range from low-level violence to aggressive campaigns of shelling of urban 
areas and massacres of entire villages in rural settings. In some cases, civilians respond to 
this violence by fleeing from the conflict to find refuge in neighboring states; however, in 
other civil wars, civilians remain trapped in the conflict zone, creating humanitarian 
disasters. This dissertation argues that civilians will flee when they have a reasonable, 
safe place to seek refuge, but in the absence of a safe place to seek sanctuary, civilians 
have no choice to but to stay put.  When civilians can flee from violence, this vents the 
pressure from the conflict; however, if there is nowhere to run, civilians will not only 
remain in the conflict zone, but will feed back into the conflict processes. Civilians are a 
resource in civil wars that armed actors can leverage to extract resources, pull in 
humanitarian aid, coopt to join the conflict, and otherwise sustain the continuation of the 
fighting. If civilians are trapped and vulnerable in a conflict with high levels of violence 
and have no paths to flight, they become easy pickings for armed actors, which in turn 
fuels the conflict further; this creates what I call a pressure-cooker conflict state. 
To test this theory, this project introduces original data on how states treat 
refugees, and subsequently uses this data to create measures of the ability to flee—or 
“exit quality.” I conduct empirical analyses using these new measures and find that, if 
civilians are exposed to violence, civil wars that lack safe exit options tend to be bloodier 
conflicts that flare quickly but also burn out sooner. This project shows, then, not only 
that states surrounding civil wars can shape civilians’ choices to flee based on how they 
treat refugees, but that this also in turn shapes the development of civil wars. Shutting off 
	 ix 
opportunities for civilians to escape from conflict is problematic not only because it 
creates a humanitarian crisis, but also because it can change the course of the conflict.
	 x 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables......................................................................................................................xi 
List of Figures....................................................................................................................xii 
Chapter 1: The Theory of the Pressure Cooker Conflict State ........................................... 1 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 
Background on Refugee Flight Restrictions ................................................................... 4 
Existing Models of Civilian Flight ................................................................................. 8 
Theoretical Foundations: Exit Quality .......................................................................... 14 
The Interaction of Exit Quality and Internal Violence ................................................. 19 
Iraq: An Illustration of all Combinations of Exit Quality and Violence ....................... 22 
Stasis: Low Violence Conflicts ..................................................................................... 24 
The Syrian Civil War: Exodus ...................................................................................... 25 
The Second Chechen Conflict: Illustrating the Pressure-Cooker ................................. 28 
Additional Theoretical Concerns .................................................................................. 38 
The Plan ........................................................................................................................ 51 
Chapter 2: The Refugee Rights Dataset ............................................................................ 55 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 55 
Literature Review .......................................................................................................... 56 
Theorizing on State Practices Towards Refugees ......................................................... 60 
Research Design ............................................................................................................ 67 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 71 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 80 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 82 
Chapter 3: Fight or Flight? Measuring Exit Quality ......................................................... 83 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 83 
The Need for Unidimensional Measures ...................................................................... 85 
Methodology ................................................................................................................. 88 
Preliminary Scores of Destination Quality ................................................................... 93 
Face Validity Test ....................................................................................................... 100 
Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable Regression ................................................... 106 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 112 
Chapter 4: Exit Quality and Civil War Duration and Intensity ...................................... 114 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 114 
The Theory of the Pressure-Cooker Conflict State ..................................................... 115 
Results ......................................................................................................................... 126 
Future Work ................................................................................................................ 133 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 134 
Chapter 5: Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 136 
Future Research .......................................................................................................... 141 
Appendix A: Refugee Rights Coding Procedure and Summary Statistics ..................... 144 
Appendix B: Methodology for Creating Destination Quality Measures ........................ 149 
Appendix C: Additional Models of Civil Conflict Duration and Intensity .................... 167 
References....................................................................................................................... 176 
	 xi 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Types of Civil Conflict States ............................................................................. 21 
Table 2: Frequencies of Refugee Rights Scores ............................................................... 69 
Table 3: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Refugee Practices (1993-2011)...........75 
Table 4: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Refugee Practices (1993-2011)...........76 
Table 5: Factor Loadings for Destination Quality Data .................................................... 95 
Table 6: Summary Statistics for Destination Quality Theta Scores (IRT) ....................... 96 
Table 7: Logistic Regression Predicting Positive Refugee Flows .................................. 104 
Table 8: OLS Regression Predicting Refugee Flows (ln) ............................................... 105 
Table 9: OLS and IV Regression Predicting Refugee Flows (ln) on Refugee Rights .... 109 
Table 10: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Predicting Civil Conflict Duration .......... 123 
Table 11: OLS Regression Predicting Annual Battle Deaths ......................................... 128 
Table 12: Summary Statistics for 1993-2011 ................................................................. 147 
Table 13: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Refugee Practices (1993-2011).......147 
Table 14: Orthogonal Rotated Factor Loadings .............................................................. 154 
Table 15: Correlation Matrix of All Variables................................................................158 
Table 16: IRT Graded Response Model - Refugee Rights ............................................. 160 
Table 17: IRT Graded Response Model - General Security ........................................... 161 
Table 18: Summary of Whether Results Support Initial Hypotheses ............................. 167 
Table 19: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Predicting  Civil Conflict Duration with Exit 
Quality Measures at Mean Score (t) ....................................................................... 174 
Table 20: OLS Regression Predicting Annual Battle Deaths with Exit Quality Measures 
at Mean Score (t) ..................................................................................................... 175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 xii 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Refoulement Score=2 ...................... 77 
Figure 2: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Protection Score = 2 ........................ 77 
Figure 3: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Government Abuse Score = 2 ......... 78 
Figure 4: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Legal System Score = 2 ................... 78 
Figure 5: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Cooperation with UNHCR = 2 ........ 79 
Figure 6: Hypothetical Exit Quality v. Destination Quality Scenarios ............................. 87 
Figure 7: Scatterplot of Selected IRT Scores - Refugee Rights v. General Security ........ 96 
Figure 8: Refugee Rights Scores around Zambia (2010) .................................................. 98 
Figure 9: Refugee Rights Scores around The Gambia (2010) .......................................... 99 
Figure 10: Out of Sample Predictions of Refugee Flows (ln) - General Security Score 103 
Figure 11: Out of Sample Predictions for Instrumented Refugee Rights with 95% 
Confidence Intervals ............................................................................................... 111 
Figure 12: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score (t-1) 
and High Civilian Deaths ........................................................................................ 124 
Figure 13: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score (t-1)  
and  Low Civilian Deaths ....................................................................................... 124 
Figure 14: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t-1) 
and High Civilian Deaths ........................................................................................ 125 
Figure 15: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t-1) 
and Low Civilian Deaths ........................................................................................ 125 
Figure 16: Predicted Battle Deaths (ln) Based on General Security (t-1) ....................... 129 
Figure 17: Predicted Battle Deaths Based on Refugee Rights (t-1) ................................ 129 
Figure 18: Scree Plot from PCA Results ........................................................................ 151 
Figure 19: Test Characteristic Curve for Refugee Rights ............................................... 162 
Figure 20: Test Characteristic Curve for General Security ............................................ 162 
Figure 21: Item Information Function for Refugee Rights ............................................. 163 
Figure 22: Item Information Functions for General Security ......................................... 163 
Figure 23: Test Information Function for Refugee Rights ............................................. 164 
Figure 24: Test Information Function for General Security ........................................... 164 
Figure 25: Item Characteristic Curves for Refugee Rights ............................................. 165 
Figure 26: Item Characteristic Curves for General Security .......................................... 165 
Figure 27: Scatterplot of IRT Theta Scores - Refugee Rights v. General Security ........ 166 
Figure 28: Predicted Battle Deaths (ln) Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t) ........ 170 
Figure 29: Predicted Battle Deaths (ln) Based on General Security Mean Score (t) ...... 170 
Figure 30: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score (t) and 
High Civilian Deaths ............................................................................................... 171 
Figure 31: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score (t) and 
Low One-Sided Civilian Deaths ............................................................................. 171 
Figure 32: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t) and 
High Civilian Deaths ............................................................................................... 172 
Figure 33: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t) and Low 
One-Sided Civilian Deaths ..................................................................................... 172	
  
	 1 
Chapter 1: The Theory of the Pressure Cooker Conflict State  
 
Introduction 
In the summer of 2014, Israel blockaded the Gaza Strip and undertook a campaign 
of heavy bombings and shelling in civilian-inhabited areas in an attempt to root out the 
terrorist organization Hamas. Gaza resident and journalist Mohammed Omer described 
the situation on the ground, where relentless attacks on civilian residences were wiping 
out infrastructure and causing massive casualties: 
The only power plant in Gaza is bombed. If that means something, it means, 
according to officials, that we will have about one year of no electricity and no 
light... Rafah crossing is closed. There is nowhere to hide. There is nowhere to 
run to, unlike many places or war zones. The humanitarian crises are growing in 
the Gaza strip... I believe that Israel, what they wanted to do is to make people 
turn against the resistance. In fact, it's the other way around. You find people in 
the street who say, “We do support resistance, because that's the only way to end 
the occupation."1 
 
The Palestinians in the Gaza Strip literally had no way out. Flight was impossible. While 
scholars and policy-makers alike often assume that civilians can flee from conflict and 
violence, this is simply not always the case. While the blockade of Gaza is an extreme 
example, it is by no means an isolated event. Border closures, policies of arresting and 																																																									
1 “Palestinian Journalist Mohammed Omer: Lifting the Blockade Isn’t a Hamas Demand- 
It’s a Human Right.” Democracynow.org. July 29 2014.  
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detaining asylum-seekers, and abuses of refugee populations are as common as the wars 
and violence that drive civilians to flee in the first place. 
As Omer's testimony states, when civilians have nowhere to run or hide, but are 
still exposed to high levels of violence and insecurity caused by conflict, they become 
quite vulnerable. Vulnerable populations - those without resources or the means to secure 
their own safety - become easy pickings for armed actors, either as targets, or as a base of 
support. After all, in an insecure environment that offers no escape, armed groups - even 
terrorists - can offer some measure of security. In these types of conflicts, in which 
civilians are effectively trapped and cannot escape from indiscriminate violence, they will 
thus be more likely to feed back into the conflict itself. These vulnerable civilians can be 
an important resource for armed actors, and if they are stuck in a violent conflict state, 
they can – willingly or not – become part of the base that fuels the fighting. This is what I 
call the pressure-cooker conflict state.   
Of course, the situation is rarely as black and white as this example suggests; 
there is usually some way to flee from conflict. However, not all paths to flight are 
created equal, and there is a continuum along which the availability and quality of exit 
from conflict states can be measured. 
In this chapter, I argue that restrictions on civilian flight from conflict states not 
only impact if and where civilians will flee, but also shape the development of the 
conflict itself. Specifically, if civilians are exposed to high levels of violence and 
infrastructure damage but lack reasonable exit options, they will be trapped without 
resources or security, and will thus be easily coopted by armed actors. This will provide a 
population from which to extract and recruit, which should in turn fuel the conflict. 
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However, while I initially expected pressure-cookers to see longer and bloodier conflicts, 
empirically, pressure-cookers have shorter and more intense conflicts. Where vulnerable 
civilians are trapped and threatened by violence, they are more likely to feed back into 
the conflict, driving conflicts that are more intense, but that also flare and burn out 
sooner. 
In this project, I therefore leverage original data on state policies and practices 
towards refugees and asylum-seekers, in conjunction with the level of internal violence 
and insecurity, to generate separate measures of exit quality - or the factors that “pull" 
civilians from a conflict state - and violence, which should exert the pressure to “push" 
civilians from a conflict state. This allows me to examine, in later chapters, how the 
precise balance of the “push" and “pull" affects internal conflict dynamics. In short, I am 
able to leverage these measures to determine whether armed actors in the state in question 
are pushing people who are effectively trapped, and what this means not only in a 
humanitarian sense, but also for the long-term development of the conflict.  
This project should connect the literatures on the macro-level characteristics of 
civil wars (Regan and Stam 2000, Regan 2002, Regan and Norton 2005, Collier et al. 
2003), violence against civilians (Kalyvas 2006, Lyall 2009, Condra and Shapiro 2012, 
Wood 2010, Weinstein 2007, Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004) and 
displacement, in terms of the prediction of refugee flows (Schmeidl 1997, Moore and 
Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Melander and Oberg 2006, 
2007, Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009), the effects of migration (Salehyan and Gleditsch 
2006, Salehyan 2007), and the use of forced displacement as a strategy of conflict (Azam 
and Hoeffler 2002, Steele 2009, 2011). At its core, the project is about the short and long-
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term internal characteristics of civil conflict: how long a conflict endures, how many 
casualties accumulate over the course of a conflict, and how civilians can impact both of 
these dynamics. However, building from the understanding of civilians as central to the 
development of civil wars, I give new insights on how both external and internal actors 
can shape these outcomes - intentionally or not - by restricting the ability of civilians to 
exit from the conflict. 
Background on Refugee Flight Restrictions 
 Observationally, it is clear that states do close borders to incoming refugees and 
asylum seekers, or otherwise restrict their entry, fairly frequently. The refugee crisis in 
Syria has garnered the most substantial amount of attention in recent years; the first wave 
of media attention gathered some steam as bordering countries, such as Lebanon and 
Jordan, opened and closed their borders to Syrian civilians fleeing the conflict. That 
coverage paled in comparison to the avalanche of media attention to European states 
closing their borders to Syrian refugees and asylum seekers. However, despite what 
seems to be a new conversation about the responsibility of sovereign states to take in 
civilians fleeing conflict and persecution, these types of restrictions are neither new nor 
unique. 
 In 1991, Turkey closed its border to the Iraqi Kurds fleeing from chemical 
weapons attacks by Saddam Hussein (Long 2010, Haberman 1991). In 1999, Macedonia 
left thousands of Albanian Kosovar refugees stranded when it closed its border with 
Kosovo to refugee flight (Rohde 1999). Kenya has a lengthy history of closing its border 
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to Somali refugees. 2  These are but a few extreme examples; many other states have 
effectively closed borders to refugees, regularly abused refugees and asylum-seekers 
within their territory, or jailed asylum-seekers purely for the crime of entering the state. 
These all constitute violations of international law, specifically the United Nations 
Convention of the Status of Refugees (1951) and its 1967 Protocol. These documents 
define a refugee as a person that:   
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 3 
 
Over time, this definition has expanded to encompass any civilians that flee across 
international borders due to fear for their lives or safety arising from violence and 
conflict. It is explicitly forbidden to refuse entry to any civilians who meet these 
standards, or to arbitrarily detain civilians who meet these standards for the crime of 
entering the country. Sending back civilians who qualify for refugee status or asylum to a 
country where they have reason to fear for their lives or safety - either at the border or 
once they have entered the state - is called “refoulement" and is a clear violation of 
international refugee law. 4 Nonetheless, it is quite common. 
																																																									
2 “Kenyans close border with Somalia." BBC News. January 3 2007. Mould, Hussein.; 
"Kenya Violates Refugee Laws by Forcing Somali Refugees Back to Somalia." New 
American. November 30, 2010.; Miriri, Duncan. “Kenya demands U.N. removes massive 
Somali refugee camp." Reuters. April 11 2015. 
 
3 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 1. 
 
4 The difference between asylum and refugee status is based on where the individual in 
question is located when they ask for the state's protection: if the individual is already 
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 Violations of this law are perhaps to be expected since it lacks a strong 
enforcement mechanism but is costly to obey. Respecting the law, or allowing free entry 
to all those fleeing for their lives or safety, requires taking on some amount of cost and 
risk that should increase in direct proportion to the size of the incoming population. 
However, while the violations are common enough, it is unclear what effects these 
restrictions on flight from conflict states actually create. By the same token, physical and 
geographic barriers to flight from states in civil war can have the same effect; mountains, 
deserts, and oceans can all effectively make flight very risky or impossible. Yet again, it 
may not be feasible to exit, leaving civilians stranded. 
 If it is harder to get out of the conflict state, will more civilians simply stay put 
and die? Or, will civilians react differently to violence and insecurity if they are trapped? 
Since civilians are an important resource for armed actors in civil war, this also opens up 
another set of questions: Will armed actors be as likely to use displacement as a way to 
consolidate territory? Or, will this change the kind of displacement strategies they use? It 
certainly seems strange to expect that if displacement is a strategy or goal during conflict, 
that restrictions on flight would not change the dynamics of conflict or the behavior of 
belligerents (Steele 2011). Given the growing unwillingness of the international 
community to shoulder the burden of refugees since the end of the Cold War, this is an 
area well worth exploration: 
																																																																																																																																																																						
within the state or at the border of the state where they request protection, they will 
request asylum. Individuals who are already located in a state other than their home state 
will request to be resettled as refugees in a third country. This definition can become 
quite muddled, however, based on host-state legal policies and the granting of prima facie 
refugee status to large conflict-induced migration flows. For the purposes of this chapter, 
and the chapters that follow, the terms will be generally interchangeable.	
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Increasingly, however, the absence of alternatives is influencing the decision to 
remain [internally] displaced. The growing inclination of the international 
community is to prevent refugee flows and restrict refugee admissions. Although 
the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution is enshrined in international 
human rights law, large numbers of persons are finding borders closed to them 
(Cohen and Deng 1998, 29-30). 
 
It is the effects of these policies, and equivalent barriers to civilian flight from civil 
conflict, that I explore in this project. This is a valuable contribution in a number of areas. 
Of course, improving on existing models of refugee flight is useful for its own sake, but I 
also offer the empirical contribution of a disaggregated pair of measures of the “push" 
and “pull" forces that shape civilian behavior in conflict. Using these measures, I aim to 
bridge the literatures on migration and civil conflict dynamics through a study on how 
restrictions to civilian flight shape the resources and behavior of armed actors. This also 
has particular relevance to the sub-literature in civil conflict on violence against civilians, 
as using violence against civilians coercively should have very different implications in 
settings where they have no means of escape. 
There are potential policy implications from this study, as it is largely policy that 
shapes the availability and quality of flight from conflict. If it is the case that closing 
international borders to refugee inflows from a neighboring state might actually create a 
more violent and more destabilizing conflict, this might be a good reason for states to 
reconsider their policies. Additionally, while it is normatively and morally unpalatable to 
see states close their borders to civilians fleeing conflict, this has its limits in persuading 
leaders to change policy. Demonstrating that there is a clear theoretical and empirical 
basis for expecting that trapped and endangered civilians cause broader conflict-related 
security issues may prove more convincing. 
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Existing Models of Civilian Flight 
 Most scholarly work on displacement from conflict can be grouped broadly into 
three categories: studies predicting refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) 
migration patterns (e.g. Schmeidl 1997, Moore and Shellman 2006, Davenport, Moore 
and Poe 2003, Bohra- Mishra and Massey 2011); studies of the impact of refugee 
populations on host communities (Black 1994, Choi and Salehyan 2013, Jacobsen 2005, 
Lischer 2005, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, Salehyan 2007, Salehyan 2008); and studies 
on the use of displacement as a strategic tool in conflict (Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Steele 
2011, Uzonyi 2014). In this study, I aim to unite models of the factors that drive and 
restrict refugee flight with theories of displacement’s effect on conflict dynamics. If 
moving civilians is an important tactic for belligerents in civil conflict, then surely, 
considering how restrictions on this flight shape conflict should offer valuable insights.  
I will first discuss the traditional approach to modeling migration flows in 
conflict; I will then explain how purposely disaggregating both the broad factors that 
shape migration and the different types of migration that they create allows for a better 
understanding of the relationship between civilian migration and civil conflict processes.  
Models for Predicting Migration Flows 	
 The existing literature on migration from conflict assumes that individuals have a 
choice to either flee or to stay put, and attempts to evaluate how individuals make this 
choice in response to the factors that push civilians to leave, and those that pull civilians 
away from their homes. In the case of refugees, this will entail factors that “push" or 
“pull" civilians outside of their home state; for the internally displaced, this will only 
involve movement to a new destination within the home state.  Common “push" factors 
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include violence against civilians by the state, violence by rebels and/or dissidents, and 
violence between rebels and the state (Schmeidl 1997, Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 
2007, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Melander and Oberg 2006, 2007, Czaika and 
Kis-Katos 2009). This may be simply the level of violence, in terms of casualties, or it 
might be the geographic scope of the violence (Melander and Oberg 2007). In a number 
of studies, “push" factors are the only topic of investigation, particularly if the topic at 
hand is the size of migration outflows, rather than their direction (see Moore and 
Shellman 2004, Melander and Oberg 2006); this is based on the premise that civilians 
who flee their homes first choose whether to flee, and then choose their destination 
(Moore and Shellman 2006, 601). This is problematic because if an individual is making 
the decision of whether or not to abandon their home and seek refuge elsewhere, the set 
of available destinations must figure directly into this decision. If there are no options for 
flight that are superior to the current situation, then the individual in question will not 
flee. Separating push and pull into different stages of the decision-making process of the 
individual civilian implies a very strong and seemingly unjustifiable set of assumptions in 
this regard. 
 This then leads to the factors that “pull" individuals to flee, or in some 
conceptions, determine the destination that an individual will choose. “Pull" factors in the 
existing literature are usually confined to the same measures that are used to determine 
quality of life and security in the home state: the level of democracy in neighboring 
states, the wealth and wages in neighboring states, the presence of civil conflict in 
neighboring states, and of course the human rights practices of neighboring states (Moore 
and Shellman 2006, 2007). Additionally, networks available in potential host states 
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through a prior diaspora from the state in question might facilitate easier flight, thus 
acting as a “pull" factor (Schmeidl 1997, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Moore and 
Shellman 2006, 2007). Of course, the closer a state, the greater the “pull"; the further a 
potential host state is, the higher the costs to get there, which decreases the pull of 
otherwise attractive destinations (Iqbal 2007). On its face, this is a reasonable approach; 
civilians should prefer to go somewhere with superior government practices, security, 
and economic opportunity, that is easier to reach. However, there are a couple of serious 
problems with this general approach. 
 First, the stark problem: not all states allow refugee and asylum inflows. If the 
goal is to model refugee migration patterns, this is an enormous omission from existing 
models. Even outside of the most extreme example of a border closure, there is still a 
great deal of room to restrict conflict-induced migrants from entering the state. While it is 
easy to argue that the motivated migrant can cross a border illegally, this is not without 
its own costs and risks; although asylum seekers should not be punished for illegally 
entering the country per the terms of the UN Convention on Refugees, the simple fact is 
that many states will throw all illegal migrants into jail, or immediately deport them, 
regardless of their reason for seeking entry to the country. State policy towards the 
immigration of refugees and asylum-seekers, then, should figure prominently in any 
model of these migration flows. Migration to a particular state may actually not be an 
available choice; if the state in question is the only neighboring state - or if all 
neighboring states restrict refugee entry - then perhaps flight from the conflict state is not 
actually within the set of choices available to an individual choosing whether to flee. 
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This brings me to the second problem, which is perhaps more subtle but no less 
important: how states treat their citizens and how they treat refugees and asylum-seekers 
are often quite distinct. While previous studies expect that refugees and asylum-seekers 
will go to states that have better civil rights and human rights practices broadly, this 
makes the enormous and untenable assumption that refugees and asylum-seekers will 
have access to these same rights and protections. This is simply not the case; asylum-
seekers and refugees do not generally have the same set of rights - or the same level of 
protection for their rights - as native citizens. Therefore, to properly measure the “pull" of 
outside states requires directly measuring how those states treat refugees and asylum-
seekers, not just how they treat their own citizens. Considering how states treat refugees 
and asylum seekers - specifically, whether or not states grant them entry, and how they 
are treated if they are able to enter the state - should allow for a stronger understanding of 
not only the strength of the “pull" of outside destinations, but whether there is any pull at 
all. 
Models of the Ability to Flee 
 
It is therefore possible that restrictions on flight from conflict by neighboring 
states will shape the level of “pull" from these potential destinations, and in the extreme, 
may rule out external flight entirely. The existing literature does show that it matters 
whether people can flee in predicting migration; many models of both internal 
displacement and refugee flight consider variables that might hinder or facilitate 
individual ability to flee; this typically is measured in terms of economic wealth in IDP 
models, or in models of refugee flight, the networks available through previous refugee 
outflows (Okatmoto and Wilkes 2008) or the number of contiguous land borders that 
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asylum-seekers can cross (Moore and Shellman 2006). Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003) 
make the only mention of the possibility of migration policy restrictions impacting flight 
patterns; specifically, they argue that autocracies should be more likely to restrict civilian 
exit from the state, while democracies should be more likely to restrict entry (33). This 
largely grows out of observable patterns during the Cold War; however, it is since the end 
of the Cold War that refugee policies have changed appreciably, and over the past 
twenty-five years, autocratic states figure just as prominently in the list of refoulement 
offenders as democratic states. It is therefore very important to consider and measure the 
impact of refugee and asylum policies directly. 
Thus, the literature clearly says that barriers to flight matter, and I argue that 
major barriers to flight have to this point been neglected. If, then, migration is not equally 
available in all circumstances, then some civilians are unable or unwilling to flee.  If they 
cannot or will not flee from the state but are still exposed to the forces that impel flight, 
this should have distinct implications for the nature of the civilian population left behind, 
and how this population will shape the continued development of the conflict. Lacking 
the means to vent a heavily victimized civilian population, this population will instead 
remain within the conflict state, feeding back into the conflict and thereby creating 
increasing pressure. This will manifest in destructive and unstable outcomes. For 
example, Okamoto and Wilkes (2008) argue that if ethnic groups lack reasonable places 
to flee as a refugee (as proxied by the present ethnic kin networks in neighboring states) 
then they will instead choose to address their grievances through rebellion. Melander and 
Oberg (2006) show that those with the lowest cost to flight will leave early in the 
conflict, leaving behind an increasingly uniform population of those unable to flee - and 
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perhaps those most vulnerable to the armed actors that have destabilized their state. 
While Melander and Oberg (2006) lump IDPs and refugees into the aggregate category of 
“forced migrants," disaggregating these types of flows allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of how barriers to flight from the conflict state - either on the individual 
level or at the country-level - shape conflict-induced migration. 
Models for Disaggregating Migration Flows 
 
 The previous literature typically models flight exclusively in terms of refugee 
flows (Moore and Shellman 2007), lumps IDPs and refugees together into the “forced 
migrant" category (Melander and Oberg 2006), or studies micro-level internal 
displacement within a single conflict (Adhikari 2012, Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009, Steele 
2009, 2011).  There are specific reasons to study each of these, but I argue that to 
understand how the availability of flight from violence shapes the development of the 
conflict, refugee and IDP flows must be modeled as separate but substitutable outcomes 
impelled by the same set of push factors. This follows Schmeidl's (2000) model, in which 
she states “Refugees and IDPs flee from similar root causes rather than responding to 
completely different occurrences" (152), and also follows the logic of Moore and 
Shellman's (2006) article, which was the first to systematically study refugee flight and 
internal displacement as substitutes. 
 If the ability to flee from the state is shaped by not only violence pushing civilians 
out, but also by restrictions on flight by outside states, then some conflicts will have 
higher levels of internal displacement simply because the option to become a refugee is 
not feasible or not worth the cost of the journey. I will argue in subsequent sections that 
IDPs and other victimized but stationary civilians have very different impacts on the 
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conflict that created them than refugees, who are technically outside of the conflict once 
they leave the state's borders. 5 
 This will have implications beyond predicting migration flows. Specifically, 
given the importance of civilians to civil conflict, if victims of violence and insecurity 
cannot leave the state despite high levels of violence to push them out, this population 
will become volatile and vulnerable to targeting and manipulation by armed actors. This 
will create a fertile base of recruits and supporters, a hostage population to bring in 
resources through external humanitarian aid inflows, and will thus ultimately create 
longer, bloodier conflicts and greater instability. This is the pressure-cooker conflict 
state, subject to a positive-feedback cycle of violence by armed actors and increasing 
civilian support for armed actors, which in turn fuels further conflict. 
In the next section, I will build on existing individual-level decision models to 
flee to build a more nuanced model of the availability of flight and its implications for 
civilian behavior in conflict. 
Theoretical Foundations: Exit Quality 
 Individuals in civil conflicts choose whether to flee from violence and insecurity 
based on a rational decision calculus; they weigh their available choices and the expected 
utility for each choice, then select the option that maximizes their expected payoffs. In 
broad terms, the most basic choice available in migration studies is to either stay put or 
flee. In this basic choice model, an individual civilian evaluates the risk to his or her life 
and security posed by violence; this shapes the utility for staying put. As the level of 																																																									
5 This is obviously not strictly true, but I will discuss this in greater detail later. 
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violence and the threat to the civilian's life increases, the utility for staying put should 
decrease proportionately. This shapes one side of the decision calculus, commonly 
measured in terms of the “push" factors that drive flight out of civil conflict. Generally, 
this means violence. In the broader terminology of the processes that drive and constrain  
behavior, this would equate to the willingness to flee; greater violence, and a greater risk 
to survival, means an increased willingness to pick up and leave one's home. 
 The expected utility of flight is shaped by factors specific to the expected benefits 
and costs of flight itself. While the existing literature has considered the isolated effects 
of push at great length and from varying perspectives, the effect of pull factors has 
received comparatively little attention outside of limited dyadic studies of refugee flows 
(Moore and Shellman 2007). I propose considering, rather than “pull" factors, the overall 
quality of exit options, or exit quality. Exit quality is a function of the expected quality of 
life in target destinations, less the costs of the journey to arrive at said destinations. There 
are, then, a number of factors that shape exit quality for conflict-induced migrants that 
seek asylum or refugee status across international borders: the treatment of refugees and 
asylum-seekers in nearby states; the likelihood of gaining entry to nearby states; 
geographic obstacles to potential asylum states including distance, oceans, mountains, 
and deserts; the threat of violence en route to the destination; and of course the actual 
costs of not only leaving behind property, possessions, and livelihood, but also of 
financing the journey - a venture that frequently becomes prohibitively expensive due to 
a combination of visa-related migration fees by potential host states and payments to 
human smugglers in cases where flight is restricted. Thus, while violence drives the 
willingness to flee, exit quality determines the opportunity to flee; following the original 
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framework of opportunity and willingness articulated by Most and Starr (1989), I argue 
that while the willingness to flee may vary enormously in direct relation to the level of 
violence, this will only translate into actual refugee outflows if there is sufficient 
opportunity to flee, or high enough exit quality. 
Specifically, I argue that increased push or willingness to flee through violence 
decreases the utility of staying put; thus, while it does not increase the absolute utility for 
flight, decreasing the utility of staying put will of course make the other option - to flee - 
relatively more attractive. That is, higher levels of violence against civilians will make 
staying a much less palatable option; it does not change the expectation of the conditions 
awaiting in the destination, nor does it change how difficult the journey to reach it will 
be. Violence against civilians does not improve exit quality. It does, however, make the 
flight option - difficult though it may be - relatively more attractive. If the level of 
violence is low and generally confined to fighting between armed actors, civilians will be 
unlikely to leave behind their homes and possessions to seek an uncertain life as a 
refugee in a foreign country; however, once there is widespread violence against 
civilians, the uncertain life abroad may be a better option than the certainty of imminent 
death at home. Therefore, the willingness to flee should increase along with the levels of 
violence and the probability of becoming a casualty. 
 This is perhaps easy to accept; after all, there is a consensus in the literature that 
higher levels of violence, and more widespread violence, will unilaterally increase the 
likelihood of flight (Schmeidl 1997, Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007, Davenport, 
Moore and Poe 2003, Melander and Oberg 2006, 2007, Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009). 
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However, I propose that changes in  exit quality - or the opportunity to flee - will also 
shift the likelihood of flight, even as the level of violence stays constant. Thus, even if the 
level of violence stays the same, a sudden decrease in exit quality will make staying put 
relatively more attractive, and will therefore diminish flight. If the utility for flight, or exit 
quality is high, it will only require low levels of violence to make flight the more 
attractive option; however, if exit quality is low, even at high levels of violence, staying 
put may remain the best choice. Indeed, on an individual level, given the high costs 
sometimes entailed by flight, some individuals will never flee because they simply cannot 
afford it; to expect increased violence to suddenly drive these people out would be 
unrealistic. In the absence of any opportunity to flee from the conflict state, refugee 
outflows will be observationally equivalent between high levels of violence and zero 
violence; if people lack the opportunity to get out, then modeling outflows as a function 
of willingness alone is highly problematic. Not only will it produce biased predictions of 
migration, but also it will not accurately measure the true impact of violence on flight. 
In short, the concepts described above can be grouped into the two main determinants of 
civilian behavior in conflict, as shown below: 
1. pull = opportunity to flee = exit quality 
2. push = willingness to flee = violence 
These combine to determine whether civilians flee or stay put, and whether the civilians 
that stay put are likely to feed into the conflict processes or to continue with their lives 
unimpeded. 
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A contemporary illustration of this is in the comparison of Yemen and Syria, both of 
which are experiencing civil wars with high levels of civilian-targeted violence, but have 
starkly different levels of exit quality. A journalist on the ground in Yemen describes the 
frequent indiscriminate shellings, which not only cause high levels of civilian casualties, 
but also wreak havoc on infrastructure: 
...despite the risks, many Yemenis “would rather die in their homes and suffer 
with their families on their own land than live an undignified and abused life as a 
refugee,'' Potter says...The war has led to a rise in malnutrition. And more than 8 
million Yemenis currently lack access to basic health care. If this war had 
happened elsewhere, it might have caused a refugee crisis like the one in Syria. 
But unlike in Syria, where besieged families can flee to Turkey, Iraq, Jordan or 
Lebanon, Yemenis often feel trapped. 
 
To the north are the Rub’ al Khali desert and the closed borders of Saudi Arabia 
and Oman. To the south are the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, across which lie 
Djibouti and Somaliland (a breakaway region from Somalia). “Neither are very 
hospitable to Yemeni refugees'', says Potter.  Embassies from neighboring 
countries have mostly closed in Sanaa. Yemenis who have left tend to be from 
wealthy families, who can afford expensive air travel and endure complicated visa 
requirements. 6 
 
In Syria and Yemen, though there are comparable types and levels of violence against 
civilians, driving similar willingness to flee, the difference in exit quality - or opportunity 
- keeps Yemenis stationary, while Syrians surge outwards in search of refuge. 
The use of push and pull factors is well established in the conflict migration 
literature. However, it is new to explicitly think about the balance of these two. My 
contribution is this: I argue that the precise balance of push and pull, of motivation and 
opportunity, of violence and exit quality, will drive distinctly different civilian choices 
																																																									6	“The Unthinkable: An ancient city plunges into darkness as a war on civilians rages." 
NPR, August 21, 2015	
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and leave behind a different civilian population. This population, in turn, will shape 
different conflict dynamics. 
The Interaction of Exit Quality and Internal Violence 
I opened this chapter with the inquiry - what happens if states refuse to let in 
refugees? Here, I argue that closing borders to refugee inflows - or restricting refugee 
inflows broadly - will severely diminish exit quality for civilians in neighboring states. If 
all the neighboring borders are closed, and there is effectively no opportunity to flee, then 
flight from a conflict state should remain at zero.  This does not, however, mean that the 
violence that would otherwise impel them to leave will stop. This just means that these 
civilians will be effectively trapped inside the conflict state, exposed to violence and 
living in the remnants of infrastructure that survive campaigns of violence such as 
indiscriminate shelling.  
If a population has the opportunity to flee but lacks willingness, then refugee 
flows should be at zero. If a population is willing to flee but lacks the opportunity to do 
so, again, refugee flows will be at zero.  These are extreme examples, but they illustrate 
the importance of considering these as separate processes that shape migration. Perhaps 
more importantly, in the case of the first situation - opportunity to flee but no willingness 
- we should expect the civilian population to remain in their homes and communities, 
productive and secure. This might characterize a conflict with very low levels of 
violence, which is exclusively between the rebels and the state, in one very small part of 
the state, far away from heavily populated areas. The second situation, however, will 
have very different implications; where there is high willingness to flee from the conflict 
state but little or no opportunity to do so, civilians will be more likely to be internally 
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displaced, or to stay in their homes and communities while still exposed to violence and 
infrastructure loss; these civilians will be less productive and quite vulnerable, leading 
them to seek any available security from armed actors, even if it means joining the armed 
actor in question.  
To simplify the discussion above, I can break down the essential expectations for 
the set of types of civil conflict states based on the combination of exposure to violence 
and exit quality. This is by necessity a simplification into binary categories of high and 
low violence and exit quality, respectively. In reality either of these should be ranged 
along a continuum, with a corresponding set of continuous but constrained values for 
each measure. However, for the sake of clarity, I reduce this to the most extreme cases of 
willingness to flee and opportunity to do so. The table below shows the expected 
outcomes for each combination. 
As shown in Table 1, the latent level of exit quality only comes into play when 
there is a high enough level of violence to push people to flee. That is, it does not matter 
whether there is an opportunity to flee unless the individuals in question are actually 
willing to uproot their lives. In the absence of violence - or when violence is only 
exchanged between armed actors - there will simply be no push to flee. In that case, an 
island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean and a landlocked state surrounded by accessible, 
high-quality neighbors will be observationally equivalent. Either will be characterized by 
the third outcome, stasis, in which civilians should not change their behavior because 
there is no motivation to do so. Therefore, refugee outflows should remain at or close to 
zero, in the absence of the violence necessary to create genuine refugees. 
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Table 1: Types of Civil Conflict States 
 
 
High Exit Quality 
(High Pull/Opportunity) 
 
 
Low Exit Quality 
(Low Pull/Opportunity) 
 
High Violence 
(High Push/Willingness) 
 
 
Exodus 
 
Pressure-Cooker 
 
Low Violence 
(Low Push/Willingness) 
 
Stasis 
 
 However, as the top row of outcomes shows, the level of exit quality becomes 
extremely important once violence escalates to levels that push civilians to flee abroad. 
Once willingness reaches high levels, the observed outcome will depend on the latent exit 
quality; where flight options are high-quality and easily accessible, I expect to observe 
high volumes of refugee outflows resulting in the exodus outcome in Table 1 above. In 
this case, as violence increases, the victimized population should vent into neighboring 
states, draining this vulnerable group away from the reach and control of armed actors 
and limiting their capacity to feed back into the conflict process. Theoretically, the scale 
of violence in terms of casualties is itself inherently limited by outflows, which should 
respond to this violence, decreasing the potential civilian targets and thereby limiting the 
scale of casualties. Yet, again, if exit quality is low, the population will be trapped in an 
increasingly violent and destructive environment, lacking any outlet to vent the pressured 
civilian population. This leads to the pressure-cooker conflict state; this is the worst-case 
scenario for limiting the intensity and destruction of conflict. Returning to the opening 
example of the Israeli blockade and bombing of Gaza, Omer’s description of the 
devastation on the ground paints a clear picture of a pressure-cooker conflict. It is then 
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perhaps unsurprising that the civilians in Gaza would respond by increasing their support 
for Hamas, given that this was their only available path towards survival.  
To better illustrate the outcomes of the interactions of violence and exit quality, I 
trace examples of the three types of civil conflicts: exodus, stasis, and pressure-cooker. I 
begin by tracing all four combinations of conditions through the duration of the conflict 
in Iraq (2003-present). I then give a brief description of stasis conflicts, and in-depth 
descriptions of cases of exodus in Syria and pressure-cooker conflict in the Chechen 
conflict. 
Iraq: An Illustration of all Combinations of Exit Quality and Violence  
The Iraqi conflict provides an excellent illustration of each of these outcomes over 
the course of the war. Initially, when the conflict began in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq 
by the United States, neighboring states made an explicit effort to advertise that they 
would not take in refugees. Iran announced that its border would be closed to any civilian 
who tried to cross; the border with Kuwait was already walled off, a reminder of Iraq's 
own past invasion of Kuwait. However, despite the expectation of a massive refugee 
exodus on the part of neighboring states and the humanitarian community, none came. 
The violence at this stage of the conflict was specifically targeted at the actual armies and 
bypassed the civilians, who simply “hunkered down" in their homes, waiting for the 
violence to end. This was a clear example of stasis, in which low exit quality did not 
matter because there was no motivation or willingness to flee. 
 In the second stage of the Iraqi conflict (2004-2005), exit quality changed: when 
the massive refugee outflows never appeared, neighboring states relaxed their policies 
and the borders reopened. While these neighbors, like most Middle Eastern states, did not 
	 23 
have explicit policies in place for refugees and asylum-seekers, they did generally allow 
other Middle Eastern citizens to stay as “guests" in their countries. Violence did 
gradually pick up during this stage as the insurgency against U.S.-led Coalition forces 
began, but the bulk of this violence still bypassed uninvolved civilians. Yet again, though 
exit quality was now markedly higher, almost no one left because there was no strong 
push to make civilians willing to flee. Thus, the second stage remained in stasis, with 
minimal outflows of refugees. 
In the third stage (2006-2007), however, the level of violence escalated 
dramatically. The beginning of the sectarian conflict following the al-Anbar awakening 
left civilians extremely vulnerable to not only being caught in the crossfire between the 
Iraqi insurgents and Coalition forces, but also to incredibly brutal sectarian violence 
between Sunnis and Shias. During this stage, the exodus began from Iraq, sending 
massive outflows of civilians seeking refuge into the neighboring states of Syria and 
Jordan, with some outflows into Turkey and Iran, and a very limited number to Saudi 
Arabia (Fagen 2007, 2009). 
These massive outflows drove the onset of the fourth stage (2007-2009): in 
reaction to high volumes of Iraqi refugees and a perceived increase in crime and terrorism 
rooted in those communities, neighboring states began closing their borders in rapid 
succession from 2006 through 2007 (Fagen 2007, 2009, Harper 2008, Hodson 2007). In 
addition to these external border closures, governorates within Iraq began to seriously 
restrict internal migration in an effort to limit the movement of insurgents and terrorists. 7 
																																																									
7 Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (NRC/IDMC). 
“Challenges of forced displacement within Iraq." 29 December 2008; Norwegian 
	 24 
Further, most roads were largely impassable and unsafe due to the violence of armed 
groups and criminal gangs. The humanitarian community was in agreement that there 
were no viable internal exits to substitute for external exits. In this stage, the Iraqi conflict 
entered the pressure-cooker state. 
Violence has since dropped off and then dramatically increased in Iraq; there are 
additional instances of entering into lulls of stasis and then again into exodus and 
pressure-cooker following the invasion of ISIS. 
Stasis: Low Violence Conflicts 
 There is very little of interest to say about civil conflicts characterized by low-
level, localized violence in the context of flight. This is simply because if there is nothing 
to push civilians to flee from conflict, then the quality of flight options does not come 
into play; not only is there a theoretical "push" factor missing from the model, but 
without evidence of violence or persecution, these civilians by definition cannot claim 
asylum or refugee status abroad.  
The odds of identifying a conflict that never flares up sufficiently to impel some 
level of flight are vanishingly small; first and foremost, it is unlikely that this level of 
violence would qualify as a civil conflict or civil war in most current datasets. Further, 																																																																																																																																																																						
Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (NRC/IDMC).  “Iraq: a 
Displacement Crisis." 30 March 2007; Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Center (NRC/IDMC).  “Iraq: Sectarian Violence, Military 
Operations Spark New Displacement, as Humanitarian Access Deteriorates. A Profile of 
the Internal Displacement Situation." 23 May 2006. Though this may seem like it would 
be ineffective, the governorates were responsible for distributing the food rations most 
Iraqis relied upon for survival; without proper registration in the governorate, these 
rations were not accessible. 
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over the lifespan of a civil conflict, there will be moments characterized by a high level 
of violence, but these may just be punctuation to long periods in which violence 
decreases to the point of almost disappearing, subject only to the occasional flare-ups that 
signal that to some degree, the conflict lingers on. Many civil war scholars would also 
rightfully argue that the level of violence will vary greatly within a civil conflict state, 
leaving some areas free of violence, while others are subject to high levels of violence 
and destruction. I will delve into these distinctions in later chapters; in the meantime, it is 
worthwhile to think of whether the conflict is generally characterized by low levels of 
civilian exposure to violence. 
Thus, it is more appropriate to consider periods of time in civil conflicts in which 
violence is at low levels, infrastructure damage is minimal, the location of fighting is 
confined to small and remote areas, and violence is restricted primarily to fighting 
between armed rebels and the state military. In these circumstances, there will be little 
civilian involvement, and the impact of the continued conflict will be small enough to 
exert little to no "push" on civilians to flee the area.  
Again, these types of conflict are of little interest for this study, because they are 
by definition observationally equivalent between high and low exit states. The latent 
quality of flight options remains latent, and the conflict exerts no push for change in 
civilian behavior. 
The Syrian Civil War: Exodus 
 The Syrian conflict is a classic case of exodus; neighboring states largely opened 
their borders, the international community provided high levels of aid, and Syrians 
pursued all available paths out of the state. As shown in Table 1, this conflict had a 
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combination of high exit quality and high violence against civilians, driving massive 
civilian flight from the conflict state, or exodus. As one recent news article described: 
“‘Everyone I know is leaving,” said Mohammed, 30, who climbed three mountains to 
make his way across the Turkish border from the city of Aleppo with his pregnant wife… 
‘It is as though all of Syria is emptying.'" 8 
 Following a brutal government crackdown on pro-democracy protests in 2011, the 
opposition solidified into an armed rebellion. The Assad regime responded with a large-
scale, indiscriminate campaign of violence, most of which has been borne by civilians. 
The civilian-directed violence in Syria is on a massive scale and is largely inescapable. 
This included the use of chemical weapons against civilians in residential areas. 9 Regime 
forces have systematically dropped barrel bombs on civilian-inhabited areas, as one 
resident of Palmyra described: “Everybody can see it, but they don't know where it is 
going to be dropped [or if] it’s going to hit them, or their neighbors...They simply wait to 
see whether they will die.” 10 This tactic alone has drastically increased the willingness of 
civilians to flee: 
Beyond killing civilians, barrel bombs are playing a big part in forcing Syrians 
from their country. In most wars, civilians can find a modicum of safety by 
moving away from the front lines. But Mr. Assad's indiscriminate use of barrel 
bombs deep in opposition-held territory means that for many there is no safe place 
																																																									
8 Sly, Liz. “Syria is emptying." The Washington Post. 14 September 2015. 
 
9 Pannell, Ian. “Syria civilians still under chemical attack." BBC News. 10 September 
2015. 	
10 Masi, Alessandria. “The Syrian Regime's Barrel Bombs Kill More Civilians that ISIS 
and Al Qaeda Combined." International Business Times. August 18 2015. 
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to hide. That ugly reality has played a major part in persuading four million 
people to flee the country. 11 
 
The Syrian refugee crisis has become a focal point in the international 
humanitarian community and media; the effects of this scale of refugee outflows have 
gone well beyond neighboring states in the Middle East and changed border and 
migration policies in the European Union as well. Four million refugees is a definitive 
exodus, and shows that clearly exit quality was high enough to permit flight given the 
willingness of civilians to flee. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey have together 
taken in well over 4 million Syrian refugees.12 Of course, this does not mean that exit is 
available equally across the population or over time; some people cannot afford to flee; 
some are trapped in sieged cities; some borders have opened and closed periodically over 
time. However, the macro-level balance of exit quality and violence has resulted in the 
expected outcome of a massive drain of the civilian population out of the conflict state. 
The Syrian conflict displays another characteristics of exodus civil conflicts: over 
time, exit quality degrades. The massive outflows of Syrian refugees squeezed out the 
available aid resources of the international humanitarian community.13 Eventually, if 
large numbers of refugees flee, they will eventually wear out the welcome in their host 
states and cause a severe dip in the level of exit quality. 
																																																									
11 Roth, Kenneth. “Barrel Bombs, Not ISIS, Are the Greatest Threat to Syrians." New 
York Times. August 5, 2015. 
 
12 Quick facts: What you need to know about the Syria crisis." MercyCorps. February 5, 
2016.	13	Sly, Liz. “As tragedies shock Europe, a bigger crisis looms in the Middle East." The 
Washington Post. August 29, 2015.	
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The Second Chechen Conflict: Illustrating the Pressure-Cooker 
 The Second Chechen Conflict (1999-2009) is a strong example of a pressure-
cooker conflict state; it was a scorched-earth campaign by the Russian state against a 
separatist Islamic rebellion, characterized by not only extremely high levels of civilian 
casualties and infrastructure damage, but also by the Russian state's intentional blockade 
of most exit corridors for Chechen civilians. Thus, to revisit Table 1, the Chechen 
conflict was a combination of low exit quality and high violence against civilians, 
creating the outcome of a pressure-cooker conflict. While its immediate effects were 
generally confined to the republic of Chechnya and the surrounding area of the North 
Caucasus and encompassed only a small portion of the Russian state, the geographic 
constraints imposed by the Russian government ensured that within its borders, Chechnya 
fit this typology quite well.  
The second Chechen conflict is not a perfect example of this type of conflict 
because there was one exit path available to civilians, albeit unevenly over time and 
across the space of the republic of Chechnya. The ideal case would, of course, have exits 
entirely blocked; this is a rare thing to find in the world, with possible exceptions 
including the blockade of Gaza in 2014 that opened this chapter. The neighboring 
republic of Ingushetia did shelter hundreds of thousands of Chechen civilians who fled 
the violence and destruction of the conflict, which relieved some of the pressure pushing 
these people out (Nichols 2000, 248). However, it remains an excellent illustration of the 
types of barriers that incumbents can construct to deter not only flight abroad, but also 
flight within the state. Additionally, while the exit was available at times, this had its 
limits; not only was it unevenly accessible, but it was also an extremely low-quality exit. 
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The fact that anyone chose to take it speaks to the strength of the forces pushing them 
out, and the extremely high willingness to flee. Nonetheless, not everyone could flee, and 
the low quality of life in Ingushetia for the internally displaced, along with the 
devastation wrought in Chechnya itself, made for a fertile base of recruits and supporters 
to fuel the conflict. 
Background 
 
 This conflict followed a long history of displacement and violence with the 
Russian state or the USSR, depending on the timing of the incident in question; most 
prominently this included Stalin's forced deportation of the entire Chechen population in 
1944 to Siberia and Central Asia (Nichols 2000, 243). After Stalin's death and the official 
permission to return, most of the survivors did return to Chechnya (243). The tiny 
republic again came into conflict with the Russian state following the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, in which it declared its independence; this resulted in the first Chechen 
war, which lasted from 1994-1996. In this round of conflict, Chechnya defeated Russian 
forces, although at great cost in Chechen civilian lives and infrastructure: “The war had 
left Chechnya devastated‚ with much housing and nearly all infrastructure destroyed and 
much farmland mined or poisoned" (Nichols 2000, 245). 
 A power vacuum emerged in Chechnya following the departure of Russian troops, 
and criminality and violence thrived in the ruined economy that the first conflict left 
behind (Holland 2004, 335).  In this environment, a militant Islamism took root, which 
resulted in a renewed conflict with the Russian state in 1999 as a result of Chechen 
rebels' invasion of the neighboring republic of Dagestan. This was part of a greater effort 
to create an Islamic state in the entirety of the North Caucasus region (US embassy cables 
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2010). When a series of terrorist bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow killed over 
200 civilians, Vladimir Putin, then Prime Minister of Russia, blamed Chechen terrorists 
and launched a scorched earth campaign against Chechnya and all of its inhabitants, 
lumping civilians in with rebels (Holland 2004, 335). 14 This was supposed to be a "quick 
anti-terrorist operation" but became a war that only saw operations officially cease a 
decade later in 2009, and which continues to fuel terrorist and insurgent activity to the 
present day. 
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the first and 
second Chechen wars together displaced more than 800,000 people (2013). The second 
conflict alone displaced over 300,000 (Gilligan 2010, 2). The bulk of this movement was 
to the neighboring republics in the Caucasus, primarily that of Ingushetia. Estimates of 
civilian deaths from 1994 on vary widely, but a conservative estimate runs from 65,000 
to 75,000 (Gilligan 2010, 3). 
Violence and Destruction in Chechnya: the Push to Flee 
 
 The violence and infrastructure damage of the second Chechen War are almost 
unparalleled in contemporary warfare: 
The military engagement that began in 1999 led to five months of indiscriminate 
bombing and caused thousands of civilian deaths. By March 2000, Russian troops 
had some control over most of Chechnya. Since 2000, violence has continued as 
Russian forces attempt to crush the opposing guerrillas, carrying out extra-judicial 
and summary executions, forced `disappearances', exploitation of paramilitary 
forces, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, rape, attacks and assassinations of 
civilians and virtually complete impunity for the perpetrators of such human 
rights abuses (Holland 2004, 335). 
 																																																									
14 Mansur Mirovalev. “Chechnya, Russia and 20 years of conflict." 11 December 2014. 
Alljazeera. 
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All violence by Russian troops in Chechnya was by very definition indiscriminate, 
because every Chechen male over the age of ten was officially considered a terrorist, and 
by the same token, any person residing in Chechnya after the start of the 1999 invasion 
was similarly considered to be a member of the separatist rebels (Nichols 2000, 242). 
While Chechen rebels accounted for a much smaller portion of the violence and primarily 
targeted ethnic Russians or supporters of the pro-Russian regime, they also contributed to 
the dangers for civilians in Chechnya (Holland 2004, 335). Estimates of the total civilian 
casualties over the first and second Chechen conflict are, at the conservative end, 65,000 
to 75,000 for the period up to 2005 (Gilligan 2010, 3). 
While in the first conflict the fighting was confined to specific areas of Chechnya, 
making it feasible for civilians outside of these areas to safety stay put, this was not the 
case in the Second Chechen War. A displaced Chechen described this: “During the first 
war, we lived north of Grozny. At that time it was still possible to stay in Chechnya, 
which is no longer the case. We can neither hide nor defend ourselves" (Gilligan 2010, 
36). The scope of the fighting and the violence encompassed the entirety of the region, 
making it impossible for civilians to find refuge in rural areas and forcing them to seek it 
outside of Chechnya, if at all. 
As a Chechen civilian who had fled to Ingushetia stated in 2002, “It's become too 
dangerous to stay in Chechnya. One day can be quiet, the next day shooting and shelling 
break out all around. The Russians are constantly making security sweeps, and taking 
men away. We just couldn't bear it anymore." 15 
																																																									
15 Fred Weir. “Russia says 'return,' but Chechen refugees stay put." Christian Science 
Monitor. 5 February 2002. 
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In addition to the casualties directly caused by indiscriminate bombing and 
security sweeps, this campaign decimated what remained of Chechnya's infrastructure 
from the first conflict. As Johanna Nichols described: 
Even more than the 1994-96 war, the one that began in September 1999 is notable 
for its brutality towards civilians and its levels of destruction. The capital city of 
Grozny, formerly home to about 400,000 people, suffered unprecedented levels of 
destruction in 1994-96 and has been almost entirely reduced to rubble in the 
present war; this must be the greatest level of destruction ever visited on any 
urban area in any non-nuclear war" (2000, 246). 
 
Nearly every ethnic Chechen who lived in Chechnya before the war has now been 
economically ruined. The bombardment of towns, cities, and villages has been 
massive and continuous, and the degree of destruction of Grozny‚ probably 
unparalleled in non-atomic warfare. The conflict has destroyed urban and rural 
infrastructure. Farmland and pasture has been ruined by bombing, mining, and 
bombing of oil refineries, waste dumps, and other toxic sources (2000, 250). 
 
Another Chechen IDP gave a similar account of the situation in 2002: “It was just 
impossible to stay there. If you have any food, Russian soldiers will steal it. There is no 
school, no electricity, no water. Most of all there is no safety‚ Russian soldiers seize our 
men in the security sweeps, beat them and rob them. Sometimes they disappear 
forever.”16 Attempts to convince Chechen IDPs to return home began as early as 2002 as 
part of an attempt to convey that the insurgency was defeated, but these met with fierce 
resistance amongst the displaced who understood the reality of the situation on the 
ground. Not only was there concern regarding the violence perpetrated by Russian forces, 
but also the criminal gangs that had flourished in the anarchic conditions in Chechnya. 
Vera Daudova, also a Chechen IDP, explained this in 2004: “I know that the majority of 
people do not want to go back to Chechnya. They are afraid to go back because there is 																																																																																																																																																																							
16 Weir 2002. 
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no security there. At any time, somebody might intrude into their homes. It doesn't matter 
who the intruder is. Nobody knows. All these people are in camouflage. People are 
disappearing in [Chechnya]." 17 
 In the end, some might conclude that Putin's scorched earth campaign was brutal 
but effective; Russian troops were able to largely subdue the insurgency, recapture the 
bulk of the Chechen territory, and eventually to funnel massive funding into Chechnya to 
rebuild the cities and villages it had destroyed (though much of this was lost to the 
corruption endemic to the pro-Moscow regime, leaving unemployment and poverty at 
dangerous levels).18 However, the damage done to Chechnya, both in terms of the 
practical loss of infrastructure and economic opportunities, and the emotional damage 
wrought by murdering much of the population and displacing and impoverishing the 
remainder, has left behind a legacy that continues to fuel insurgent and terrorist activities, 
long after operations were officially concluded in the Caucasus. Indeed, the extremist 
Islamic insurgency that took root in the devastation of the Chechen wars is still thriving 
under the guise of the Caucasus Emirate, and not only has it continued to conduct 
operations within Chechnya and across the wider Russian Federation, but it has also 
produced a substantial number of the most feared foreign fighters in the Islamic State. 19 
																																																									
17 Valentinas Mite. “Russia: Chechen Refugees Face Ejection from Camps in Ingushetia." 
RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty. 14 January 2004. 
 
18 Lamb, Zachary. "Instability in Russia's North Caucasus Region." Council on Foreign 
Relations. February 6, 2014 	
19 Lamb (2014, 4). 
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Nearly 2,000 of the Islamic State's foreign fighters originated in the Caucasus, making 
Russia the fourth-largest contributor of such forces.20 
 Clearly, the combination of direct, on-the-ground violence during security 
sweeps, randomized shelling of Chechen cities and villages, and the utter destruction left 
behind meant that there was an extremely high willingness to flee. There was no real cost 
to abandoning a home that had already been razed to the ground and that lacked any 
electricity or clean water already, particularly when any means of securing a livelihood 
was likely long gone at that point in any case. Russian forces all effectively wiped out 
medical care, food, clean water, and shelter. Criminal gangs abducted Chechen civilians 
to secure ransoms, while Russian forces abducted males over the age of eleven into 
"filtration camps," where they were tortured, executed, or occasionally ransomed back to 
their families (Nichols 2000, 246). It is difficult to conceive of how much more could be 
done to push civilians out, short of actually using nuclear weapons. 
The Pull to Flee from Chechnya 
 
 However, the opportunity to flee was severely limited. Flight abroad was almost 
entirely inaccessible; Russia began the conflict by blockading Chechnya and Ingushetia's 
borders, so while a few thousand were able to make it across the border early in the 
conflict, the rest were only able to move within Russia, and then only to Ingushetia 
(Nichols 2000, 246). Russia stopped permitting Chechens to apply for international 
passports, and Chechens were generally not permitted to move elsewhere within the 
Russian Federation; a system of checkpoints, both at the borders of the republic and 																																																									
20 McCarthy, Niall. Oct 8 2015. “Where Syria & Iraq's Foreign Fighters Come From 
(Infographic)." Forbes.	
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within Chechnya itself, meant that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for 
Chechen civilians to evade these restrictions: 
The border blockade means that buses and cars must pass through a checkpoint 
with strict passport control, and in general people can pass these checkpoints only 
if they have a residence permit for their intended destination. There are similar 
internal checkpoints along highways and major roads in Chechnya (12 of them, 
for instance, along the 25-mile stretch of highway from Gudermes to the border 
checkpoint at Ingushetia). Each of these too involves possible harassment, 
solicitation for bribes, and/or detention (Nichols 2000, 247). 
 
Later in the conflict (primarily from 2003 onwards), the plight of the internally 
displaced worsened dramatically and return to Chechnya remained unsafe, so thousands 
of Chechens managed to make their way to Europe through Belarus or Ukraine. Though 
some Western European states - notably Austria - did grant asylum and assistance to 
Chechen refugees, those more proximate to Russia, including Poland, Slovakia, and 
Ukraine, routinely refused asylum and deported asylum-seekers back to Russia (Gilligan 
2010, 119). Thus, while some Chechens did eventually find their way out of the country, 
refuge abroad was largely inaccessible and highly uncertain, even after the worst of the 
conflict had passed. 
Attempting to flee elsewhere within the Russian Federation was also problematic 
beyond official restrictions on leaving Chechnya itself; the racism against Chechens, 
which had always been present throughout the state, became pronouncedly worse when 
the conflict began. 
Although Chechens have long encountered racial discrimination and harassment 
in Russia, since the resumption of armed conflict in 1999, racial discrimination 
has evolved into a state-sponsored, large-scale coordinated campaign. During 
2000, federal and local law enforcement agencies, by their actions, demonstrated 
their intention to make living conditions for Chechens in the Russian Federation 
outside Chechnya unbearable. This discrimination has taken several forms: 
forcible evictions from residences; arbitrary identity checks, forcible entrance into 
premises, searches, detention and beatings; fabrication of criminal accusations; 
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refusal to grant the status of 'forced migrant'; denial of the right to employment, 
health care and education; and refused to grant sojourn or residence registration in 
many Russian regions. Government actions betray a strategy to keep Chechens in 
Chechnya’ (Holland 2004, 337). 
 
This made exit elsewhere within Russia an extremely low-quality option, and in any case, 
a generally unavailable path.  
This leaves flight to Ingushetia as the only available option, and indeed, it was 
one that many Chechen civilians chose to pursue. However, not everyone could access it. 
Generally, while some pull factors are determined by nature, such as terrain, distance, 
and a lack of contiguous borders, or by behavior, such as the decision to close borders, 
other pull factors are structural. Structural issues, such as poverty, age, and illness, might 
make flight impossible on the individual level even if nature and behavior leave paths to 
exit otherwise open on the aggregate level. Distance, expenses, dangerous travel, and the 
occasional closing of the border checkpoint all curtailed access to Ingushetia, leaving 
many civilians with no path from the conflict. The geographic location of civilians, 
coupled with the locations of active fighting, determined the availability of flight in some 
cases: 
Not all who wish to flee are able to do so. The refugee entry point to Ingushetia is 
in the western Chechen lowlands, while the cities of Grozny and Gudermes are in 
the east, and the highlands that have seen most of the recent fighting are in the 
southeast. Travel to Ingushetia is difficult and dangerous for people from these 
areas, and the cost of transport by vehicle is prohibitive for many (Nichols 2000, 
247). 
 
Indeed, traveling through Chechnya was itself dangerous, and since civilians 
could only flee to Ingushetia, traveling through Chechnya was the only way to reach it. 
The journey was fraught with peril, so even before considering the expected quality of 
life in the target destination, the path to reach it may have made it too dangerous an 
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option to be worth pursuing. In order to get out, fleeing civilians risked being shot, 
bombed, or having to pay bribes in order to pass through humanitarian corridors set up by 
Russian troops (Nichols 2000, 248). Further, the border crossing to Ingushetia would 
arbitrarily close, sometimes when violence was particularly high; on one particular 
occasion, this left thousands stranded at the border, many of which were wounded and in 
severe need of assistance (247). Additionally, Chechen rebels at times prevented civilians 
from leaving Chechnya, as this worked against their interests (see Holland 2004 ,335): 
"[Chechen forces] laid extensive antipersonnel land mines in apartment buildings and 
around the city, obstructing [civilians'] exit from the capital" (Gilligan 2010, 41). At one 
point, Russian forces dropped leaflets on Grozny warning civilians to leave, and 
promised to stop bombing for five days so that civilians could safely leave; however, 
bombing resumed the next day, leaving many civilians stranded (Gilligan 2010, 38). 
Once the distance, expense, and risk of the journey and border crossing were 
accounted for, that still left much in question at the final destination. The conditions in 
Ingushetia were also dire, although they of course could not compare with the devastation 
inside of Chechnya. Ingushetia was small, crowded, impoverished, and ill-equipped to 
handle the influx of Chechen refugees, which by 2000 already amounted to 250,000 
people, against the 300,000 people that comprised its own population (Nichols 2000, 248; 
Gilligan 2010, 16). While they were generally spared the violence occurring at home, the 
internally displaced in Ingushetia still faced a host of problems: 
“The minimum living conditions [for IDPs in Ingushetia and Chechnya] are 
nonetheless devastating. IDPs in Ingushetia face increased health risks, including higher 
incidences of tuberculosis, measles, infant mortality and HIV. Most of those displaced in 
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Ingushetia have little or no access to employment. Over 99 percent of the population of 
Chechnya and nearly all of the IDPs in Ingushetia and Dagestan lived under the poverty 
line and have difficulty meeting their basic food needs" (Holland 2004, 341). 
In the Chechen case, then, there is an extremely high push, creating an almost 
unparalleled willingness to flee amongst civilians, coupled with a very low, 
intermittently-available, but nonetheless widely-utilized opportunity to flee. The fact that 
anyone, let alone hundreds of thousands of Chechen civilians, chose to flee under these 
conditions speaks directly to the strength of the forces pushing them out; under less dire 
conditions, it is difficult to imagine that so many would choose such a path. Without any 
available exit, it is likely that the insurgency would have gained further strength; as it 
was, the minimal exit opportunity that remained was still an insufficient substitute for 
many who instead were radicalized and joined the insurgents. The long-term economic 
consequences of the destruction of Chechnya have also left many young people without 
alternatives to joining the continuing insurgency, at it is frequently the only means of 
employment available to them.21 
Additional Theoretical Concerns 
Criminality and Predation 
 
The Chechen example leads to an additional concern regarding the feedback cycle 
of violence and poverty that plagues trapped civilians in pressure-cooker conflict states. 
In civil conflict, civilians have varying levels of access to economic activity and 
production. In some cases, if the war is geographically contained in a small area of the 																																																									
21 "US embassy cables: Chechnya, the once and future war." The Guardian. 1 December 
2010. Cables originally from May 2006. 
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state and violence does not spill over beyond that area, most economic activity will 
continue unimpeded. However, in other cases where the conflict impacts wider 
proportions of the state, the negative externalities of conflict will severely decrease 
economic capacity. This is the most common scenario (Murdoch and Sandler 2002, 
Murdoch and Sandler 2004). The violence of civil conflict not only drives the loss of 
physical capacity through the destruction of both public infrastructure and private 
property, but also sends workers and investment capital fleeing for safer climes. Travel 
routes for carrying traded goods through and out of the state are also likely to be blocked 
or otherwise insecure due to potential or actual violence en route, further crippling the 
economy. There is little incentive to invest in education, business growth, or other 
foundational necessities for a strong economy when any of these investments is likely to 
be lost to violence and other destruction (see Murdoch and Sandler 2004, Kathman 2011, 
Costalli and Peschedda 2014). This is true both for the government, which is likely to 
divert funds away from building the economy and towards fighting the rebellion, and for 
private investors (Kosuke and Weinstein 2000). Civil conflict is so crippling to the 
economy that it damages the economies of neighboring states as well (Murdoch and 
Sandler 2004). While typically the macroeconomic consequences of civil war are the 
most visible and receive most scholarly attention, there is also good reason to give 
particular attention to how this impacts civilians directly. 
In the presence of widespread violence and the destruction of infrastructure and 
property, the means of eking out a livelihood for individual civilians should diminish 
substantially. This has obvious consequences related to the general discussion in this 
chapter: where it becomes more difficult to survive in one's current location, the utility of 
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staying put should decrease and flight should become a relatively more attractive option. 
If, however, the exit quality is still too low to make flight feasible, then the civilian in 
question remains trapped inside a conflict state without the means to produce sufficiently 
for the survival of himself or his family. This will should ultimately drive increased 
pressure on civilians, compounding the impact of the pressure-cooker conflict through 
higher levels of criminal activity in the state and increasingly violent tactics to extract 
resources from the remaining civilians. Criminality and predation are one mechanism 
through which the pressure-cooker effect takes place, and in conjunction with the direct 
pressure from one-sided violence, this should push more civilians to feed into the conflict 
processes and to undermine the conditions that would allow for functioning peace. 
 It is easy to draw a direct line to the earlier expectation: if civilians cannot 
produce enough to survive, and lack the ability to flee, they should be more willing to 
cooperate with or fight for any armed group that will provide them with some means of 
survival. Indeed, armed groups often hijack the distribution of humanitarian aid inflows 
in order to bring civilians under their control.22 The loss of work and productive capacity 
can directly drive civilians into cooperation with armed groups in order to secure food 
and shelter; even in the absence of high levels of civilian casualties through 
indiscriminate violence, a trapped population without access to these basic necessities is 
still extremely vulnerable. 
However, over and above the direct insecurities created by infrastructure damage 
and economic loss, there remains yet another impact of the loss of economic self-
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sufficiency in conflict zones: where legitimate means of production vanish, those who are 
trapped within the conflict state are more likely to predate on each other. This is 
especially likely in the presence of indiscriminate shelling in urban areas, or scorched 
earth tactics in rural areas. With no other way to produce, and with law and order in a 
state of flux, trapped civilians are more likely to simply steal whatever they can from 
each other. Aid workers may be particularly lucrative targets, but fellow civilians are 
more plentiful. Of course, the threat of kidnapping and extortion should push out any 
civilians who remain with the means to leave; however, for those individuals who lack 
such means, or those areas where refugee flight is inaccessible across the board, the 
situation becomes all the more dire.  
 This was a prominent issue in the conflict in Chechnya, the classic example of a 
pressure-cooker conflict state. The Russian government shut down all pathways for flight 
out of the region and simultaneously laid waste to its major cities and agricultural areas. 
Grozny, the capital city of Chechnya, was "almost entirely reduced to rubble" in "the 
greatest level of destruction ever visited on any urban area in any non-nuclear war" 
(Nichols 2000, 245). The farmland was "mined or poisoned" (Nichols 2000, 245). With 
nowhere to go and a complete loss of not only local infrastructure and economy capacity, 
but also bureaucratic oversight and security, crime flourished, leaving vulnerable 
civilians to be preyed upon by their neighbors.  
Chechnya sank into lawlessness and economic chaos; some war veterans became 
leaders of paramilitary, radical fundamentalist, or criminal groups and fomented 
civil war, assassinating several high government officials. Kidnapping gangs, 
secure in implicit impunity for crimes against Chechens and crimes committed in 
Chechnya, operated in and near Chechnya, terrorized the local population, and 
drove out nearly all international observers and aid agencies (Nichols 2000, 245).  
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Nichols (2000) estimates that about a thousand hostages were taken during this period in 
the Chechen war.  As she explains, although fellow Chechens were not able to pay 
particularly large sums in ransoms for their kidnapped relatives, kidnapping remained 
lucrative because there was so little overhead due to the lack of legal and security 
oversight.  
 This example shows clearly that the combination of the power vacuum in 
contested conflict zones and the loss of economic capacity can create ideal conditions for 
criminal gangs to flourish; this is particularly true in cases where there are no viable 
substitutes such as flight from the conflict. While the Chechen example is particularly 
illustrative in the context of low exit quality, criminal gangs that kidnap and extort 
civilians are a common feature of civil wars: Syria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and many 
other civil wars share this feature.23 This is all the worse, then, for the civilians that are 
trapped in these areas, and it should be little surprise that any armed group or paramilitary 
organization that offers some measure of protection from criminals, possible protection 
from the violence of the opposing forces, and access to food and shelter, will be met with 
open arms. FARC, Colombia's long-enduring insurgent force, is perhaps the most well-
known for using these tactics, but they have also flourished in other areas, including 
Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, and Haiti.24 The targeting of civilians by criminal groups 
																																																									
23 Glen Johnson, Aljazeera "Syria's rising abductions: A spate of kidnappings over the 
past year adds a new dimension to the devastating civil war" 14 October 2013; BBC 2013 
 
24 David Williams, "Kidnapping is big business in Colombia." CNN.com, May 7 2001. 
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has also plagued the Syrian civil war, where a black market for kidnapping sprung up in 
the midst of the outbreak of violent conflict.25 
Of course, when the economic capacity of the conflict area dips, so too does the 
amount of resources that armed actors can easily extract from the area. The shrinking 
resource base will make the civilians who hold these resources less willing to give any 
part of it up, since they will need more of it, if not all of it, to survive - and it may well 
still prove insufficient. This can lead these armed groups to use more violent and coercive 
tactics in order to continue to fund their enterprise; they thus take up the behavior of 
criminal groups, kidnapping and extorting through violence in order to continue 
squeezing resources out of impoverished civilians.  
Therefore, the conclusion is this: any individual civilian who cannot sufficiently 
produce for him or herself should already be more willing to cooperate with armed 
groups in civil wars for food and shelter. However, on top of this, other civilians in the 
area who face the same challenges - who are attempting to fill the gap left by lost jobs, 
businesses, and farms - may turn to criminal activity out of necessity. These new 
criminals, then, are kidnapping and extorting their neighbors, who are already in dire 
straits themselves. In this insecure environment, this type of criminal activity will provide 
an even stronger impetus for civilians to put their trust in armed groups. Not only might 
armed groups provide food and shelter, but they can also offer some measure of security, 
from not only the violence of war, but also the criminal activity of other civilians. This 
will, of course, impact the poorest individuals the most; these are the very people who are 
least likely to be able to flee in the first place. 																																																									
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Uncertainty 
Obviously, if civilians in conflict zones are facing a rational decision calculus to 
either stay put or to flee, and these civilians have expectations about the quality of life 
and likelihood of survival for each of these choices, they will always face some degree of 
uncertainty. To an extent, this is true for staying put: will the fighting continue, or will 
there be a cease-fire? Will the front lines of violence move closer to or further away from 
their homes? Will their village lose power or be bombed or burned to the ground, will 
there be a massacre like the ones that have taken place in other villages, or will the worst 
of this pass them by? However, the degree of uncertainty for fleeing will almost always 
be much greater than for staying in place; this is because not only do potential refugees 
face the same uncertainties about the future that plague staying put, but they also face a 
significant amount of uncertainty about the realities of the present situation. This is not 
just a problem of the unknowable circumstances of the future in a war zone, but is 
actually a problem of bad and incomplete information about the current state of affairs on 
the ground in potential host countries. The lack of certainty about the reality on the 
ground is thus what differentiates fleeing and staying put in this regard, and is therefore 
the focus of this section. 
Realistically, when civilians make the choice to flee, they are unlikely to have 
perfect information about their likelihood of being permitted to enter another state, or the 
availability of asylum/refugee status, or even the probability that they will survive the 
journey. War zones are notorious for bad information; official channels of 
communication are often disrupted, unavailable, or distrusted, leaving word-of-mouth 
through networks of friends and family as the main method of communication. Of course, 
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this high-stakes game of whisper-down-the-lane is unlikely to communicate such vital 
information with a high level of accuracy.  
Indeed, there is a small but fairly consistent body of literature addressing how 
well refugees understand the conditions for asylum-seekers and refugees in their host 
countries before leaving. Most of this literature suggests that they either have very little 
understanding of these conditions, or, even knowing that they were in for a long and 
difficult journey that might end with indefinite detention or refoulement, felt it was 
worthwhile anyway (Crawley 2010, Gilbert and Koser 2006, Spinks 2013, Richardson 
2010). This literature argues that it is thus unrealistic to expect changes in policy or 
practice towards refugees and asylum seekers to change their decision calculus prior to 
fleeing from conflict zones. 
 However, there are reasons to doubt these findings. Most of this work is based on 
surveys of refugees who were already in the destination country; knowing that this group 
of people chose to flee despite having bad information does nothing to tell us about the 
people who chose to stay. This is a serious selection bias. Further, just because some 
individuals felt it was worthwhile to flee even though they expected low-quality 
conditions in their host countries does not automatically mean that efforts to deter 
asylum-seeker inflows through tougher policies were ineffective. Rather, this just means 
that for those people, the situation on the ground in their home state was bad enough that 
even a low-quality exit was a better choice than staying put. For others, though, whose 
situation was perhaps poor but not quite as desperate, decreasing the quality of the 
conditions for asylum-seekers may have prevented them from attempting to flee; 
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restricting studies to those have already made the journey removes this equally if not 
more informative portion of the population from consideration altogether. 
Additionally, this body of work is almost exclusively focused on OECD states 
(e.g. Australia and Western Europe). It is perhaps unsurprising that a civilian facing 
indiscriminate shelling in Syria might not have a good idea of the asylum policies in 
Denmark or New Zealand; these are distant states that the average Syrian would have 
little exposure to in the course of their typical daily life. Any other Syrians who had fled 
there would have a difficult time communicating the conditions back to those still at 
home. However, most refugees simply flee across a contiguous border to a neighboring 
country; the Syrian in question would instead be considering the expected conditions in 
Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, or the neighboring Gulf States, for example. It is far more 
reasonable to expect that the average Syrian facing the violence and destruction of the 
conflict would have a somewhat accurate idea of what they would face in these states, 
and be able to use that information to make a reasonably informed decision to flee or to 
stay. 
However, even Syrian civilians fleeing the war know that, for example, Europe 
has better protection of refugees than the neighboring Gulf States. A news article from 
late 2015 belabors this point: 
Why [do] refugees want to go the Europe? The answer is simple: Europe has the 
best laws for them. None of the six Gulf Cooperation Council states has signed 
the UN convention on refugees, which has governed international law on asylum 
since World War Two. The convention defines the status of refugees and the 
duties and rights of governments. In practice it means that there are no 
standardized procedures to deal with large numbers of people arriving from 
abroad seeking help. 
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Critics say that many of the Syrians cited as having taken refuge in the Gulf states 
are in fact affluent citizens looking to sit out the war in comfort, rather than 
fleeing families forced out of their homes. 
 
Receiving refugee status in European states gives migrants the right to stay in the 
country indefinitely, guarantees access to social support, accommodation, 
schooling for children, language courses, and help with training for the job 
market. 
 
Crossing into [Gulf state] countries neighboring Syria, which do not have a 
recognized refugee status, may be possible but often means staying in refugee 
camps with no jobs, meagre living conditions and no prospects.26 
 
The almost uniform unwillingness of Syrian civilians to attempt flight into the 
Gulf States - coupled with the strong border control exercised by Gulf State governments 
- results in rather good information about the barriers to flight across these borders, and 
the low quality of exit expected in these states. 
There are some facets of exit quality that are easier to predict than others; 
geographical barriers and climate, for example, are fixed and known quantities. 
Mountains, oceans, deserts, and distance are all consistent and should be known to those 
considering flight. When it comes to policies, some are better established and thus easier 
to predict; if states have gained a reputation for mistreating or refusing entry to asylum-
seekers, they may be known for this and thus be better understood by civilians 
contemplating flight. It is also reasonable to expect that, as in the example of the Syrian 
above, potential refugees will have better information about more proximate states, not 
only because they will have a better understanding of how these states have treated 
fleeing populations historically, but also because it will be much simpler for refugees and 
asylum-seekers on the ground to communicate this information back to those still in the 																																																									26	"Why aren't rich Gulf states welcoming Syrian refugees‚ or are they?" Euronews, 
September 30 2015.	
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conflict zone.27 For this same reason, over the course of a conflict, civilians on the ground 
should have better information about what they would face if they flee, simply because 
the first waves of refugees will have already tested those waters. This will also extend 
broadly to cases in which ethnic kin communities are larger in the target destination, 
because they will be more likely to convey information about conditions back to those 
still within the conflict state. 
There is certainly anecdotal evidence to suggest that potential refugees internalize 
their expectations about conditions in destination countries, and that at times they will not 
attempt to flee in the first place because of these expectations. One civilian in Yemen 
facing the violence of Saudi-led airstrikes stated that "fleeing the country is not a viable 
option for him because he is a Yemeni national with no other citizenships. 'There is no 
other place I can go to even in Yemen itself,' he said.” 28 
Assuming that potential refugees do have a concrete expectation about the 
conditions they will face, though perhaps the expectation is incorrect, then the following 
should hold: In reality, it probably only matters if would-be refugees perceive conditions 
to be worse than they actually are and stay put, never verifying the actual conditions if 
they should flee. In this case, the model has a problem because people that should flee 
will stay, despite the higher level of exit quality. If, on the other hand, refugees perceive 																																																									
27 "Anecdotal evidence from the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, suggests that many of 
those now fleeing Syria are increasingly aware of the situation in Lebanon and Jordan - 
both of which have tightened up entry restrictions - and so are attempting to head to 
Europe instead.", from Sam Jones and Kareem Shaheen. 11 September 2015. "Destitute 
Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon may return to warzone." The Guardian. 
 
28 Morgan Winsor. 27 April 2015. "Yemen Crisis 2015: Trapped Civilians Face Saudi-
Led Airstrikes, Houthi Crossfire, Power Shortages and Hunger." International Business 
Times. 
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conditions to be better than they actually are, they will update their information upon 
actual exposure to these conditions upon attempted or actual flight from the country; if 
they find the border closed, then of course they will observably remain in the country, 
and at that level the implications are the same as if they had known the border would be 
closed in the first place. Even if these civilians are able to flee abroad but find conditions 
to be so low quality that they realize they should have stayed, this need not be a problem 
for the model, because in such circumstances typically these refugees will simply return. 
Though it is not always a simple and straightforward task, it is by and large much easier 
to get back into the conflict state than it is to be admitted to another state as an asylum-
seeker or refugee. 
Indeed, the clearest observable implication of this uncertainty (about both present 
and future conditions in destination countries) is in the return of refugees to their home 
state while conflict conditions remain constant. While the going assumption is that the 
fear of violence, and the possibility of injury or death, will push people out in the same 
manner across all conflicts and over time, the return of refugees from safe, if otherwise 
intolerable exits, shows that even in the face of danger at home, a lack of viable 
alternatives can still make remaining at home - or returning there - preferable. If you have 
no means of income, and no food or shelter in your host country, the risk of death by 
violence may be preferable to the certainty of starvation abroad. The recent swell in 
returnees to Syria (in fall 2015) is a strong example of this. A recent BBC article 
described the situation for Syrian refugees in Jordan, who were beginning to return to 
active conflict zones in droves after the conditions in Jordan became particularly dire: 
Increasingly, Syrian refugees in Jordan are in dire financial straits. The UN says 
86% now lives below the Jordanian poverty line of 68 Jordan dinars ($96) a 
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month. The government does not allow most to work legally and no longer 
provides free medical care. At the beginning of last month, 229,000 living outside 
refugee camps had their aid from the UN's World Food Programme (WFP) totally 
cut due to a lack of international donations. 29 
 
This article describes the situation of one Syrian refugee in Jordan: "Khaled was well-off 
in Syria but now his savings have run out. He shows me a photograph of his large house 
in Deraa. His parents are there and have told him the situation is calm now. 'It's been 
terrible; shelling and barrel bombs almost every day. People dying. For the last 20 days 
there's been talk of a truce‚ I can't deny I'm scared, but you only die when your time is 
up. We don't have a life here." 30 
 A spokesman from the World Food Program in Jordan stated that "the people here 
are telling us that they would go back to Syria - back to an active war zone. That must 
mean that they have really reached rock bottom to make that choice." 31 
Thus, while there is absolutely reason to expect uncertainties, it is still very 
reasonable to expect that potential refugees will have some sense of what they should 
face in host countries, particularly those that neighbor the conflict state, which are of the 
greatest interest for this study. This is where most people flee, and it represents the most 
direct and accessible path away from the dangers of civil conflict. The topic of 
uncertainty and its variation is vast and ripe for in-depth exploration, but it is secondary 
to the main purpose of this project, and because I focus on states that neighbor those in 
																																																									
29 Yolande Knell. 12 October 2015. "Desperate Syrian refugees return to war zone." BBC 
News, northern Jordan. 
 
30 Knell (2015). 	31	Sam Jones and Kareem Shaheen. 11 September 2015. "Destitute Syrian refugees in 
Jordan and Lebanon may return to warzone." The Guardian.	
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active civil wars, the OECD states that claim their asylum seekers are ignorant of policy 
are also generally outside of the scope of the relevant exits for this study as well. At most, 
these regions (e.g. Western Europe) may represent a viable exit option, but the 
distinctions of specific policies within them are both unlikely to be clear to would-be 
refugees, and unlikely to specifically shape patterns of out-migration from a conflict zone 
in different ways. 
The Plan 
 This chapter has introduced the idea that state practices towards refugees and 
asylum-seekers can impact whether civilians choose to flee from violence in civil wars. I 
further have argued that how civilians react to violence – specifically, whether they flee 
or remain within the conflict state – will shape the ongoing dynamics of the conflict. To 
facilitate this understanding, I have introduced the concept of exit quality, for which I will 
develop a measure of the expected utility for flight from a civil conflict; high exit quality 
conflicts are surrounded by states that treat refugees and asylum-seekers well, while low 
exit quality conflicts are typically surrounded by states that close their borders to 
refugees, abuse refugees and asylum-seekers, or routinely jail these populations as illegal 
immigrants or criminals. 
 In civil wars surrounded by neighbors that welcome and protect refugees – 
conflicts with high exit quality - escalating indiscriminate violence should push civilians 
to flee the state. On the other hand, if neighboring states treat refugees poorly – that is, if 
exit quality is low – civilians will be less likely to flee. Instead, they will remain trapped 
within the conflict state, exposed to increasing violence and danger. This leads to a 
pressure-cooker conflict state, in which civilians are unable to escape and thus feed back 
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into the conflict. Civilians are at minimum a resource for armed groups, and may actually 
chose to join the conflict as combatants for protection or to gain access to the resources 
that these groups have – resources which likely become scarce elsewhere due to the 
ongoing conflict. I argue that this will lead to more violent conflicts – not only in terms of 
violence against civilians, but in terms of casualties from battle – and that these conflicts 
will flare and burn out sooner. However, while these conflicts may end sooner, the sheer 
destruction will leave behind a legacy of instability and destruction that is likely to 
contribute to long-term terrorism, insurgency, and general instability. 
To test this requires generating a measure of conflict-level exit quality. To this 
point, however, there has been no comprehensive data available on state practices 
towards refugees and asylum-seekers. As this is obviously a necessity to measure exit 
quality from conflict, in Chapter 2 I introduce a new dataset on state practices towards 
refugees, the Refugee Rights dataset, which covers all states in the international system 
for each year from 1993-2014. The Refugee Rights dataset includes indicators for 
refoulement, government abuse of refugees, cooperation with UNHCR, protection from 
abuse by non-state actors, and the legal system for refugees and asylum-seekers. This 
chapter includes preliminary theoretical expectations on the characteristics of states that 
drive better or worse respect for these rights; empirical tests confirm that wealthier states, 
and states that face high volumes of refugee inflows, are more likely to abuse the rights 
of refugees and asylum-seekers. 
Chapter 3 takes the next step towards generating a measure of conflict-level exit 
quality. Using the Refugee Rights dataset, data on the respect for human rights of native 
citizens, and data on civil conflict intensity, I build measures of the destination quality of 
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individual states. Using factor analysis and item response theory, I confirm that there are 
two distinct dimensions of destination quality: the treatment of refugees, and general 
security. I use item response theory to generate scores for each of these two dimensions. I 
then run face validity models of dyadic refugee flows from civil war states to neighboring 
states. These models confirm that the interaction of destination quality and violence 
against civilians drives refugee flight. 
Chapter 4 tests the interacted effect of violence against civilians and exit quality 
on civil conflict duration and intensity. To create the measures of exit quality, I aggregate 
the individual destination quality scores of states neighboring each civil war. I evaluate 
each measure of destination quality – refugee rights and general security – separately. 
Lower levels of general security in neighboring states drives longer civil wars if violence 
against civilians is high, however, at low levels of violence against civilians, high and 
low general security surrounding a conflict has no impact on its duration. However, 
general security has no impact on conflict intensity (battle deaths). The findings are 
clearly distinct for refugee rights (the second dimension of exit quality). Low levels of 
refugee rights in neighboring states drive more intense conflicts if violence against 
civilians is high, but refugee rights do not impact intensity if violence against civilians is 
low. The results for duration are somewhat mixed; initially, it does seem that low refugee 
rights and high violence will drive shorter conflicts. However, robustness tests show that 
generally, it actually appears that conflicts with low refugee rights and high violence will 
end sooner than those with high refugee rights and high violence. It seems that the 
pressure cooker conflict state is ultimately an accurate analogy: trapping civilians in a 
violent conflict creates a more violent conflict that ultimately burns out sooner. General 
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security, on the other hand, creates a more stable region that can prevent outside 
resources from flowing into the conflict and sustaining it. 
Finally, I conclude in Chapter 5 by reviewing the findings and suggesting 
directions for future work in this area. Ultimately, this project shows that there are 
consequences when neighboring states fail to protect refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing 
civil wars, and these consequences extend beyond the humanitarian costs. When civilians 
are trapped in violent and dangerous civil wars, they can easily be pulled into the conflict 
and feed its progression. This effect is distinct from the effect of a generally “good 
neighborhood”, in which there is no other civil conflict or repression. Stable neighbors 
help to dampen the continuation of conflict, but neighbors that welcome refugees 
ultimately vent pressure from violent situations and dim the intensity of violent conflicts. 
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Chapter 2: The Refugee Rights Dataset 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I introduce a new dataset on state treatment of refugees and 
asylum seekers. This dataset is meant to measure the pull factors, or the opportunity to 
flee, specific to refugees and asylum-seekers. It is comprised of hand-coded annual scores 
drawn from the State Department Human Rights Reports, covering the post-Cold War 
period, from 1993-2014, for all states in the international system. These data, which 
cover practices including government abuse of refugees and the forced return of refugees 
and asylum-seekers (or refoulement), are a necessary step towards creating accurate 
measures of exit quality. Measures of exit quality that include the treatment of refugees 
specifically, and separately from the treatment of native citizens, are vital to test the 
theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state. I expect that civilians respond differently to 
violence based on how they expect to be treated if they flee, but to predict how this will 
impact civilian behavior and in turn the progression of civil conflicts, I first need to 
measure how refugees expect to be treated. This dataset allows me to measure this 
expectation of exit quality, and in turn to test whether civil wars with high levels of 
violence against civilians will progress differently based on how neighboring states treat 
refugees fleeing the conflict.  
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However, the data are also a valuable contribution in their own right. I argue that 
greater attention to varying respect for refugees’ rights is necessary for three reasons 
beyond generating a measure of exit quality: first, because the rights of refugees may be 
in contention with the rights of native citizens; second, because studies predicting the 
direction of refugee flows should consider not only the treatment of citizens in host states 
but the actual treatment of refugees and asylum seekers; and third, because varying 
respect for the rights of refugees may increase or decrease the negative externalities 
commonly associated with refugee populations such as conflict over resources, terrorism, 
and civil war.  In the following sections, I introduce and explore the data, and advance 
and test some preliminary theoretical expectations on what drives variation in state 
treatment of refugees. This is valuable because it allows for a better understanding of 
what makes some states attract refugees, while others repel them. In more specific 
terminology, this develops expectations about the correlates – and perhaps the causes – of 
the factors that pull refugees, or more succinctly, of exit quality.  
Literature Review 
The extant literature on government respect for human rights focuses on either 
general respect for human rights, or on rights specifically for citizens (e.g. Poe and Tate 
1994, Poe et al. 1999, Cingranelli and Richards 2010). There is a particular interest in 
rights that are coded into international law, because there is some consensus, or at the 
very least a focal point, against which to compare both state practices and law. Most of 
the scholarly focus is on physical security rights, as these are the most basic rights upon 
which most people can agree (Cingranelli and Richards 2010, Wood and Gibney 2010). 
Specifically, in one of the most prominent measures of physical security rights, these 
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rights include freedom from political imprisonment, torture, extrajudicial killing, and 
disappearance (Cingranelli et al. 2014). These rights are also the primary focus of most of 
the policy community’s attention to human rights. Other work on the state’s respect for 
human rights includes women’s rights, workers’ rights, and civil liberties, all of which 
have garnered some attention and all of which have some degree of presence in the 
quantitative empirical literature (e.g. Mosley and Uno 2007). 32 However, these are all 
built on the understanding of the government’s responsibility to - and reliance upon - its 
own citizens. The forces that shape respect for the human rights of citizens may well 
differ from the forces that shape respect for the rights of non-citizens. In particular, the 
treatment of refugees is of interest, because while they are non-citizens, they also benefit 
from rights coded into international law (UN 1951, 1967). 
With a couple of notable exceptions, the quantitative political science literature 
has done little to measure or directly theorize on the drivers of state practices towards 
refugees and asylum seekers (Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004).33  The actual treatment of 
refugees by governments deserves attention for several reasons.  
																																																									
32 The CI-RIGHTS database, for example, has coded measures of all these rights (see 
Cingranelli and Filippov 2018). 
 
33 The World Refugee Survey (WRS) has produced annual refugee grades on several 
dimensions, though there has been little analysis of these grades. However, there are a 
few issues with the WRS coding procedure. First, the limited coverage of states is likely 
biased by the fact that these are the states that receive the most refugees: thus, the states 
that are best able to deter refugees from entering in the first place may never even make it 
into the sample. Second, in some cases it aggregates fundamentally different concepts. 
This is a particular concern with regard to the refoulement/physical protection score; this 
score aggregates the functionality and “fairness” of the asylum system, incidents of 
refoulement, and physical violence against refugees or asylum seekers by the 
government. These are concepts that are best examined individually to accurately 
determine how willingness and capacity affect each. Third and finally, the U.S. 
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The first and most important reason for giving attention to state practices towards 
refugees is to measure the exit quality, or pull, of states that neighbor civil conflict. Exit 
quality, in conjunction with violence against civilians, will shape the pull, or opportunity 
to flee, and the push, or willingness to flee, respectively. Measuring how states treat 
refugees should allow for better prediction of both refugee migration patterns from civil 
wars and civil conflict development generally. In conflicts with high levels of violence 
against civilians, specifically, refugee rights in neighboring states should condition 
whether civilians respond by fleeing (if refugees are treated well), or by staying in the 
conflict state and feeding back into the conflict processes (if refugees are treated poorly). 
Thus, for understanding how civilians impact civil conflict development, measuring exit 
quality is absolutely vital. 
The second reason for devoting attention to how refugees are treated is for 
broader studies on the migration of refugees and asylum-seekers. These studies are 
suffering from serious omitted variable bias by excluding how states deal with refugees. 
In studying the push-pull forces that impel, deter, or generally direct migration, we 
should be considering not only how refugees expect to be treated in a potential host-state, 
but also whether that state will let them in the first place (Davenport et al. 2003, Moore 
and Shellman 2006, Schmeidl 1997, Steele 2009). After all, just because a potential 
destination may “pull” migration with a high standard of living, economic opportunity, 
and civil and political rights, does not mean that said state simply permits would-be 
asylum seekers to enter. Most refugee movements are between states with low levels of 
																																																																																																																																																																						
Committee for Refugee and Immigrants ceased producing the WRS reports and the 
associated scores after 2009. 
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human rights practices; this is in part because these states tend to cluster together in 
space, but it is also because the most desirable target states are often incredibly difficult 
to get into.  
Of course, we should also consider how asylum seekers expect to be treated in 
host states: if they are likely to be put into detention camps upon arrival or suffer abuse at 
the hands of the state, they should weigh these risks carefully when choosing a 
destination. From the point of view of potential refugees, there is an overarching risk that 
even if they are able to enter an asylum state, they will not be able to access the human 
rights, civil rights, wealth, and other opportunities and protections that native citizens 
enjoy. Generally, if we as scholars only consider how the state treats its citizens when 
predicting migration flows, we are seriously neglecting the very real fact that the 
migrants in question will not have access to those same rights in many (if not most) 
cases. The reality is that refugee policies and rights should shape if, how, and to where 
refugees flee. Individuals seeking to flee their countries should have some awareness of 
how refugees specifically are treated in other states. Rationally, they should incorporate 
their expectations for the treatment of refugees into their decisions of whether and where 
to flee. Nonetheless, abuses of refugees do not automatically deter all future refugee 
inflows; even poor conditions for refugees may be preferable to horrific conditions at 
home. 
Third, from a normative standpoint, considering only how states treat their own 
citizens may paint an overly rosy portrait of their rights practices. The European Union, 
for example, uses harsh and aggressive measures to deter asylum seekers, which clash 
with the EU’s generally high standard of respect for human rights (USCRI 2008). 
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Additionally, given that respecting the rights of citizens requires resources and refugees 
can create a very real drain on state resources, it reasonable to expect that there may be a 
trade-off between the amount of support the state can devote to refugees’ rights while still 
respecting those of its own citizens. 
The fourth and final consideration for direct theorizing and data on state practices 
towards refugees is that the treatment of refugee populations may condition the 
relationship between refugee inflows and the negative externalities they create. These 
include resource shortages, terrorism, and civil conflict onset (Black 1994, Lischer 2005, 
Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, Salehyan 2008, Choi and Salehyan 2013). It is possible 
that greater respect for and attention to the rights of refugees might help to prevent their 
radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups and militias. However, it is also 
possible that restricting refugee access in the first place and keeping the population more 
secure by restricting movement may temper the likelihood that refugee flows present a 
threat to the state. Either way, given the recent surge of attention to the problems that 
refugee populations cause, it is only logical to consider how the state’s treatment of 
refugees might shape these outcomes. 
Theorizing on State Practices Towards Refugees 
The definition of refugees and the rights accorded to them by international law 
grew out of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and were specifically 
codified in the UN 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the subsequent 1967 
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Protocol. 34 According to the 1951 Convention, a refugee is defined as “[a person] who is 
unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group, or political opinion” (UN 1951 Convention, 3). The Convention also 
stipulates that refugees and asylum-seekers should not be punished for illegal entry or 
stay (UN 1951 Convention, 3). The most prominent of the rights for refugees in the 
Convention, however, is the right to non-refoulement, which asserts that: “no one shall 
expel or return any refugee against his or her will to a territory where he or she fears 
threats to life or freedom” (UN 1951 Convention, 3). The definition of refoulement, then, 
is the forced return of refugees, asylum-seekers, or individuals who would qualify for this 
status to a geographic territory where they have reason to fear for their lives or freedom. 
Additional rights stipulated for refugees include access to primary education, the right to 
work, and access to courts.35  
At present, 145 states are participants in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. 
Clearly there is a broad consensus that these are the agreed-upon definitions of refugees 
and their rights. However, the degree to which states uphold the rights enumerated in 
these documents varies greatly. The normative push for respecting these rights is often in 
conflict with the difficulties that a large refugee population creates for the government. I 
																																																									
34 The 1967 Protocol effectively removed the geographic and temporal restriction from 
the 1951 Convention, which limited its coverage to events in Europe occurring before 
1951, though states could still restrict their coverage in that manner if they so chose.  
 
35 Exceptions are for individuals who have committed war crimes or crimes against 
humanity, or for Palestinians who are protected under the auspices of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA). 
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argue that states’ respect for the rights of refugees is a function of both willingness and 
capacity (Jacobsen 1996, Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004). That is, there are varying 
factors that may influence a government’s inclination to take on refugees, and a separate 
set of factors that should influence its capacity to do so.  
State Inclination to Respect Refugee Rights 
 The most obvious indicator of a state’s inclination to respect the rights of refugees 
is participation in the international treaties that define and enumerate these rights. I 
expect participants in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol to have better relationships 
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and therefore to be 
more likely to cooperate with it in times of crisis (see Jacobsen 1996). However, while 
membership will likely have a positive correlation with respect for refugees’ rights, it is 
unlikely to be causal; rather, it is more likely that participation in these treaties simply 
reflects a greater likelihood to respect these rights in the first place (Keith 1999).  
Hypothesis 1: States that are participants in the 1951 Convention on the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol will have higher respect for refugees’ rights. 
By the same logic, if respect for the rights of citizens is part of an underlying dimension 
of respect for overall human rights, then states that have better respect for their citizens’ 
basic human rights should be more likely to respect the basic rights of refugees as well. 
If, however, respect for human rights is a simple function of citizens’ domestic demand 
for their own rights and not in any way concerned with the dignity of the person, then 
there should not be a relationship between these two outcomes. Yet, if respect for 
physical integrity rights is non just a function of the desire to respect human rights, but is 
also the result of a well-controlled state security apparatus (see Englehart 2009), then this 
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respect should extend beyond native citizens to asylum-seekers and refugees. It may 
therefore be difficult to entirely separate inclination and capacity in the impact of human 
rights respect of native citizens on the respect for the rights of refugees. 
Hypothesis 2: As the level of government respect for citizens’ human rights increases, 
the level of respect for refugees’ rights will also increase. 
Regime type may also exert a normative influence on the level of respect for the 
rights of refugees and asylum seekers. Democratic states should have inherently greater 
respect for the civil rights of their citizens than autocratic states, and should therefore 
have greater overall respect for human rights (Gibney 2009). By extension, these states 
should show higher levels of respect for the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. 
However, it is less clear whether this is actually a reasonable expectation the effect of 
regime type on refugee practices, since democracies should carry out the will of their 
citizens, and in many cases citizens will resent the burden of a refugee population and the 
problems this causes for resource distribution. 
Hypothesis 3: The level of democracy will impact respect for refugees’ rights.  
 A final consideration on state inclination to host refugee populations is the effect 
of ethnic kin networks. That is, if the potential host state is home to an ethnic group that 
has ties to the refugee population, this should affect the level of protection that the state 
affords the refugees in question. However, again, the direction of this effect is murky and 
should ultimately be conditional on the state’s relationship with the ethnic group; if there 
is no tension between ethnic groups, or the ethnic group is in the majority in the state, 
then the presence of an ethnic kin network should have a positive effect on the level of 
respect for refugees’ rights. In contrast, if there is a fragile balance between ethnic 
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populations that an influx of refugees could upset, or if the ethnic group in question is 
problematic for the host state, this should decrease the level of respect for refugees’ 
rights. The plight of the Kurds in northern Iraq is an excellent example of this dynamic: 
though this group has often had a strong case for asylum  - including Saddam Hussein’s 
genocide in 1988 – Turkey is consistently reluctant to permit more Kurds to enter, due to 
its long and troubled relationship with its own Kurdish population.36 
Capacity 
 The state’s capacity – often defined in terms of wealth, military strength or 
bureaucratic effectiveness – generally speaks to its overall strength and ability to carry 
out the goals that it sets (Braithwaite 2010). The most obvious effect of capacity on rights 
is direct: respecting any human rights requires resources, and weak states lack the 
capacity to effectively enforce respect for human rights (Englehart 2009). If one can 
accept that the respect of physical integrity rights depends on state capacity, it should be a 
much smaller logical leap to accept that respecting the rights of refugees will require 
resources and manpower. After all, refugees often require the support of the host state to 
survive. Therefore, we might expect that higher-capacity states would be more likely to 
be able to respect the rights of refugees. However, this is actually a more complex 
concept than it may seem at first glance: increased capacity can also increase the ability 
of the state to keep refugees out in the first place or actively violate their rights once they 
enter the state (see Jacobsen 1996). This may well tie into Braithwaite’s (2010) finding 
that state capacity conditions the likelihood that civil war spreads spatially: high-capacity 																																																									
36 To effectively evaluate the relationship between ethnic kin networks and state practices 
towards refugees requires dyadic data including the composition of refugee populations, 
so I am not able to test it in this chapter.  
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states are better equipped to stem and secure the inflow of refugees that Salehyan and 
Gleditsch (2006) find spreads conflict. 
These high-capacity, resource-abundant states should also be more attractive 
targets for would-be refugees, which can decrease state willingness to take on refugees – 
at least compared to the number of refugees that wish to go there in the first place. Since 
demand for entry is so high, these states have incentive to diminish the ability of asylum 
seekers to enter. Thus, these states may have the perverse outcome of both increased 
incentive and increased capacity to keep refugees out and restrict the rights of those who 
do make it into their borders.37 I therefore expect that states with more resources should 
actually be less likely overall to respect refugees’ rights.  
However, there is reason to expect that the effect of state capacity is likely 
conditional on the regime type. Autocratic states, without the constraints of a liberal 
democracy, are most likely to abuse refugee rights if they have the wealth to attract 
refugees and the resources to curtail refugee entrance, movement, and other refugee 
rights. More democratic states, however, should be more constrained in their reaction to 
potential or actual refugee inflows, so the impact of wealth should be smaller or non-
existent at the highest levels of democracy. 
Hypothesis 4: The impact of state capacity (resources) is conditional on the level of 
democracy. At low levels of democracy, as state capacity (resources) increases, the level 
of respect for refugees’ rights will decrease. However, at high levels of democracy, state 
capacity (resources) will not impact respect for refugees’ rights. 																																																									
37 These states should also have greater pull for economic migrants, making it more 
difficult to distinguish between true refugees and economic migrants seeking a way in the 
door. 
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Additional Influences 
There are several other factors that should shape state practices towards refugees. 
First, the size of the state’s native population should shape the level of respect for 
refugees’ rights, simply because states with larger populations will be less affected by 
each additional refugee. Therefore, states with larger populations should be better 
equipped to handle refugee inflows, so the larger a state’s population the greater its 
expected respect for refugees’ rights. 
Actual exposure to refugees should also have a very direct effect: simply put, 
more refugees should increase the likelihood that states have the opportunity to abuse the 
rights of refugees. Many isolated island states have never had asylum requests.38 The size 
of the refugee population should also shift the capacity of the state to respect the rights of 
existing or would-be refugees. Simply put, a larger refugee population should drain the 
resources of the state, decreasing the level of respect that the state shows for refugees. 
Hypothesis 5: States that host larger refugee populations should have lower respect for 
refugees’ rights. 
A neighboring civil war should have a similar effect: the state will be more likely 
to face a problematic refugee population, but it will be an even greater concern because 
this population may harbor rebels and terrorists, presenting a threat to the state (Choi and 
Salehyan 2013). This should lead to decreased respect for the rights of refugees. Carter 
and Poast (2015) find that while refugee inflows do not predict the building of permanent 
structures at borders, the threat of a neighboring civil war will do so. It is likely that states 
																																																									
38 For this very reason, I include robustness checks in the empirical portion that control 
for the number of contiguous land borders. 
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will simply restrict the ability of refugees to enter the state and to move within the state to 
deal with the security problem that refugees present, which may be why Carter and Poast 
do not find evidence for the effect of refugee populations on permanent border structures. 
After all, it is well established that refugee populations from civil war states bring along a 
number of negative externalities in terms of security for their host states (Gleditsch and 
Salehyan 2006, Salehyan 2007, 2008, Choi and Salehyan 2013). However, states should 
be particularly motivated to protect their security in whatever manner they can in the face 
of potential conflict spillover (see Jacobsen 1996), so I expect neighboring conflict to 
drive decreased respect for the rights of refugees. 
In the next section, I outline the methodology I use to test these expectations, 
including the collection of a new annual state-level dataset on respect for the rights of 
refugees. 
Research Design 
Dependent Variables: State Practices towards Refugees 
 To measure state practices towards refugees, I undertook a data collection effort 
to create annual scores on several dimensions based on a reliably produced source 
document. To this end, I used State Department Annual Reports from 1993 through 2014 
to construct the Refugee Rights dataset: a twenty-two year dataset of the practices 
towards refugees of the full sample of states in the international system.  Some had 
insufficient information, but this still generated a sample of 175 states. Unfortunately, in 
these reports the coverage on issues such as freedom of movement for refugees and 
asylum seekers, their right to earn a livelihood, and their access to courts was spotty at 
best. However, there is consistent reporting on the legal state of the asylum system, 
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incidents of refoulement, government violence towards refugees and asylums seekers, 
protection of refugees and asylum seekers from violence by other (non-governmental) 
actors, and cooperation with the UNHCR to provide services and protection to refugees. 
Considering that these should be the most basic concerns of refugees, this is a reasonable 
indication of both the expectations of refugees regarding their welfare, and the general 
practices of states towards asylum-seekers and refugees. The reports do not give detailed 
enough information to create a fine-grained breakdown of the scores in an internally 
consistent manner. Therefore, I instead use a 0 – 1 – 2 scale, in which zero indicates the 
lowest level of protection of these rights and two indicates the highest level of 
protection.39 40 I code five categories on this scale: (1) legal system for asylum and 
protection of refugees; (2) refoulement; (3) governmental violence against 
refugees/asylum-seekers; (4) protection from violence by non-governmental actors and 
(5) cooperation with the UNHCR.41 Across all the scores, higher values indicate a higher 
level of respect for the right in question. 
 
																																																									
39 The distinction between a 1 and a 0 is based on whether the abuse of the right in 
question is isolated or widespread/systematic.  If there are isolated incidents based on 
individual failures – but little reason to expect this is a consistent or systematic problem – 
the score is a 1. If the abuse is widespread or there is evidence of an underlying 
systematic issue creating the abuse, the score is a 0. 
 
40 The use of this 0-1-2 scale is loosely modeled after the CI-RIGHTS/CIRI physical 
integrity rights indicators, which are also built on annual human rights reports. 
 
41 The measure of the legal system is only a measure of the policy, and does not take 
actual practice into account. As stated earlier, refoulement is the forced return of 
refugees, asylum-seekers, or individuals who would qualify for this status to a geographic 
territory where they have reason to fear for their lives or freedom. 
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Table 2: Frequencies of Refugee Rights Scores 
 Refoulement Government 
Violence 
Protection 
from non-
state violence 
Cooperation 
with UNHCR 
Legal System 
0 616 
 
18.1% 652 19.2% 313 9.2% 108 3.2% 994 29.2% 
1 370 
 
10.9% 147 4.3% 60 1.8% 238 7% 550 45.4% 
2 2,414 
 
71% 2,601 76.5% 3,027 89% 3,054 89.8% 1,856 54.6% 
Total 3,400 100% 3,400 100% 3,400 100% 3,400 100% 3,400 100% 
 
Table 2 shows the frequencies of each of the refugee rights scores. Refoulement 
measures whether a state has refused entry to individuals who were seeking asylum or 
who would qualify for asylum; has forcibly expelled any individuals already present in 
the country who did or could qualify for asylum or refugee status; or has undertaken 
general practices that would have this impact (e.g. wholesale closing of borders or 
screening practices that keep the individuals from applying successfully for asylum).42 
Government violence measures the equivalent of physical integrity rights, but specific to 
the refugee and asylum-seeker population. This can also include those who might have 
technically qualified for asylum or refugee status, but who were never given the chance 
because of flawed refoulement practices. For example, if a state beats back asylum-
seekers at borders, both preventing entry and physically abusing them, this would be 
codeable as government abuse. Arbitrary detainment and long-term detainment against 
international refugee law also qualify as government abuse. Extortion and harassment of 
refugees and asylum-seekers by state security forces also qualify. Protection from non-																																																									
42 Determination of whether an individual might qualify for asylum is based on UNHCR 
definitions, not on internal national definitions, which often diverged from international 
norms. 
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state violence measures the exposure of refugees and asylum-seekers to abuse from any 
actor other than the host state’s security forces; this includes societal violence by native 
citizens, violence by rebel forces within the state, and violence by security forces from 
states other than the host state. Cooperation with UNHCR measures the extent to which 
the state cooperates with the UNHCR overall; if the states restricts UNHCR access to 
refugee and asylum-seeker populations, or otherwise curtails the UNHCR’s ability to 
carry out its directives in the state, this qualifies for a lower score on this measure. 
Finally, the legal system measures whether the state has implemented a legal system to 
process and protect refugees in accordance with the international norms laid out in the 
UNHCR 1951 treaty and 1967 protocol.43  
Independent Variables 
 To measure the level of human rights afforded to citizens, I use the Cingranelli-
Richards (CIRI) Physical Integrity Rights score, which ranges from 0-8, where 0 
indicates the lowest level of respect and 8 indicates full respect (Cingranelli et al. 2014).44  
This score encompasses torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and 
disappearance. To measure regime type, I use the Polity IV data, which ranges from -10 
(complete autocracy) to 10 (full democracy) (Marshall et al. 2013). 45 To capture overall 
state capacity – with a focus on access to material resources – I use the size of the 																																																									
43 For a full description of the coding procedure, please see the Appendix of this chapter. 
 
44 In this chapter, I only use the data covered by the original CIRI data (through 2011); in 
subsequent chapters, I add in the data covered in the extended CI-RIGHTS data (in the 
models that run through 2014). 
 
45 I recalculated this by adding ten points so that it ranges from 0 to 20 in my data to 
avoid any issues working with negative numbers. 
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economy, or gross domestic product (GDP) as reported by the World Bank (2012).46 I use 
the UCDP-PRIO definitions of civil war, which includes both internal armed conflicts 
and internationalized external armed conflicts, to control for the effect of internal conflict 
on practices towards refugees (Themnér and Wallensteen 2014). I also use this definition 
to measure for the binary presence of civil conflict in a bordering state. Following 
standard practice in the literature predicting human rights, I control for the total size of 
the population using the Gleditsch (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP Data. The binary 
indicator of participation in the UN Treaties on the rights of refugees (UN 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol) data comes from the World Refugee Surveys (2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). Finally, to control for the size of the refugee population, I use 
data from online statistical database of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees. 47  
Results  
 The refugee rights scores range from zero to two, so I use an ordered logistic 
regression model. The results are in Table 3 and 4; Table 3 uses the basic model for 
predicting individual refugee practice scores, while Table 4 adds an interaction term 
between regime type and wealth to test the conditional impact of wealth based on regime 
																																																									
46 As this measure is skewed, I use the natural log of GDP. I measure this in the previous 
year to avoid problems of reverse causality. 
 
47 Summary statistics for all measures available in Table 2 and in Appendix A in Table 
12. The measure of the refugee population is also used in the natural log form, and lagged 
one year to avoid reverse causality. It only includes refugees from within 950 km to 
conform to practices in the quantitative refugee literature, notably Salehyan and Gleditsch 
(2006). 
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type.48 I predict each outcome (refoulement, government violence, protection from non-
governmental violence, the legal system towards refugees and asylum-seekers, and 
cooperation with UNHCR) separately. 49 
 Human rights towards citizens are significant in predicting government violence 
towards refugees, protection against other violence, and cooperation with UNHCR. It 
seems intuitive that it would impact the level of governmental violence towards refugees 
because the types of abuses coded in the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights score are the 
same as those that would be coded as government violence here; only the population 
being abused (or not) changes. This also does suggest that either the normative notion 
that respect for human rights of citizens extend to refugees and asylum seekers – or that a 
state security apparatus that does not engage in corrupt abuses of citizens will likewise be 
restrained in violating the traditional physical integrity rights of refugees and asylum 
seekers. The fact that physical integrity rights of citizens also predict the level of 
protection from other violence (societal, by rebel forces, or by neighboring state security 
forces) lends some support to the argument for the capacity of the security apparatus 
driving the impact of the CIRI measure, as this would explain the ability to restrain other 
actors from abusing refugees and asylum seekers. However, notably, there is no impact 
on refoulement; therefore it seems that while states that respect the human rights of their 																																																									
48 Table 13 in Appendix A shows the results for the basic ordered logistic model with the 
addition of an indicator of the number of UNHCR refugee-specific agreements that the 
country has signed (of the UNHCR 1951 Treaty and the associated 1967 Protocol). I run 
these separately as the signatory indicator is likely to soak up a great deal of variation 
because it will vary little over time within individual countries. 	
49 I also ran a regression predicting refoulement that includes safe country of 
origin/transit restrictions as a violation of refoulement; the results are essentially 
unchanged.	
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citizens are less likely to physically abuse refugees within their borders, this has no 
impact on the likelihood that they will close borders to asylum-seekers, return these 
populations to countries where they fear for their life and well-being, or otherwise restrict 
entry for would-be refugees and asylum-seekers. 
The results from the interactive model are shown in Figures 1 through 5. Each 
figure plots the out of sample predicted probability of scoring a “2” – the highest score – 
on one of the five measures of refugee rights. These probabilities are plotted for high and 
low GDP states across all levels of regime type (democracy).50 Figure 1 shows the 
probability of a 2 on the refoulement score. Across all levels of democracy, wealthy 
states are more likely to refoule; however, the gap between wealthy and poor states 
shrinks at the highest levels of democracy, suggesting that regime type can constrain the 
refoulement abuses of high capacity states.  This is not the case in the protection of 
refugee populations from non-governmental violence, shown in Figure 2. In protection, 
there is no appreciable difference between high and low capacity states across all levels 
of democracy.  
Wealthier states are more likely to engage in government abuse refugee and 
asylum-seeker populations at any level of democracy, shown in Figure 3.These 
differences actually become more pronounced at higher levels of democracy. Since 
government abuse includes detention, this might also reflect the propensity of high 
capacity, highly democratic states to detain refugees for extended periods of time. This 
pattern is also reflected in the prediction of cooperation with UNHCR, shown in Figure 5: 
there is no difference between high and low capacity states if they are autocratic, but as 																																																									
50 High GDP (ln) is set at 14, while low GDP (ln) is set at 6. 
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states become more democratic, low capacity states are actually more likely to fully 
cooperate with UNHCR. This might be explained in part by the greater need of low-
capacity states for the resources, personnel, and bureaucratic oversight that the UNHCR 
provides. Autocratic states may be more willing to forego UNHCR aid in order to retain 
complete control over the management of refugee populations within their own borders.  
Finally, Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities of a fully implemented legal system 
for refugees and asylum-seekers in accordance with the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol. This is the only plot that exactly matches the expectations from Hypothesis 4; 
with the least democratic governments, high capacity states are less likely to implement a 
full legal system for refugees and asylum-seekers. However, as states become more 
democratic, this difference disappears. At least in terms of the legal system for the 
protection of refugee populations, regime does constrain high-capacity states from 
ignoring the rights of refugees. 
Contiguous civil conflict is one of the most robust predictors of abuses of the 
rights of refugees and asylum-seekers; it has a significant and negative effect on every 
outcome with the exception of the legal system. This speaks very strongly to the negative 
reaction of governments to the refugee populations created by neighboring civil wars.  
The possible presence of terrorist, rebel groups, and other dangerous populations amongst 
the refugees might trigger this reaction. Notably, though unsurprisingly, contiguous civil 
conflict also makes it more likely that refugee-type populations will be abused by groups 
other than their host state government – while this may well include native citizens, it 
likely is also shaped by rebel forces and or the security forces of the neighboring conflict 
state.   
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Figure 1: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Refoulement Score=2 
 
Figure 2: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Protection Score = 2 
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Figure 3: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Government Abuse Score = 2 
 
Figure 4: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Legal System Score = 2 
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Figure 5: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Cooperation with UNHCR Score 
= 2 
 
 Larger refuge populations are also frequently significant in predicting practices 
towards refugees; this matches my expectations, and conforms to more general patterns 
of human rights abuses (see Cingranelli and Richards 2010). With more refugees, there 
are more opportunities for abuse; further, with more refugees there is a greater tax on the 
state’s resources. The size of the refugee population is a significant and negative 
predictor of refoulement, government violence, and protection from violence. However, it 
has no impact on cooperation with UNHCR, and has a positive impact on the legal 
system.  The effect on the legal system does wash out with the inclusion of UNHCR 
treaties (see Model 9).  This may speak to the fact that with larger refugee populations, 
states are more likely to undertake the effort of implementing fully functional legal 
systems to handle refugees, rather than dealing with them in an ad-hoc manner. 
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 The actual (non-refugee) population of the state has very little impact on practices 
overall; however, larger states are significantly better in avoiding governmental violence 
against refugees and asylum-seekers. This does conform to my initial expectations, 
suggesting that larger states are better prepared to handle refugee inflows and less likely 
to abuse these groups.51 
Discussion 
 The results from the empirical tests show clearly that different types of rights and 
protection for refugees – each representing a different element of the pull factors in 
neighboring states - do have distinct drivers. The finding that human rights practices for 
citizens do typically translate into better respect for the rights of refugees that are already 
within the country suggests some level of support for the notion that normative rights 
matter. This suggests that states that respect human rights generally will exert a stronger 
pull on potential refugees, not only because of the general lack of repression, but also 
because these states are more likely to respect refugee rights. 
																																																									
51 In the set of models in Appendix A (Models 11-15 in Table 13) that include the sum of 
UN refugee treaties signed (of the UNHCR 1951 Treaty and 1967 Protocol), UN refugee 
treaty signing is a significant and positive predictor of everything with the exception of 
protection from non-governmental violence. It is not clear that this is necessarily causal, 
but more likely is a proxy for a general predisposition to respect the rights of refugees 
and asylum-seekers. Including this does wash out some of the significance of other 
variables, most notably in the model predicting the legal system (Model 9).  The size of 
the refugee population and the level of democracy both lose significance, leaving the UN 
treaty indicator as the only significant variable in the model. Finally, the implementation 
of a legal system for refugees does predict higher levels of cooperation with UNHCR, 
though this is only significant at the p < 0.10 level with the inclusion of the actual treaty 
signing (separate from implementation). 	
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 However, this is tempered by the finding that wealthier states are more likely to 
both practice refoulement and to violate the physical integrity rights of asylum seekers, in 
terms of both arbitrary detention and violence by government agents. These effects were 
generally not tempered by regime type. This does make sense given the increased 
demand for asylum in richer states, and their greater capacity to keep unwanted asylum 
seekers out or detained if they enter the country illegally. Even if relatively poor states 
would prefer to keep refugees out, a combination of porous borders and limited 
manpower and bureaucratic capacity may make it impossible for these states to 
effectively restrain refugee inflows. Richer states may also be therefore be better 
equipped to refuse help from the UNCHR, making it more likely that they will restrict 
UNHCR access to asylum-seeker and refugee populations. Of course, this effect 
disappears in autocratic states, suggesting that autocracies may be more willing to forego 
UNHCR assistance across the board in order to maintain complete control over refugee 
populations within their borders. Thus, while the wealth of high GDP states may exert an 
independent pull on refugee inflows, their increased likelihood of refoulement and abuse 
may diminish this pull, although in some cases regime type will weaken this impact. 
The consistent finding that contiguous civil conflict increase incidents of 
refoulement supports the arguments that the security threat presented by these refugees 
drives down respect for refugees’ rights in an attempt to protect the state. This might also 
provide another reason that state capacity conditions the deleterious impact of refugee 
flows from neighboring civil wars; higher capacity states are more likely to restrict these 
refugee flows and to systematically detain them within the country. This will once again 
translate into a decreased level of pull for refugee inflows; however, this may not be 
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enough to outweigh the risks and immediate dangers of remaining within the conflict 
state. 
Conclusion 
 With the new dataset on state practices towards refugees, I am able to evaluate the 
drivers of refugee rights systematically through regression analysis. This allows for a 
better understanding of what types of states are most likely to be good destinations for 
refugees, or to exert the strongest pull. Up to this point, this type of modeling has only 
been used on respect for the rights of citizens, or at best across the population of the 
country as a whole. I find that capacity, regime, norms, and security concerns all have 
influences on the level of respect for the rights of refugees. In turn, these factors all 
influence the expected quality of life of states that neighbor civil wars, and therefore 
shape both the pull from civil wars and consequently the development of these conflicts. 
In the next chapters, I will use this dataset to construct a measure of the  
destination quality of each state for would-be refugees and asylum seekers. Using 
measures of the individual destination quality of states neighboring civil conflicts will 
allow me to then generate an aggregate measure of the total exit quality from each 
conflict. Using the information on refugee rights in states around civil wars therefore 
allows me to test how the combination of exit quality, or pull from surrounding states, 
and violence against civilians shapes refugee outflows and civil conflict dynamics. I can 
thus determine whether states with high levels of violence against civilians and low exit 
quality are indeed longer, bloodier conflicts; that is, I can test whether the pressure-
cooker conflict theory holds. 
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Chapter 3: Fight or Flight? Measuring Exit Quality 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have argued that civil wars can become longer, 
bloodier conflicts if civilians attempting to flee violence are unable to leave the conflict 
state. This the pressure cooker at work; widespread violence and human desperation 
combine to create mounting pressure, which will continually build on itself if civilians 
lack reasonably safe places to which they can flee. It is the availability of refuge that 
determines whether this dynamic comes into play. When civilians have nowhere to seek 
sanctuary, violent civil wars can become more brutal, racking up increasing casualties not 
only amongst civilians, but also on the battlefield. Trapped civilians cannot escape the 
violence, so they cannot avoid being victims of it; in turn, civilians are more likely to 
feed into the conflict by supporting armed actors for protection and resources, or even by 
becoming combatants themselves. The availability of refuge is what determines whether 
violence against civilians creates a pool of resources to feed conflict, or drains resources 
to starve it.  
Chapter 2 introduced a new dataset on state practices towards refugees and 
evaluated the characteristics that drive states to be better or worse hosts of refugees and 
asylum-seekers. The Refugee Rights data are important because they present original 
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indicators of the opportunities civilians have to flee civil war. Going forward, the key 
question will be whether states’ treatment of refugees actually does shape civilian flight 
and broader civil war dynamics as the pressure cooker theory suggests. Toward that end, 
this chapter sets out to develop a single measure of exit quality rooted in the new data 
described in Chapter 2. 
Exit quality should include both the quality of the treatment of refugees and the 
level of general physical security in the states that neighbor civil conflicts. In this chapter, 
therefore, I use established statistical methods including factor analysis (FA) and item 
response theory (IRT) to create a set of unidimensional measures of the latent destination 
quality of each individual state-year in the international system covering the years 1993-
2014. Destination quality measures expected quality of life for refugees in a single 
potential destination. For example, in the Syrian Civil War, a civilian contemplating 
flight might consider the destination quality of Jordan specifically, or might weigh this 
against the destination quality of Lebanon or Turkey. Exit quality, then, is simply the 
aggregation of destination quality for all states neighboring a civil war state, and 
measures how safe a potential asylum-seeker can expect to be overall if they attempt to 
flee. In the Syrian case, this would comprise the full set of potential destinations 
surrounding the conflict. These concepts are discussed in greater detail in the beginning 
of this chapter. 
As stated above, a key question is whether exit quality shapes refugee flight as the 
pressure cooker theory suggests. Testing this is central to this chapter, and should reflect 
on the validity of the constructed measure of exit quality. I therefore use a model of 
dyadic refugee flows from civil conflict states to neighboring states to evaluate the face 
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validity of the individual measures of destination quality. The next chapter examines how 
exit quality influences the dynamics of civil wars, and will use aggregated measures of 
overall exit quality to test this. In both this chapter and the next, the importance of human 
movements and human suffering are key to whether civil wars become pressure cookers 
of elevated violence, deprivation, and suffering. 
The Need for Unidimensional Measures 
The theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state is built on the impact of variations 
in exit quality in conflict zones. Specifically, it is built on the interaction of exit quality 
and the level of violence directed against civilians. In civil conflicts where there is little 
to no violence against civilians, civilians should have limited cause to fear for their 
physical security and should thus be relatively less impacted by the conflict in general. 
They will be unlikely to attempt to flee, and less likely to impact the conflict if they 
cannot flee. However, in civil conflicts where there are high levels of violence against 
civilians, specifically one-sided violence that civilians cannot avoid, these civilians will 
be pushed to respond. If there are good options for flight – or high-quality destinations 
that treat refugees well and are generally considered safe - neighboring the conflict state, 
they will be more likely to flee to those neighboring states. However, where the 
neighbors surrounding the conflict state are low-quality destinations – or treat refugees 
poorly, and are generally considered to be unsafe - civilians are more likely to remain 
within the conflict state, and to feed into the conflict itself, driving longer, bloodier civil 
wars. 
To test the impact of exit quality of the civil conflict requires first generating a 
single, unidimensional measure of exit quality for each civil conflict that I can model 
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directly. However, to get to the exit quality, I first need to general unidimensional 
measures of the latent destination quality of all states that neighbor civil wars. In this 
chapter, I use both existing data on general physical security protection within individual 
states, and my new dataset of states’ practices towards refugees, to create unidimensional 
measures of the latent continuous dimension of destination quality. This follows the 
example of Treier and Jackman (2006), who use the various Polity IV indicators to 
generate a measure of the latent level of democracy. Specifically, each individual 
indicator is considered an observable indicator of the otherwise unobservable level of 
democracy; in the same manner, I use the individual indicators from the data introduced 
in Chapter 2 on Refugee Rights and the indicators from CIRI/CI-RIGHTS and the 
UCDP/PRIO level of civil war to measure the underlying dimension of destination 
quality. 
To better conceptualize the difference between destination quality and exit 
quality, consider the two hypothetical conflict states illustrated in Figure 6. On the left 
panel, the landlocked conflict state A is surrounded by neighboring states B-G. On the 
right panel, conflict state H has one neighbor (state I), but otherwise is surrounded by 
water. Referring back to the left panel, each individual state (state B, state C, state D, 
state E, state F, and state G) has its own individual destination quality. For example, state 
G may welcome refugees, have generally high levels of human rights practices, and be 
free from any of its own internal conflict. State G would then have very high destination 
quality. State E, on the other hand, might refoule and arbitrarily detain refugees, abuse its 
own citizens, and be fighting off an internal armed conflict. State E would have low 
destination quality. Each of the other individual states will have their own distinct 
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destination quality based on these considerations.  However, to truly consider the full exit 
quality of the civil conflict in State A, all of these individual destination qualities must be 
aggregated. Yet, if we consider the conflict state H in the right panel, the destination 
quality of its only neighbor, state I, would be equivalent to the entire exit quality for state 
H, as there is nowhere else to go. 
Figure 6: Hypothetical Exit Quality v. Destination Quality Scenarios 
 
 
Figure 6 shows two hypothetical civil conflict states A and H (in gray). A is a landlocked 
country surrounded by six neighboring states B-G, while H is a coastal country with a 
single neighbor (I). The exit quality for state A is an aggregation of the destination 
qualities of states B-G, while the exit quality for state H is equivalent to the destination 
quality of state I. 
 
In order to create an actual measure of destination quality that I can use for 
modeling and testing, I need as condensed a measure as possible. While it would be ideal 
in some ways to have just one single measure and unilaterally consider that to be the sole 
measure of destination quality, this approach has some weaknesses. Most immediately, 
	 88 
there are simply too many characteristics of potential destination states to meaningfully 
and consistently encompass in a single measure. These might include: the treatment of 
refugees and asylum-seekers, respect for the physical security rights of native citizens, 
respect for civil rights, regime type, involvement in a civil or international war, wealth, 
the presence of ethnic kin networks or diaspora communities, and the level of 
criminal/gang activity. Measuring all of these is beyond the scope of this project, and 
indeed, forcing all of these into a single measure would make the interpretation of that 
measure quite difficult. Therefore, for the purposes of testing my theory, I focus on 
creating measures of destination quality within each potential asylum state encompassing: 
(a) the treatment of refugees/asylum-seekers, and (b) general physical security. Each of 
these is useful in its own right, and modeling these separately allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of the characteristics of neighboring states that can impact refugee 
outflows from civil wars and in turn the development of said wars. 
Methodology 
To create the destination quality measures, I start with two sets of data. The first 
is the data described in Chapter 2 on state practices towards refugees (or, more 
succinctly, “Refugee Rights”). As discussed in the previous chapter at greater length, 
these measures include refoulement, government violence against refugees, the legal 
structure for granting asylum/refugee-status, cooperation with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, and protection of refugees and asylum-seekers from 
violence by non-state actors. All of these are scored as a 0, 1, or 2, depending on the level 
of respect for these practices, in which a score of 0 indicates widespread or systematic 
abuse and a score of 2 indicates no credible reports of abuse.  
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The second group of data that I use to create measures of destination quality uses 
broader information on the level of physical security within a potential destination state. 
This includes general information on the respect for the physical integrity rights of native 
citizens drawn from the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights data up to 2011, and from the 
updated CI-RIGHTS dataset from 2012-2014 (Cingranelli et al 2014, Cingranelli and 
Filippov 2018).  The measures cover extrajudicial killing, torture, political imprisonment, 
and disappearance. These are also scored 0-1-2, in which a 2 represents the highest level 
of respect, and a 0 represents the lowest level of respect. To these I add a measure for the 
presence of a civil conflict within the destination state, sourced from the UCDP-PRIO 
conflict dataset. This is also a simple 0-1-2 measure. However, in this case, this is 
measuring whether there is no conflict (0), a low-scale conflict (1), or a widespread 
conflict (2). I reverse the order of the scores so that higher scores represent a safer 
destination, matching the ordering of the CIRI and Refugee Rights scores. 
This still leaves me with ten data points for each neighboring state in each 
conflict-year, or at best, a set of five data points measuring Refugee Rights and five data 
points measuring general physical security. It would be very difficult to properly evaluate 
the interactive effect of destination quality and civilian-directed violence with so many 
measures of destination quality with which to contend. These are also measures that are 
unsurprisingly correlated, which would distort regression models that included all of 
them.52 Further, considering each of these in isolation would likely obscure the effect of 
																																																									
52 See Table 15 in Appendix B for the full correlation matrix of these variables. 	
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overall treatment of refugees and overall physical security within the state, which is after 
all the actual interest of the project. 
I therefore turn to a set of tools used to reduce a multiple correlated data points 
into single dimensions. The main tools used in the social sciences to accomplish this are 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Factor Analysis (FA), and Item Response Theory 
(IRT). PCA is used to condense data with the understanding that it is creating a 
unidimensional measure out of the data, rather than assuming there is an underlying, 
latent dimension that drives the data and backwards engineering a measure of that 
underlying dimension from the data, which is the purview of the FA and IRT strategies. 
PCA also assumes there is no measurement error in the data, which may be 
problematic.53 As my theory is built on an underlying dimension of exit (destination) 
quality, I focus on FA and IRT, both of which grew out of Classical Test Theory. 54 
Factor Analysis is frequently used to take large sets of survey responses and tease 
out underlying dimensions driving patterns of responses. For example, in surveys of 
student evaluations of teaching administered at the end of a college course, certain 
questions may get at the underlying dimension of how accessible an instructor was, while 
other questions might instead speak to the how well the instructor knew the subject. Each 
of these are important measures of teaching quality, but the underlying dimensions may 
well be distinct, and even run counter to one another in some cases. I use FA to explore 																																																									
53 See Baglin (2014, 2). 
 
54 I did also estimate PCA scores for robustness checks; they performed generally in the 
same manner as the factor analysis and IRT scores. For more information on the PCA 
estimation, see Appendix B. 
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the distinctions between general physical security and the treatment of refugees/asylum-
seekers, and to confirm that these two underlying dimensions, while correlated, are 
indeed distinct. 
Item Response Theory is similar to factor analysis in that it seeks to derive a 
measure of an underlying dimension (or multiple underlying dimensions).55 However, 
IRT generates not only a measure of the underlying dimension(s), but also a measure of 
how effectively each individual test item is at evaluating that underlying trait.56  IRT has 
principally been used to evaluate the effectiveness of tests and their individual questions 
(Rasch 1980, Cai et al. 2016, 298).57 For example, IRT might be used to evaluate the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) to determine how well an individual question could 
distinguish between a high-aptitude and low-aptitude test taker; very easy questions that 
everyone could get right would not be useful in identifying individual aptitude.58 By the 
																																																									
55 The main difference between the IRT and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) models 
are that IRT assumes a non-linear relationship between the underlying trait of interest and 
the individual item responses, while CFA assumes the relationship is linear (Reise et al 
1993, 557). 
 
56 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) can also measure item difficulty and 
discrimination; however, it is a simpler and more direct extension of the IRT models, 
particularly within Stata 14, so I favor IRT for these measurements. 
 
57 Obviously, IRT has grown to have much broader applications than this; for example, 
Laver et al. (2003) use IRT to estimate political party ideological positions, Bonica 
(2013) uses an IRT count model to estimate the ideologies of political candidates and 
PACs, and Reed et al. (2008) use it to estimate state preferences based on United Nations 
voting patterns. As discussed previously, Treier and Jackman (2006) use IRT to estimate 
latent democracy measures. 
 
58 In fact, not only is IRT used to evaluate the SAT, but employees of the Education 
Testing Service (ETS), the company that creates and administers the SAT, have 
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same logic, very difficult questions that nobody could get right would also be poor tools 
for identifying aptitude levels. Aggregating points naively – giving equal weight to each 
question, scoring based on the percentage answered correctly, and ignoring how 
effectively the test as whole parses out the aptitude of the test-taking population – might 
give a very inaccurate score. IRT therefore gives measures not only of the latent trait (e.g. 
aptitude) of individual test-takers, but also gives measures of the difficulty of each 
individual test item and how well it discriminates between test takers. Difficulty, then, 
measures the aptitude level at which a test taker would have a 50/50 shot at getting the 
correct answer to a specific question; in classical test theory, this would equate to the 
proportion of test-takers who answered the question correctly (Reckase 2009, 26). 
Discrimination, on the other hand, measures how well a question distinguishes between 
test-takers with a different level of the latent trait. If there is little difference in the 
probability of a correct answer between high and low aptitude test takers, than that 
question does not discriminate well. 
The ordinal IRT model that I use follows the example of Treier and Jackman 
(2008), who use ordinal measures of democracy from the Polity IV dataset to create a 
measure of the latent level of democracy. In my case, I am using the data points from the 
Refugee Rights dataset and the human rights and general security data to measure latent 
destination quality. In both cases, it is not possible to directly observe the quantity of 
interest (democracy or destination quality), but it is possible to use observable indicators 
																																																																																																																																																																						
contributed greatly to IRT’s development and expansion over time (Carlson and von 
Davier 2013).	
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of that underlying dimension to create Bayesian measures that can be assigned to each 
individual country-year of interest. 
I extend the strengths of these modeling strategies that have been built primarily 
for evaluating surveys and tests – but have found increasingly broader applications within 
political science (see e.g. Laver 2003, Treier and Jackman 2008; Reed et al. 2008; Treier 
and Hillygus 2009; Bonica 2013)  - to evaluate the number of dimensions in my data on 
destination quality, which data points are best measuring the underlying dimension(s) of 
the data, and in turn to generate a scale of the underlying dimension(s) and to score 
individual countries on that scale. 
Preliminary Scores of Destination Quality 
After running the entirety of the data points through factor analysis, it appears that 
there are likely two distinct underlying dimensions driving the data.59 However, there is 
one dimension that overwhelms all of the others. Simplified factor loadings are displayed 
in Table 5 below; for the full factor loadings, please refer to Table 14 in Appendix B. 
The first factor – or underlying dimension – explains most of the variance in the 
full dataset, with an eigenvalue of 4.07. The CIRI/CI-RIGHTS data on the physical 
integrity rights of native citizens – or, more concisely, repression - and the UCDP/PRIO 
measure of civil conflict load very heavily onto this factor. Protection of refugees from 
non-state violence also weakly loads onto this dimension, which does make sense 
because in states where general physical integrity is not well-protected, this will likely 
spillover into the refugee population – particularly where civil conflicts are concerned. 																																																									59	As the data are ordinal, I use polychoric factor analysis. 
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The second factor explains much less of the variance in the overall data with an 
eigenvalue of 1.43, and appears to be measuring refugee rights distinctly, as none of the 
CIRI/CI-RIGHTS or civil war measures have loaded onto this factor over 0.3. The law on 
refugees and asylum-seekers only weakly loads onto this factor, suggesting that legal 
practices are less informative with regards to refugee rights than the other data points. 
Refoulement and cooperation with UNHCR load very heavily, followed by government 
violence and protection from non-state violence.  
Based on these initial findings, it does not seem that there is evidence for 
evaluating exit quality as a unidimensional measure; despite the extremely high 
eigenvalue on the first factor, it is most appropriate to consider it two-dimensional 
because the second eigenvalue is still greater than one and the two factors have distinct 
variables loading onto each one. After running the same data through an IRT model, it is 
clear than compressing all eleven data points into a single score means that the bulk of 
that score is driven by the general physical security data points (CIRI/CI-RIGHTS and 
UCDP/PRIO), the same scores that loaded so heavily onto the first factor.60 
I therefore run a factor analysis model and an IRT model, running each set of data 
(general physical integrity and refugee rights) on its own. I emerge with two sets of 
destination quality scores: general security and refugee rights. Moving forward, I 
evaluate the performance of each of these in turn. As the IRT scores correlate quite 
closely with the factor analysis scores, I primarily use the IRT-generated scores of 
destination quality. 
																																																									60	See Appendix B for a full accounting of the results per test item from the IRT analysis. 
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Table 5: Factor Loadings for Destination Quality Data 
  Factor Loadings  
Item Source 
Factor 1 
(General 
Violence) 
Factor 2 
(Refugee 
Violence) 
 
Law 
 
Refugees - 0.3808 
Refoulement 
 Refugees - 0.7773 
Cooperation with UNHCR Refugees - 0.7353 
 
Government Violence 
 
Refugees - 0.5041 
Protection from non-State Violence Refugees 0.3363 0.5041 
 
Killing 
 
CIRI 0.8603 - 
Disappearance 
 CIRI 0.8164 - 
Torture 
 CIRI 0.7485 - 
Political Prisoners 
 CIRI 0.6772 - 
Civil War 
 
UCDP/PRIO 
 
0.8315 
 
- 
 
 
Eigenvalue 
 
 4.0768 1.4277 
 
* N=3,535 
** Factors loadings under 0.3 are omitted 
 
The destination quality scores are the estimates of the latent destination quality 
traits: refugee rights and general physical security. Summary statistics for the scores are 
shown in Table 6.  The estimated scores are of theta, the latent trait measure within the 
IRT framework. The scale of theta – or the latent traits – ranges from about -2 to .7 (in 
the case of refugee rights alone) or to 1.5 (in the case of general physical security alone). 
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The lowest scores correspond to the worst practices, while the highest scores correspond 
to the best practices. 
Table 6: Summary Statistics for Destination Quality Theta Scores (IRT) 
Destination Quality 
Measures (Theta) 
 
Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
 
Refugee Rights  
 
 
3,851 
 
-0.0018 
 
0.7446 
 
-2.3727 
 
0.6828 
General Physical 
Security  
3,851 5.16e-06 0.8854 -2.2049 1.4679 
 	
Figure 7: Scatterplot of Selected IRT Scores - Refugee Rights v. General Security 
 
 
The scatterplot above shows the country labels for selected country-years’ IRT scores of 
refugee rights and general security, respectively. These are snapshots of a single point in 
time within the sample for each of the countries displayed; some countries will change 
position over time, and many even change quadrants within the timespan covered by the 
sample. 
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Across the continuums of refugee rights scores and general security scores, there 
are states that fall into all combinations of values. Selected countries are labeled in Figure 
7, which is divided into four quadrants splitting high/low refugee rights scores, and 
high/low general security scores.  Uruguay, for example, has very high general security 
and very high refugee rights, and would thus be a uniformly high quality destination for 
any potential refugees or asylum-seekers in the area. By the same token, Sri Lanka is 
very low on both refugee rights and general security, and would thus be a uniformly low-
quality destination should a civil war break out in a neighboring state. However there are 
plenty of countries that do not fit so neatly into a unidimensional approach; for example, 
Nigeria has low general security but reasonably good respect for refugee rights. 
Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates scores well on general security, but has poor 
respect for refugee rights. All quadrants are well populated (see Figure 27 in the 
Appendix for the full scatterplot). It is therefore quite clear that it is worth considering 
these dimensions in isolation, as they are not even visually correlated and do seem to be 
measuring distinct characteristics. Further, the data do contain examples of most 
combinations of these two characteristics. 
For another illustration of the destination quality scores, refer to the maps in 
Figures 8 and 9. These figures are the real-world applications of the hypothetical maps in 
Figure 6. Figure 8 shows the destination quality - specifically, the Refugee Rights score – 
for all the neighboring states within 950 km of landlocked Zambia in 2010. Lower scores 
correspond to worse destination quality; clearly, Kenya is the worst destination in terms 
of how refugees are treated, while Mozambique and Namibia have the highest possible 
score for Refugee Rights. This is analogous to Country A in Figure 6; by the same logic, 
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the exit quality for Zambia will be the aggregation of all of these individual destination 
quality scores.  
Figure 8: Refugee Rights Scores around Zambia (2010) 
 
 
This map is the real-world equivalent of Country A from Figure 6. It shows the level of 
respect for refugee rights for all countries within 950 km of Zambia, a fully landlocked 
country in Africa. Higher scores indicate higher levels of respect; Mozambique and 
Namibia have the highest levels of respect for refugee rights – or destination quality - at 
0.683, while Kenya has the lowest level of respect – or destination quality - at -1.409. The 
exit quality for Zambia is the aggregation of all of these individual scores; for example, if 
I use the mean destination quality of neighbors to measure exit quality, Zambia’s exit 
quality in 2010 would be -0.283. 
 
DRC
Uganda Kenya
Tanzania
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
Malawi
South Africa
Namibia Botswana
0.057
-0.546 -1.409
0.095
-0.560
-1.084
-0.718
0.683
-0.141
-0.025
-0.573
0.683 -0.141
Zambia
(.0945303,.6828349]
(-.1410992,.0945303]
(-.5459036,-.1410992]
(-.7176511,-.5459036]
[-1.408754,-.7176511]
	 99 
Figure 9: Refugee Rights Scores around The Gambia (2010) 
 
 
This map is the real-world equivalent of Country H from Figure 6. It shows the level of 
respect for refugee rights for all countries within 950 km of the Gambia, a coastal 
country with one country that shares its borders in Africa. Higher scores indicate higher 
levels of respect; Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, and Burkina Faso have the 
highest levels of respect for refugee rights – or destination quality - at 0.683, while 
Senegal has the lowest level of respect – or destination quality - at -0.594. The exit 
quality for the Gambia is the aggregation of all of these individual scores. If considering 
only bordering countries, the exit quality of the Gambia would be equal to the destination 
of quality of its own direct neighbor, Senegal. In this case, the exit quality would be 
-0.594. If considering all neighboring states within 950 km, Zambia’s exit quality in 2010 
would be the mean of their individual destination quality scores, equal to 0.381. 
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Figure 9 shows all states within 950 km of the Gambia, a coastal country with 
only one state that shares a contiguous land border (Senegal). This is analogous to 
Country H, on the right panel of Figure 6. If the measure of exit quality was restricted to 
states that directly border the Gambia, its exit quality would be exactly equal to the 
destination quality of its sole neighbor, Senegal. Even though there are numerous states 
within 950 km, unlike in the case of Zambia, the Gambia has only one direct land route 
for flight: into Senegal. To reach any of these other countries and take advantage of their 
higher destination quality, any civilian fleeing the Gambia would have to either go 
through Senegal or attempt to flee by boat. Thus, in some sense, we could consider that 
the Gambia has fewer paths to flight and fewer substitutable options, while Zambia has a 
full eight states sharing a land border. However, if the measure of exit quality does 
include all states within 950 km equally, the Gambia’s exit quality would be the 
aggregation of all of these states’ destination qualities. 
Face Validity Test 
The goal of this chapter is to generate measures of destination quality, which I 
will then aggregate to measure exit quality for each civil war state in the next chapter. 
This will be used for testing whether civil conflict dynamics respond to changes in exit 
quality as the pressure cooker theory suggests. However, this response is built on the idea 
that exit quality should first and foremost influence civilian flight. The pressure cooker 
theory expects that, faced with violence, civilians will flee when exit quality is high but 
will stay put when exit quality is low. In this section, I begin by running models of 
civilian flight to evaluate the face validity of these exit quality measures. Specifically, 
these models test the hypothesis that exit quality is positively related to refugee flows.  
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To undertake the most direct test of the measures I have generated thus far, I use 
individual state measures of destination quality to run a basic model predicting dyadic 
refugee flows from civil conflict states to immediate neighbors.  Based on the arguments 
from the previous chapters, I would expect that generally, higher levels of destination 
quality should drive higher levels of dyadic refugee inflows. Specifically, considering a 
dyad of origin state and destination state, better general security and better refugee 
treatment in the destination state should both increase refugee inflows. I also expect that 
there should be an interactive effect between the level of violence against civilians in the 
origin state and destination quality, much the same as I would expect this interactive 
effect in predicting how civil wars develop. At low levels of violence against civilians, 
high and low quality destinations should see the same volume of refugee inflows, both of 
which should be low because there is little reason to flee. However, at high levels of 
violence against civilians, high-quality destinations should see greater levels of refugee 
inflows than low-quality destinations. 
To test the impact of the scores directly – and to connect this with the general 
theory of pressure-cooker conflict states – I interact one-sided civilian deaths with each 
measure of exit quality. One-sided violence measures violence by armed actors directly 
against civilians; that is, it includes violence such as massacres and summary executions, 
but does not include violence that is the unintentional byproduct of battles or deaths from 
malnutrition or disease resulting from conflict.61 The outcome variable  - refugee flows – 
is generated using UNHCR data on refugee stock and calculating the difference in the 
																																																									
61 The one-sided violence data are from Eck and Hultman (2007). 
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refugee stock from the previous year to the current year. The vast majority of refugee 
flows (68%) are at or below zero; as such, I use both an OLS regression model predicting 
the natural log of refugee flows to correct for skewness and a logit model predicting the 
presence of any positive refugee flows.62 The full sample includes all dyads covering 
1993-2014, but I focus on refugee flows from civil war states to neighbors within 950 
km.  
While I would generally expect higher levels of both refugee rights and general 
security to drive higher levels of refugee inflows, the findings from the previous chapter 
suggest that this may be somewhat more complicated to model. That is, because 
wealthier, higher capacity states – and states that host greater refugee populations – are 
more likely to abuse refugee rights, it is reasonable that the states that are receiving 
higher levels of refugee inflows respond with refugee abuse, resulting in lower scores. 
This would create endogeneity between the outcome variable of refugee flows and the 
independent variable of refugee rights. To deal with this problem,  after running the 
preliminary face validity models, I also run an instrumental variable regression for the 
refugee rights model. 
In all of these models, in accordance with general standards in the literature, I 
control for wealth in both the country of asylum and the country of origin (GDP per 
capita from the World Bank Database). I also control for the general level of physical 
integrity rights in the origin country (CIRI/CI-RIGHTS), the level of the civil war in the 																																																									
62 Refugee flows are calculated by subtracting the current year’s population from the 
previous year’s population. If the current year’s population is smaller than the previous 
year’s, that indicates that refugees have been returning to their home state, resulting in 
negative refugee flows. This is why refugee flows can be below zero. 
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origin state (UCDP/PRIO), the size of the population in the origin state (World Bank 
Database), a binary measure indicating the presence of a contiguous land border, and the 
minimum distance between the origin state and the asylum state (Gleditsch and Ward 
2001). In each model evaluating the interactive impact of a violence against civilians and 
one destination quality IRT score (General Security or Refugee Rights, respectively), I 
control for the other IRT score. 
The results of the logistic regressions using each of the IRT destination quality 
scores are displayed in Table 7. The General Security Score predicts the presence of 
positive refugee flows out of civil war states, while there is no clear effect of the Refugee 
Rights Score on positive refugee flows. The out of sample predicted probabilities in 
Figure 10 confirm that generally, higher levels of general physical security do predict the 
presence of positive refugee flows, although the refugee rights score does not.  
Figure 10: Out of Sample Predictions of Refugee Flows (ln) - General Security Score 
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Table 7: Logistic Regression Predicting Positive Refugee Flows 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Refugee Rights 
Score 
General 
Security Score 
 
   
Full Score (IRT)   
   
General Security (IRT) 0.144*** 0.133*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) 
Refugee Rights (IRT) 0.053 0.052 
 (0.032) (0.032) 
Civilian Deaths -1.57e-07 2.30e-07 
 (3.74e-06) (4.37e-06) 
IRT Score * Civilian Deaths -1.63e-06 7.98e-07 
 (4.96e-06) (4.76e-06) 
Physical Integrity (Origin) -0.161*** -0.161*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Minimum Distance (Dyad) -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Contiguous Border 0.453*** 0.452*** 
 (0.073) (0.073) 
GDP/PC (ln) (Asylum) 0.203*** 0.203*** 
 (0.022)        (0.022) 
GDP/PC (ln) (Origin) -0.184*** -0.184*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Population (ln) (Origin) -0.173*** -0.173*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
Level of Civil War (Origin) 0.280*** 0.280*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) 
Constant 2.109*** 2.109*** 
 (0.390) (0.390) 
   
Observations 7,718 7,718 
Chi2 430.8 430.7 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 	  
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Table 8: OLS Regression Predicting Refugee Flows (ln) 
 (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Refugee Rights 
Score 
General 
Security Score 
 
Full Score (IRT)   
   
General Security (IRT) 0.126*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0372) 
Refugee Rights (IRT) -0.0275 -0.0333 
 (0.0347) (0.0346) 
Civilian Deaths 1.00e-05** 1.65e-05*** 
 (4.32e-06) (5.08e-06) 
IRT Score * Civilian Deaths -1.82e-05*** 1.29e-05** 
 (5.74e-06) (5.49e-06) 
Physical Integrity (Origin) -0.192*** -0.192*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0191) 
Minimum Distance (Dyad) -0.00103*** -0.00103*** 
 (0.000103) (0.000103) 
Contiguous Border 0.888*** 0.887*** 
 (0.0806) (0.0806) 
GDP/PC (ln) (Asylum) 0.185*** 0.186*** 
 (0.0238) (0.0238) 
GDP/PC (ln) (Origin) -0.263*** -0.263*** 
 (0.0250) (0.0250) 
Population (ln) (Origin) -0.219*** -0.219*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0217) 
Level of Civil War (Origin) 0.523*** 0.524*** 
 (0.0646) (0.0646) 
Constant 5.591*** 5.586*** 
 (0.418) (0.418) 
   
Observations 7,718 7,718 
R-squared 0.112 0.111 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results from the OLS regression predicting logged positive refugee flows – 
shown in Table 8 - are generally consistent with the logistic regression. The one major 
difference is that civilian deaths in the origin state are a positive and significant predictor 
of refugee flows in the OLS regression, but is not significant in the logistic regression. 
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This is likely because it is easier to see an impact on the level of refugee flows than on 
the presence, as there is likely not a single threshold at which civilian deaths will impel 
outwards migration. In both sets of models, the control variables perform as expected. 
Better physical integrity in the origin state decreases refugee outflows, while greater 
distance between the origin and asylum state decreases refugee flows. A shared 
(contiguous) border increases refugee flows, unsurprisingly. Greater wealth (GDP per 
capita) in the origin state decreases refugee outflows, while greater wealth in the asylum 
state increases flows. Civil wars with greater levels of battle deaths drive out higher 
numbers of refugees. The one odd result in the control variables is that the total (logged) 
population of the origin state is a negative and significant predictor of refugee flows in 
both sets of models. This might indicate that in larger states, there are more internal 
options for flight, making refugee outflows less likely. 
The performance of the general security score conforms to the standard 
expectations in the refugee literature: states that respect their own citizens’ human rights 
do attract higher levels of refugee inflows. However, across both the OLS and logistic 
regression models, refugee rights remains stubbornly insignificant in predicting refugee 
flows. This is likely due to the endogeneity of the refugee rights score and the measure of 
refugee outflows; indeed, after running an exogeneity test, it is clear that these are indeed 
endogenous.  
Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable Regression 
Specifically, refugee rights and refugee flows are endogenous because not only 
should higher refugee rights pull in larger refugee flows, but increased refugee inflows 
should also push down the level of respect for refugee rights. In short, there is a 
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simultaneity problem. This is not just a theoretical issue, but was actually one of the 
findings in the previous chapter testing the key drivers of changes in the treatment of 
refugees. Larger refugee populations in the previous year robustly predicted more 
refoulement, more government abuse of refugees, and poorer protection from non-
governmental abuse. In a way, this is almost paradoxical; better treatment of refugees 
drives more refugee inflows, which in turn causes worse treatment of refugees. Thus, 
without correcting for the bias introduced by the simultaneity of these variables, it is 
unsurprising that refugee rights does not initially appear to be a significant predictor of 
refugee flows. 
To deal with this endogeneity, I therefore use an instrumental variable approach 
to model this relationship. Using instrumental variable regression allows me to introduce 
additional measures that should be correlated with my x variable – in this case, refugee 
rights – but not with my y variable – refugee flows, except for the impact that it might 
have through refugee rights (see Sovey and Greene 2011). My instrumental variable 
regression includes two exogenous instruments: (1) the level of ethnic fractionalization 
(from Fearon 2003) and (2) the level of women’s empowerment.63 More ethnically 
diverse countries (those that are more fractionalized) should be more willing to respect 
the rights of refugees, because the native population is already diverse and is less likely to 
feel threatened by new refugee inflows. In particular, ethnically homogenous refugee 
inflows are less likely to potentially tip a critical balance of ethnic group power within 
the asylum state, which is one reason that these governments might fear and react 
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negatively to new refugee inflows, up to and including restricting entry of potential 
asylum-seekers and refugees (see Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). My second exogenous 
instrument is the level of women’s empowerment from the Varieties of Democracy 
(2017) dataset. This is an index constructed through Bayesian factor analysis weighting 
that includes women’s civil liberties, women’s civil society participation, and women’s 
political participation (see Sundstrom et al. 2015).64 The reasoning for this instrument is 
that a state that is likely to respect the rights of refugees is likely to also respect the rights 
of other minority groups and groups that are traditionally disadvantaged. Thus, states that 
respect the rights of women are more likely to also respect the rights other disadvantages 
and underrepresented groups – including refugees and asylum-seekers. However, there is 
no direct reason to expect that women’s empowerment in society should drive refugee 
inflows. 	  
																																																									
64 This measure is based on the following information: (1) freedom of domestic 
movement for women; (2) freedom from forced labor for women; (3) property rights for 
women; (4) access to justice for women; (5) freedom of discussion for women; (6) civil 
society organization women’s participation; (7) female journalists; (8) lower chamber 
female legislators; (9) power distributed by gender (see the V-Dem Codebook: Coppedge 
et al. 2017:67-69).  
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Table 9: OLS and IV Regression Predicting Refugee Flows (ln) on Refugee Rights 
 (5) (6a) (6b) 
VARIABLES OLS  
(No Instrument) 
IV  
(First Stage)  
IV  
(Second Stage) 
 
    
Women’s Empowerment  0.375***  
  (0.0523)  
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.136***  
  (0.0410)  
    
    
Refugee Rights (IRT) -0.0355  5.197*** 
 (0.0346)  (0.781) 
General Security (IRT) 0.129*** 0.275*** -1.394*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0130) (0.248) 
Civilian Deaths 1.02e-05** 1.48e-06 -3.05e-06 
 (4.33e-06) (1.48e-06) (9.08e-06) 
Physical Integrity (Origin) 5.197*** 0.0208*** -0.313*** 
 (0.781) (0.00649) (0.0429) 
Minimum Distance (Dyad) -0.00103*** 0.000176*** -0.00201*** 
 (0.000103) (3.50e-05) (0.000259) 
Contiguous Border 0.885*** 0.0511* 0.475*** 
 (0.0806) (0.0272) (0.172) 
GDP/PC (ln) (Asylum) 0.184*** -0.105*** 0.801*** 
 (0.0238) (0.00848) (0.0987) 
GDP/PC (ln) (Origin) -0.263*** 0.0472*** -0.567*** 
 (0.0250) (0.00875) (0.0646) 
Population (ln) (Origin) -0.219*** -0.105*** 0.801*** 
 (0.0217) (0.00848) (0.0987) 
Level of Civil War (Origin) 0.524*** 0.0250 0.365*** 
 (0.0646) (0.0220) (0.135) 
Constant 5.602*** 0.833*** -0.476 
 (0.418) (0.159) (1.258) 
    
Observations 7,718 7,001 7,001 
F test of Excluded Instruments - - 30.62  
(0.000) 
Sargan-Hansen J Statistic  
(χ2 p-value)  
- - 0.093  
(0.760) 
Standard errors in parentheses/ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9 shows the results of a slightly simplified version of the OLS regression 
predicting refugee flows (Model 5) based on refugee rights originally presented in Table 
8 (Model 3). For consistency, I omit the interaction term, as the interpretation of 
interaction terms in IV regression is difficult and complex. The results are generally 
consistent with the model including the interaction; refugee rights are not a significant 
predictor of refugee flows, while civilian deaths do increase refugee flows. Model 6a and 
Model 6b show the first and second stage of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) IV 
regression, respectively. The second-stage model (Model 6b) is the IV equivalent to the 
OLS model (Model 3). The IV regression shows that when instrumented, refugee rights 
are a highly significant positive predictor of refugee inflows. This matches my initial 
expectation: higher levels of refugee rights should increase refugee flows, after correcting 
for endogeneity. For a visual of this relationship, Figure 11 shows the out of sample 
predictions of the natural log of refugee flows across the continuum of refugee rights. 
The y axis shows the natural log of refugee flows, which has compressed the number of 
refugees to correct for the skewed distribution of these flows. The predictions veer below 
zero at the lowest levels because the OLS model makes no assumption of an outcome 
variable bounded at zero. However, if these negative predicted flows were instead 
modeled as the raw number of predicted flows, rather than the natural log, they would 
simply be expected to be at zero. It is then only the positive expected flows that are truly 
informative (starting at an instrumented refugee rights score of about 0.5), and the 
increases here are more dramatic when converted back from the natural log, as the 
increases appear exponential rather than linear. 
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Figure 11: Out of Sample Predictions for Instrumented Refugee Rights with 95% 
Confidence Intervals 
 
 
As the instrumented measure of refugee rights in a given destination state increases, the 
predicted level of dyadic refugee flows from neighboring civil conflict states significantly 
increases. 
 
The next step is to evaluate the IV regression model. First and foremost, the 
Hausman test rejects the null that the measure of refugee rights is actually endogenous, 
supporting the use of the IV regression approach. The first-stage model shows that the 
instruments are both highly significant positive predictors of refugee rights.  This, in 
conjunction with the F statistic of 30.62, which is well over both the traditional cutoff of 
10 and the Stock-Yogo 10% maximal value critical value for weak instruments, suggests 
that the excluded instruments are indeed significant predictors of refugee rights and can 
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with the error term; in effect, it fails to reject the null that the instruments are valid. 
Overall, the IV regression is supported by diagnostic testing, and suggests that after 
correcting for endogeneity, higher respect for refugee rights does drive higher refugee 
inflows. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I used the data I introduced in Chapter 2 on refugee rights, as well 
as data on general physical security, to create scores of destination quality in potential 
asylum states neighboring civil wars. Factor analysis and Item Response Theory confirm 
two distinct dimensions within the data, from which I derive two scores of exit quality to 
use in subsequent modeling: the level of refugee rights and the level of general security. 
Before moving to testing whether the pressure cooker theory is correct in terms of 
predicting the dynamics of civil war, I first need to show that the element driving the 
entire mechanism – civilian response to variation in exit quality – actually operates as I 
argued in Chapter 1. In a basic set of face validity tests I predict the likelihood of positive 
refugee flows and the volume of refugee flows from civil war states to neighboring states 
based on the destination quality scores. The models in this chapter do provide evidence 
that civilians behave as though they are both aware of the circumstances they will face if 
they flee, and that they make decisions about whether and where to flee based on this 
information. This not only provides support for the face validity of the measures, but also 
is also evidence that the central mechanism underlying the pressure cooker theory 
operates as I have argued. 
The next step is to determine whether the civilian behavior shaped by exit quality 
does in fact influence the dynamics of civil war. That is, do poor options for flight not 
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only suppress refugee outflows, but also in turn drive pressure-cooker-like outcomes 
including longer and bloodier civil wars? That is the topic of the next chapter: testing the 
pressure-cooker theory of civil conflict. 
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Chapter 4: Exit Quality and Civil War Duration and Intensity 
Introduction  
 In this project, I have articulated a theory connecting civil war outcomes to 
civilians’ ability to seek refuge in surrounding states. Specifically, in Chapter 1, I argue 
that when there are high levels of violence against civilians, the ability to flee to a 
neighboring state should shape civil war duration and severity. If there are no safe and 
viable destinations nearby, violence against civilians should drive longer and bloodier 
civil wars. This is the pressure-cooker theory of civil conflict. This theory suggests that 
how states treat would-be refugees and asylum-seekers can directly impact how 
neighboring conflicts develop. In the previous chapters, I have built measures of exit 
quality; initial testing in the last chapter shows that not only do these measures have face 
validity, but also the underlying mechanism of civilian response to exit quality works as 
expected. In this chapter, I set out to finally test whether this mechanism actually does 
impact civil conflict outcomes. That is, do neighbors that welcome refugees act as a place 
to vent the pressures of civil conflict? Further, in the absence of safe, welcoming 
neighbors, do the pressures of civil wars compound themselves, leading to longer, 
bloodier conflicts, and ultimately to humanitarian and geopolitical disasters? 
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 In order to test this theory, Chapter 2 introduced a new annual dataset measuring 
how states treat refugees. Chapter 3 condensed this new data, along with existing data on 
human rights and security, into two measures of destination quality for each state: general 
security and refugee rights. In this chapter, I aggregate the destination quality scores of 
the neighbors surrounding civil conflicts into two separate measures of exit quality from 
the conflict as a whole. I then use these measures to evaluate how general security and 
refugee rights surrounding a war impact civil war duration and severity across varying 
levels of violence against civilians. I find support for my overall expectations: at high 
levels of exit quality, high levels of violence against civilians drive longer conflicts with 
higher battle deaths. However, after running a series of robustness checks, the findings 
are somewhat more nuanced: generally, in conjunction with violence against civilians, 
lower refugee rights surrounding the conflict create more intense and rapid conflicts, 
while lower general security surrounding the conflict state drives longer conflict duration. 
This suggests that in part the general security dimension is measuring the impact of 
overall regional instability, while refugee rights are measuring the impact of trapping 
civilians within the conflict state. 
The Theory of the Pressure-Cooker Conflict State 
 Civil wars, which have increasingly dominated over international wars in 
resources, attention, and deaths in the since the end of World War II, are not made 
equal.65 Some civil wars flare briefly only to abate just as quickly, while others stretch on 
for decades, eventually becoming so deeply ingrained in the local culture that it becomes 																																																									
65 See Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 563) and Fearon (2003, 276-277). 
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difficult to separate the two.66 Some civil wars have few casualties, with insurgents 
hiding in difficult-to-reach areas and avoiding much direct confrontation with the state, 
while others are far bloodier and see huge losses in battle on both sides.67 Within a single 
conflict, battle deaths may skyrocket one year, only to drop down to minimal levels for 
many years after. Scholars in political science have undertaken a number of high-quality 
studies predicting civil war duration and severity, and have found a number of different 
factors driving how conflicts develop.68 In this chapter, I aim to add an additional 
explanation for the length and intensity of civil conflicts: the interaction of violence 
against civilians and exit quality. 
 While it is not altogether new to argue that violence against civilians might 
impact conflict dynamics (see Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and 
Kocher 2007, Lyall 2009), it is new to argue that the opportunities to flee from this 																																																									
66 Examples of short-lived conflicts include the Insurgency in Macedonia in 2001, which 
lasted 106 days and the 1998 internationalized internal conflict in Lesotho, which only 
met the UCPD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset conflict conditions for six days. Longer 
conflicts include the Colombian Civil War, which lasted over 50 years, and the civil 
conflict in the Philippines, which has lasted over 45 years.  
 
67 One example of low-intensity conflict is the Insurgency in Ogaden (in Ethiopia), which 
has lasted since 1994, but has never risen above 42 battle deaths per year according to the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The Syrian Civil War was very high intensity, with 
estimated annual battle deaths of 38,480 (2012), 68,503 (2013), and 54,547 (2014). For 
an example of a conflict that has varying intensity over time, the Sri Lankan Civil War 
flared from 17 battle deaths in 2002 up to an estimated 10,165 battle deaths in 2009. 
 
68 These include geographic characteristics such as the conflict’s distance from the capital 
(Buhaug et al. 2009) or rough terrain in the form of mountains and forested areas (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004), the relative strength of rebel groups (Cunningham et al. 2009), third-
party interventions (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Cunningham 2010), control of 
valuable natural resources (Fearon 2004; Ross 2004), and state capacity (De Rouen and 
Sobek 2004), among others. 	
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violence will condition its impact. As discussed at length in Chapter 2, most studies that 
investigate the violence against civilians as a cause of conflict outcomes - rather than as a 
byproduct of conflict outcomes (e.g. Valentino et al. 2004) -  are focused specifically on 
counterinsurgency efforts and the distinction between indiscriminate and selective 
violence (Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and Kocher 2007, Lyall 2009). The findings are 
inconsistent; some find evidence that indiscriminate violence backfires, while others find 
evidence that it weakens the opponent. What is missing from these studies is that 
sometimes, civilians can leave, and at other times, civilians simply have nowhere viable 
to go.  This should shape how they respond to violence, and should in turn drive how 
violence against civilians shapes civil war dynamics. 
 I argue that how civilians respond to violence will shape the length and intensity 
of civil wars. In the presence of neighboring states that not only are generally secure for 
the native population, but also respect the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers that are 
coded into international law, civilians should be more likely to respond to one-sided 
violence by fleeing. That is, with high exit quality, increasing levels of one-sided 
violence should not impact civil conflicts, or may even decrease the length and severity 
of conflicts because the flight of civilians is a drain on the resources within the state.  
However, if there are no viable neighbors to which to flee, either because there are no 
nearby states or because those neighbors are generally not secure or abuse refugees, 
increasing levels of violence against civilians should drive longer conflicts with more 
battle-deaths. This is because civilians trapped in a conflict become, at minimum, cannon 
fodder, and can easily be coopted into the conflict as they become a fungible resource 
that can tapped by armed combatants. Feeding the pool of resources for combatants 
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should extend the life of the conflict, and should also increase the number of bodies these 
groups can put into battle, and thus lose in battle. 
 I therefore expect an interactive effect between exit quality and civilian fatalities 
to drive civil war duration: 
Hypothesis 1: At low levels of violence against civilians, there will be no difference in 
civil war duration between conflicts with high and low exit quality. At high levels of 
violence against civilians, conflicts with low exit quality will last longer. 
By the same logic, I expect an interactive effect between exit quality and civilian 
fatalities to drive civil war severity, or the number of battle deaths: 
Hypothesis 2: At low levels of violence against civilians, there will be no difference in 
civil war severity between conflicts with high and low exit quality. At high levels of 
violence against civilians, conflicts with low exit quality will have higher levels of battle 
deaths. 
I evaluate two distinct dimensions of exit quality, driven by a combination of 
theory and empirical outcomes from the previous chapter. The two measures are general 
security and refugee rights, both of which should impact conflict duration and severity. 
General security measures the overall safety of neighboring states, focusing on the 
respect for human rights of native citizens and the presence of civil conflict within those 
states. Refugee rights measures how safe refugees can expect to be if they attempt to flee 
to a neighboring state; will the government refuse entry, throw refugees in jail, or cut the 
refugee population off from access to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR)? Although I would expect each of these two measures of exit quality 
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to have the same impact on conflict duration and severity, these are distinct dimensions 
and it is possible that they will perform differently. 
Measurement 
To test the impact of exit quality on civil conflict duration and severity requires 
two distinct models. The first set of models predicts civil conflict duration using a Cox 
Proportional Hazards model.69 70 The second set of models predicts the natural log of 
annual battle deaths, as measured in the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (Allansson 
et al. 2017) using OLS regression.71 In both sets of models, the main independent 
variables are the measures of exit quality and violence against civilians. 
There are two measures of exit quality used in turn: general security and refugee 
rights. As discussed above, the general security score is built using an Item Response 
Theory (IRT) estimation of the underlying level of general security based on the four 
indicators of physical integrity rights in the CIRI/CI-RIGHTS datasets (torture, 
extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance), in combination with the 
UCDP/PRIO measure of the level of civil conflict (Cingranelli et al. 2014; Cingranelli 
and Fillipov 2018). This creates a general security IRT score for each country/year in the 																																																									
69 I use the Cox Proportional Hazards Model because it requires no assumption about the 
shape of the baseline hazard for civil conflicts, which allows for a focus on testing the 
causal impact of the theoretical variables without forcing a possibly inaccurate baseline 
hazard parameter into the model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 47-48).  
 
70 Conflict duration data is drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset - 
Version 17.2 (2017). I use the date at which the conflict reaches the minimum of 25 battle 
deaths as the beginning of the conflict. The data are structured to allow for multiple 
failures for conflicts that end and later reemerge. 
 
71 This follows the standard of using OLS regression in the civil conflict severity 
literature (Lacina 2006; Heger and Salehyan 2007, Lujala 2009). 
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data, which should measure how safe the country is generally, but specifically for native 
citizens. This can also be considered “baseline safety” – if native citizens and residents 
are not safe from abuse by the government or violence from civil war, then there is no 
reason that refugees should be exempted from these dangers. The refugee rights score is 
also built using an IRT estimation of the underlying level of respect for the rights of 
refugees, based on the five variables from the new dataset: refoulement, government 
abuse, cooperation with UNHCR, protection from non-state violence, and legal rights of 
refugees. This produces a score indicating how well refugees are treated in each 
country/year.  
This leaves two country-year level measures: refugee rights and general security. 
However, to actually use these measures to predict civil conflict outcomes requires 
aggregating them on the civil war/year level. Therefore, for each measure of exit quality 
(general security and refugee rights), I take the mean of the respective IRT score for all 
neighboring states within 950 km of the civil war state’s borders.72  I also lag these 
measures one year; this is in part because of the endogeneity discussed in the previous 
chapter. Specifically, if a civil conflict has high levels of violence that push civilians to 
flee into neighboring states, those neighbors might respond by abusing the new influx of 
refugees. This might make it appear that refugee rights were lower than they actually 
were at the time that civilians responded to the violence. Using the measures of exit 
quality one year prior helps to correct for this. However, there are also theoretical reasons 
																																																									
72 I use the Gleditsch and Ward (2001) minimum distance data. I also aggregate this using 
the maximum score, rather than the mean score; for discussion of these outcomes, see the 
Appendix. 
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to use the lagged measure. For civilians in a civil war to incorporate information about 
how neighboring states treat refugees into their decision on whether or not to flee, new 
information has to filter back from the neighboring states into the conflict zones. It is 
reasonable to expect that it will take time for new information on abuses of refugees to 
reliably make its way. Brand new information might be met with skepticism; only with 
some time and consistent reporting should this information truly shape decision-making. 
 To properly evaluate the two measures of exit quality requires interacting these 
variables with the level of violence against civilians. To measure this violence, I use the 
UCDP/GED One-sided Violence Dataset (Eck and Hultman 2007, Allansson et al. 2017). 
This data only considers violence that was specifically targeted against civilians and in 
which civilians were clearly not combatants; it does not include secondary civilian 
casualties from battle or from war-related starvation, disease, or other maladies.73 I 
aggregate the One-Sided Violence Data to annual basis for each country using the best 
estimate of total fatalities. I then interact this term with refugee rights and general 
security, respectively. The models are broadly as follows, in which X represents a vector 
of k control variables, α represents the constant, and ε represents the error term: 
 
1. Civil Conflict Duration =  β1(General Security(t-1)) + β2 (Civilian Deaths) + 
β3(General Security(t-1) * Civilian Deaths) + βk(Xk) + ε 
																																																									
73 The One-sided violence data do not distinguish between indiscriminate and selective 
violence, and are thus not directly comparable to studies on counterinsurgency built on 
this distinction. However, the purpose of this study to is to evaluate the impact of 
aggregate international violence against civilians on the overall duration and severity of 
conflict, and for these purposes, the data are a good fit. 
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2. Civil Conflict Duration = β1 (Refugee Rights(t-1)) + β2 (Civilian Deaths) + β3 
(Refugee Rights(t-1) * Civilian Deaths) + βk(Xk) + ε 
3. Battle Deaths = α + β1 (General Security(t-1)) + β2 (Civilian Deaths) + β3 (General 
Security(t-1) * Civilian Deaths) + βk(Xk) + ε 
4. Battle Deaths = α + β1 (Refugee Rights(t-1)) + β2 (Civilian Deaths) + β3(Refugee 
Rights(t-1) * Civilian Deaths) + βk(Xk) + ε 
 
I include a fairly standard set of control variables in each model. Most 
importantly, I control for the omitted exit quality score. That is, in the models interacting 
general security and civilian deaths, I control for the level of refugee rights. By extension, 
in the models interacting refugee rights and civilian deaths, I control for general security. 
This allows me to hold the excluded dimension of exit quality constant, and better 
evaluate the impact of the dimension of exit quality under scrutiny.  I also include 
measures of biased intervention by external actors, regime type, the natural log of the 
total population, the natural log of GDP per capita, and the nature of the conflict – 
specifically, whether the conflict is fought over control of territory or control of the 
government. 74 75 
																																																									
74 Regan (2002) and Cunningham (2010) show the impact of external interventions on 
civil war duration.  
 
75 Intervention data and the reason for the conflict (territory v. government) are drawn 
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (2017). Regime type is from the Polity IV 
Dataset (2017). The total population and GDP per capita are from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators Databank. 
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Table 10: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Predicting Civil Conflict Duration 	 (1)	 (2)	
VARIABLES General 
Security  
Refugee 
Rights 
   
General Securityt-1 (Mean) 0.0104 0.0751 
 (0.192) (0.204) 
Refugee Respectt-1 (Mean) 0.195 0.190 
 (0.159) (0.162) 
Civilian Deaths 4.57e-05 -3.41e-05 
 (2.85e-05) (6.81e-05) 
General Securityt-1 (Mean) * Civilian Deaths 0.000406  
 (0.000379)  
Refugee Respectt-1 (Mean) * Civilian Deaths  5.58e-05 
  (9.89e-05) 
Battle Deaths (ln) -0.206*** -0.205*** 
 (0.0676) (0.0646) 
Total Population (ln) -0.120** -0.126** 
 (0.0533) (0.0537) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.0152 -0.00841 
 (0.0742) (0.0720) 
Regime 0.000186 -0.00211 
 (0.0129) (0.0129) 
Conflict over Territory 0.306** 0.318** 
 (0.147) (0.147) 
Intervention (Government) -0.0101 -0.0108 
 (0.305) (0.306) 
Intervention (Rebels) 0.101 0.0858 
 (0.348) (0.342) 
Intervention (Both) 0.161 -0.0204 
 (1.252) (1.142) 
Civil Wars 104 104 
Civil War Failures 152 152 
Observations 693 693 
Wald χ2(12, 12) 72.09 37.89 
Log pseudo likelihood -524.58 -526.87 
Coefficients are reported 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 12: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score 
(t-1) and High Civilian Deaths 
		
At	high	levels	of	one-sided	civilian	deaths,	civil	conflicts	with	low	levels	of	surrounding	
general	security	last	significantly	longer	than	conflicts	with	high	surrounding	general	
security.	
	
Figure 13: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score 
(t-1)  and  Low Civilian Deaths 
 
At	low	levels	of	one-sided	civilian	deaths,	civil	conflicts	with	low	levels	of	surrounding	
general	security	last	the	same	amount	of	time	as	conflicts	with	high	surrounding	
general	security.	
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Figure 14: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score 
(t-1) and High Civilian Deaths 
 
At	high	levels	of	one-sided	civilian	deaths,	civil	conflicts	with	low	levels	of	surrounding	
refugee	rights	last	significantly	longer	than	conflicts	with	high	surrounding	refugee	
rights.	
 
Figure 15: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score 
(t-1) and Low Civilian Deaths 
 
At	low	levels	of	one-sided	civilian	deaths,	civil	conflicts	with	low	levels	of	surrounding	
refugee	rights	last	significantly	longer	than	conflicts	with	high	surrounding	refugee	
rights,	though	the	difference	is	slightly	smaller	than	at	high	levels	of	civilian	deaths.	
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Results 
 The results for the Cox proportional hazards models predicting conflict duration 
are shown in Table 10.76 Model 1 evaluates the impact of general security interacted with 
civilian deaths, while Model 2 focuses on refugee rights interacted with civilian deaths. 
While it is perhaps interesting that in Model 1, neither general security nor civilian deaths 
are significant alone, this is an interactive model with two continuous variables and as 
such, properly evaluating this requires plotting predicted outcomes across the two 
variables. For models that predict how long a given process will endure until failure – 
which in this case corresponds to how long a civil war will endure until it ends – the 
appropriate way to visualize impact is to plot survival curves. Survival curves represent 
the probability that a process will survive across increasing time since the process began. 
To evaluate my models, the survival curves predict the probability that a civil war will 
continue as the time that has elapsed the beginning of the civil war increases up to 25 
years.77  
Figure 12 shows the predicted survival curves for civil conflicts with high levels 
of violence against civilians. It is clear that conflicts with low exit scores in general 
security last significantly longer than those with high exit scores in general security if 
there are high levels of violence against civilians. However, if there are low levels of 
																																																									
76 All of the Cox Proportional Hazards models use the Efron method for handling tied 
events, as this is more accurate than the Breslow method (see Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2004, 55). 
 
77 While the maximum length of a conflict within the sample is 65 years, 88% of conflicts 
in the sample are less than 25 years long, so this is a reasonable cutoff for the out-of-
sample predictions of survival. 
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violence against civilians, as shown in Figure 13, civil conflicts with high and low levels 
of general security in surrounding states are indistinguishable. This supports the 
hypothesis that exit quality should only matter in the presence of high violence against 
civilians, and that lower exit quality should drive longer civil wars. 
 The next model to evaluate, Model 2, interacts refugee rights and civilian deaths. 
Again, the results in the table are not impressive, but are also not terribly relevant for an 
interactive model with two continuous variables. The plots for Model 2 are displayed in 
Figures 14 and 15. Figure 14 shows the survival curves for civil conflicts with high levels 
of civilian deaths; it is clear in these projections that conflicts surrounded by neighboring 
states that treat refugees poorly should have conflicts that last significantly longer than 
civil wars surrounded by states that welcome refugees. In Figure 15, the gap between 
high and low exit quality states has narrowed slightly, but it is still clear that, in the case 
of refugee rights - low exit quality states should have longer conflicts than high exit 
quality states. The gap in expected duration is still smaller with lower levels of civilian 
violence, suggesting support for my initial hypothesis, though the support is not as strong 
as it was in the model using general security. 
 The models predicting civil war severity, measured as the natural log of annual 
battle deaths, are shown in Table 11. The out of sample predictions for Model 3, which 
predicts battle deaths based on the interaction of general security and violence against 
civilians, are in Figure 16. Here, it is clear that there is no significant difference in 
severity between conflicts with high and low levels of general exit security across levels 
of violence against civilians. This suggests that, at least in terms of general security, exit 
quality may not influence civil conflict severity. 
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Table 11: OLS Regression Predicting Annual Battle Deaths 
 (3) (4) 
VARIABLES General 
Security 
Refugee  
Rights 
   
General Securityt-1 (Mean) -0.169 -0.185 
 (0.140) (0.139) 
Refugee Respectt-1 (Mean) -0.124 -0.0573 
 (0.103) (0.104) 
Civilian Deaths 1.07e-05*** 7.08e-05*** 
 (3.30e-06) (2.51e-05) 
Refugee Respectt-1 (Mean) * Civilian Deaths  -9.93e-05*** 
  (3.68e-05) 
General Securityt-1 (Mean) * Civilian Deaths 1.66e-05  
 (1.90e-05)  
Total Population (ln) -0.0551 -0.0540 
 (0.0352) (0.0351) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.206*** 0.215*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0449) 
Conflict over Territory -0.754*** -0.733*** 
 (0.119) (0.118) 
Intervention (Government) 0.853*** 0.850*** 
 (0.195) (0.193) 
Intervention (Rebels) 0.626 0.386 
 (0.512) (0.509) 
Intervention (Both) 0.780 0.901 
 (0.636) (0.617) 
Constant 4.859*** 4.754*** 
 (0.652) (0.650) 
   
Observations 728 728 
R-squared 0.179 0.190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	
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Figure 16: Predicted Battle Deaths (ln) Based on General Security (t-1) 
 
Across	all	levels	of	one-sided	civilian	deaths,	civil	conflicts	with	low	levels	of	
surrounding	general	security	have	no	significant	difference	in	annual	battle	deaths	
from	conflicts	with	high	levels	of	surrounding	general	security.	
 
Figure 17: Predicted Battle Deaths Based on Refugee Rights (t-1) 
 
At	low	levels	of	one-sided	civilian	deaths,	civil	conflicts	with	low	levels	of	surrounding	
refugee	rights	have	no	significant	difference	in	annual	battle	deaths	from	conflicts	
with	high	surrounding	refugee	rights.	However,	as	one-sided	civilian	deaths	increase,	
conflicts	with	low	refugee	rights	have	higher	levels	of	annual	battle	deaths.	
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 However, the results of Model 4, shown in Figure 17, tell a different story. In this 
plot of out sample predictions, based on the interaction of refugee rights and violence 
against civilians, up to 2,200 civilian deaths high and low exit quality conflicts are 
indistinguishable. At 2,400 civilian deaths and above, civil conflicts with low quality 
refugee rights in surrounding states do have higher predicted levels of battle deaths, and 
the gap between the 95% confidence intervals on the predictions of battle deaths 
increases as civilian deaths increase. This does lend support for the hypothesis, at least in 
terms of refugee rights.   
Discussion 
 The results of the models predicting civil war outcomes show evidence in support 
of the theory of the pressure cooker conflict state; however, it does appear that of the two 
dimensions of exit quality, general security performs better in the models predicting civil 
war duration, and refugee rights performs better in the models predicting civil war length.  
Additional results based on varying specifications of the aggregations of exit quality are 
discussed in the Appendix; these results generally follow this pattern. Specifically, across 
all specifications  - based on using either the maximum or the mean IRT score of each 
dimension, and measuring this score either in the current year or lagged (in the year prior) 
- the general security measure’s performance consistently predicts conflict duration in 
accordance with the expectations of my theory. However, only one of the four 
specifications of general security is significant in predicting battle deaths. The reverse is 
true when considering the refugee rights score: almost all of the specifications support the 
expectations of the theory when predicting battle deaths, but only one of four predicts 
refugee rights in accordance with the hypotheses. The most interesting part of this is that 
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in the three specifications of refugee rights that do not predict conflict duration in 
accordance with the hypotheses, the result is robustly th oe opposite of what I originally 
anticipated: at high levels of one-sided violence against civilians, conflicts surrounded by 
poor refugee rights end sooner than those in neighborhoods with strong respect for 
refugee rights. Appendix C is devoted to exploring this in depth. 
 The fact that the general security dimension and the refugee rights dimension 
perform differently in predicting civil war outcomes lends further support to the approach 
of considering these as two distinct dimensions. It is also worth considering why these 
dimensions would perform differently. General security represents the baseline safety of 
states neighboring a civil conflict. Holding refugee rights constant, lower general security 
increases conflict duration if there are high levels of violence against civilians, but does 
not impact conflict duration at low levels of civilian-directed violence.  This is shown in 
Figure 12, which plots the predicted duration of civil conflicts under conditions of high 
violence against civilians. When general security is low, the conflicts are predicted to last 
much longer than when general security is high. Figure 13 displays the expected duration 
of civil conflicts under conditions of low violence against civilians. In this case, the 
predicted duration is indistinguishable between conflicts with high and low surrounding 
general security. However, variations in general security have no impact on conflict 
intensity, as shown in Figure 16. One possibility is that general security is acting as a 
proxy for state capacity and stability. If neighboring states are repressing their own 
citizens and are fighting their own internal conflicts, it is likely that there is conflict 
spillover regionally, driving longer periods of instability throughout the region. Strong 
and stable neighboring states are better positioned to prevent conflict spill-over into their 
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own borders, and are also less likely to feed into conflict processes. In particular, stronger 
and more secure neighbors should be less likely to allow refugee camps to become rear 
bases for rebels (e.g. Salehyan 2007), and should also be less likely to allow rebels to 
operate within their borders generally. This should also halt the black market flow of 
goods, money, and manpower into the conflict state. In this manner, more secure 
neighbors can prevent the displacement resulting from civil conflicts from creating 
processes that feed back into, and thereby lengthen the conflict.78  
Conversely, holding general security constant, civil wars surrounded by states 
with low refugee rights have higher battle deaths in the presence of high levels of 
violence against civilians, but battle deaths are not impacted by violence against civilians 
if there are neighbors that respect the rights of refugees. However, refugee rights do not 
appear to have the anticipated impact on conflict duration. Indeed, as discussed in the 
Appendix, most specifications of refugee rights perform counter to my initial 
expectations: generally, low refugee rights in combination with high violence against 
civilians actually drives shorter, but more intense conflicts. One possible explanation for 
refugee rights impacting severity is simply that more trapped civilians will translate to 
more people becoming combatants – willingly or not – and thereby drive up casualty 
counts. This might either be simply because there are more people at risk of dying in 
battle, but it could also be that, if human lives are abundant and other resources are 
scarce, human lives become cheap and are thus expended more freely by the leaders of 
armed groups. However, it also stands to reason that low refugee rights traps resources 																																																									
78 This would match the description of the spatial spread of conflict driven by refugee 
flows in Salehyan (2006). 
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and civilians within the conflict state, and in combination with the pressure exerted by 
one-sided violence, drives the conflict to flare early and to also burn out sooner. Thus, the 
pressure cooker conflict should have much higher rates of battle deaths over time, but 
will also cease quickly. On the other hand, if there are high levels of violence and 
surrounding states allow asylum-seekers and refugees entry, they allow this pressure to 
vent, so it does not build up in the same way; this leaves lower rates of battle deaths 
annually, but also allows conflicts to stretch on much longer before they in eventually 
either come to a head or wind down into a de facto peace.  
Future Work 
These models have, necessarily, been built on a number of simplifying 
assumptions, creating a macro-level, highly aggregated evaluation of the hypotheses. 
This is valuable as it gives a clear first cut test of how the treatment of refugees can 
interact with violence against civilians to impact conflict dynamics. However, there are 
certainly some assumptions that could be relaxed in future work to create more nuanced 
investigations. I discuss some of the most immediate options below; this is not a 
comprehensive list. 
The first area that could benefit from relaxed assumptions is geography. Civil 
conflicts – at least insofar as active fighting and violence against civilians are concerned - 
are usually contained to specific geographic areas of the state. The most obvious update 
to this model would be to include only geographically relevant neighboring states based 
on the actual location of the conflict. Particularly in large states where the conflict is only 
active in a very small area, it is quite possible that some neighboring states are too far 
away to be relevant, and should thus not be included in a measure of exit quality. 
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 This leads to another potential confounding factor: some states will have more 
viable internal displacement options than others. If a civil conflict is fought in only one 
very localized area of the state and there safe areas to which to flee inside of the state 
itself, this may negate the need for high-quality exit options outside of the state. 
 One additional element that could benefit the model is the consideration of 
disaggregation of which actors are actually targeting civilians. In conjunction with the 
identification of territorial control (between rebels and the state), this may generate more 
nuanced expectations regarding conflict dynamics and outcomes. Since rebels are 
typically the weaker side, they are more likely to benefit from the resources that the 
trapped population provides; however, for this to happen, they have to actually have 
access to the trapped population. If the civilian population is trapped in securely 
government-held territory, and the government is markedly stronger than the rebels, this 
might not make for longer conflicts. However, if the civilian population is exposed to 
high levels of violence and trapped in a rebel-held area, that should extend the length of 
civil conflicts. 
Conclusion 
 In some civil conflicts, civilians can easily flee from violence into neighboring 
states, where they find safety and shelter. In other conflicts, neighboring countries close 
borders to asylum-seekers and refugee flows, treat asylum-seekers as criminals and throw 
them into jail, or physically abuse refugees. The theory of the pressure-cooker conflict 
state argues the following: if there is little to no violence against civilians, it should not 
matter how neighboring states treat refugees. However, as violence against civilians 
escalates, how neighboring states treat refugees becomes increasingly important. The 
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measure of how safe neighboring countries are for would-be refugees is the exit quality of 
a conflict. In conflicts with high exit quality, violence against civilians will drive them to 
flee. In conflicts with low exit quality, there are not viable options for flight, so violence 
against civilians will instead trap these civilians in a pressure-cooker: they cannot leave, 
so instead they feed into the conflict itself. This should drive more intense and longer 
conflicts. This is the pressure-cooker theory posited at the start of this project. 
This chapter evaluates two dimensions of exit quality: general security and 
refugee rights. Empirical tests find that both can drive longer conflicts in combination 
with high levels of violence against civilians. However, general security is the more 
robust predictor of conflict duration, and the only measure that consistently performs as 
initially expected. Though refugee rights does weakly support the initial expectations for 
duration, changing the specification of the measure almost uniformly results in 
expectations of shorter and more intense conflicts when low refugee rights are combined 
with high levels of one-sided violence against civilians. This may suggest that general 
security impacts conflict contagion and instability in the region, while refugee rights 
directly shape the pressure cooker conflict state, creating more intense and rapid conflicts 
where exit quality is poor and combatants directly target civilians with violence. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 	
This dissertation opened on the story of the 2014 shelling and blockade of Gaza, 
and the utter destruction that civilians trapped in Gaza faced. In the summer of 2014, 
under the constant bombardment of Israeli bombs and lacking any means of escape, 
civilians identified Hamas as their only path forward. In 2018, the story in Gaza looks 
much the same. The blockade of Gaza, put in place a decade ago after Hamas took 
control, is still in place. In recent weeks, Hamas has pushed tens of thousands of 
Palestinian civilians in Gaza to gather at the border and engage in violence directed at 
Israeli soldiers: 
...it was billed as an independent Palestinian protest campaign. But actually 
Hamas, which controls Gaza, was a driving force. It called from mosque 
loudspeakers, encouraging people to gather at the border. And according to the 
Israeli army, there were more than 30,000 Palestinians at six different spots along 
the border. Israel responded to Palestinians throwing rocks, firebombs, burning 
tires. Israel fired tear gas and live fire. It was the most violence in Gaza since the 
Gaza war in 2014... People in Gaza tend to call it an open-air prison. Hamas took 
control of Gaza by force a decade ago. And since then, Israel and Egypt have 
imposed a blockade on Gaza. That prevents most people from being able to leave. 
It restricts what goods can enter Gaza. All of this is to try to pressure Hamas.79 
 																																																									
79 Estrin, Daniel. “16 Palestinians Killed, Hundreds More Wounded In Voilence Near 
Gaza Border. 30 March 2018. Transcript from All Things Considered, NPR. Retrieved 
from: https://www.npr.org/2018/03/30/598386478/14-palestinians-killed-hundreds-more-
wounded-in-violence-near-gaza-border 
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However, it seems that the pressure intended for Hamas has generally landed on the 
shoulders of the civilians trapped within the blockade. Rather than weakening Hamas, 
this pressure has left the terrorist organization as the only path for survival and resistance 
for the trapped civilian population. Returning to the terminology of this project, this has 
created a pressure-cooker conflict; the pressure on the civilians has no way to vent 
because of the blockade, and thus actually pushes more fuel into the conflict. It is then 
perhaps unsurprising that, not only has Gaza not recovered from the conflict in 2014, but 
Hamas will continue to leverage its one internal resource to sustain the fight: the trapped 
civilians. 
This project argues that governments’ choices to respect, or to violate, 
international human rights law on refugees has real and immediate impacts on the 
development of civil conflicts. The United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees 
(1951) and its 1967 Protocol encode the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers, and the 
responsibilities of states to protect these rights. Specifically, this includes protection from 
expulsion or the forcible return to the country from which they have fled, protection from 
penalties for entering the country illegally seeking asylum, and access to representatives 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. These documents were written 
as extensions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which articulated the most 
basic rights of life, freedom from torture, and arbitrary arrest or detention, all of which 
apply equally to those seeking asylum and refugee status abroad. Treatment of refugees 
varies widely across time and space; some states welcome refugees openly and protect 
these populations, while others gun them down as they attempt to cross the border and 
jail any that do succeed in entering the state. As with most international human rights 
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laws, there is functionally no direct punishment for governments that abuse the rights of 
refugees and asylum-seekers. However, that does not mean these actions are without 
consequences. 
 I argue that one important consequence of abusing the rights of refugees is in the 
development of civil conflicts. Civil wars are one of the primary causes of refugee flight. 
Generally, this is a reaction to the violence of the conflict; civilians realize that their lives 
and well-being are threatened, and thus make the decision to seek safety across 
international borders. However, if neighboring states regularly abuse refugees or simply 
refuse to permit refugees to enter, civilians should be less likely to respond to violence by 
fleeing. Put more succinctly, civilians will not flee to safety if there is no safety to be 
found.  
 Civilians are a vital resource in civil wars. They can be used to extract fungible 
resources such as food, supplies, funds, and manpower; they can be coopted for 
intelligence; they can be recruited as armed combatants; they can be used to bring in 
outside resources from the international humanitarian community; they can be used as 
human shields. If civilians flee, the pool of resources available to armed actors shrinks. If 
civilians are exposed to violence from the conflict – but they cannot flee – they are far 
more likely to be forced to interact with armed actors, and to thus feed back into the 
conflict processes in some way. This is what I call a pressure-cooker conflict state. 
 I therefore introduce the concept of exit quality, the measure of the expected 
quality of life as a refugee or asylum-seeker. If the states surrounding a civil conflict are 
welcoming to refugees and provide high levels of protection, exit quality will be high; if, 
however, neighboring states refuse entry to refugees, abuse refugees, and detain them for 
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years on end as criminals, exit quality will be low. In conflicts with low levels of violence 
against civilians, exit quality will not matter because there will be no cause, or 
willingness, to flee. Without a push to leave, the quality of opportunities for flight is 
irrelevant. However, in civil conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians, 
distinct patterns will emerge: if violence is high and exit quality is high, civilians will 
flee. If violence is high and exit quality is low, civilians will stay put and become part of 
the conflict dynamics. This will drive more resources into the conflict, resulting in more 
intense civil wars. While I initially also expected this to drive longer civil wars, the 
impacts on conflict duration are somewhat mixed.  
 I introduce an original dataset on Refugee Rights, which I combine with existing 
human rights and conflict data to create two separate annual measures of neighboring exit 
quality in civil wars: general security and refugee rights. General security measures the 
overall level of human rights for native citizens and levels of internal conflict in 
surrounding states. Refugee rights specifically measures how neighboring states treat 
refugees. Empirical tests show that at high levels of violence against civilians, conflicts 
with low general security in neighboring states last significantly longer than conflicts 
with high general security. At low levels of violence against civilians, general security 
levels have no impact on conflict length. General security has no impact on the intensity 
of civil conflicts in terms of battle deaths. 
 Refugee rights, on the other hand, have a significant impact on conflict intensity; 
at high levels of violence against civilians, civil wars surrounded by low refugee rights 
have higher battle deaths than those in high refugee rights neighborhoods. The results on 
duration are especially interesting; while one specification does show weak support for 
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longer conflicts in states with high violence against civilians and low refugee rights, most 
alternative specifications tell a distinctly different story. Conflicts with high violence 
against civilians and low neighborhood refugee rights actually tend to end sooner than 
those with high violence and high neighboring refugee rights. This actually lends greater 
credence to the pressure-cooker conflict state terminology: trapping civilians and related 
resources within a dangerous and violent conflict pushes the conflict to become more 
intense, but also pushes it to burn out sooner. It is also possible that while pressure-
cooker civil wars end sooner, they will leave behind a legacy of violence, destruction, 
and victimization that drives long-term terrorism and low-level insurgencies, particularly 
considering the Chechen case study in the Chapter 1, as well as the case of Gaza that 
appeared in both Chapter 1 and the start of this chapter. 
 This dissertation makes several important contributions. First, it introduces an 
original dataset on Refugee Rights, covering the bulk of the post-Cold War period (1993-
2014) for all states in the international system on an annual basis. I have also conducted 
preliminary tests of the main causes of variation in refugee rights, which show that 
overall, greater inflows of refugees and higher levels of wealth tend to drive worse 
treatment of refugees. Second, I have shown that how states treat refugees is distinct from 
how states treat their own citizens, and that using measures of governmental respect of 
native citizens to proxy governmental respect of refugees and asylum-seekers is patently 
incorrect. Third, the dissertation introduces the theoretical notion of exit quality, which 
should allow for better theorizing of any civil conflict processes related to civilians (or 
indeed any models of civilian migration), because the availability of exit should vary 
greatly and should condition civilians’ behaviors. Finally, this project has shown that 
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abuses of refugee rights – even holding general security and respect for human rights 
constant – will shape conflict dynamics. Overall, it appears that abusing refugees and 
asylum-seekers will keep more people trapped inside of violent conflicts, creating a 
vicious cycle in which conflict intensity escalates further. However, these more intense 
conflicts do also tend to end sooner. General security in neighboring states, on the other 
hand, does help to contain civil conflicts and to prevent outside resources from sustaining 
the fighting. 
Future Research 
 This dissertation has focused entirely on the macro-level of conflict, and this has 
been a very deliberate decision. To effectively evaluate the broad impact of states’ 
refugee policies on conflict requires measuring the policies at the level at which they 
occur: this is national and in the available reporting, it is annual. Finding effects even at 
the highest levels of aggregation should speak to the strength of these effects. However, 
civil wars benefit from study and measurement at lower levels of aggregation. The study 
of the impact of exit quality should be no exception. Disaggregating in terms of 
geography, time, and actors could offer substantially more nuanced and specific tests of 
the interaction of exit quality and violence.  
 Civil conflicts generally do not occur over the entire geographic space of the 
conflict state. Active fighting is usually restricted to smaller areas; indeed, some of the 
most nuanced notions of geography in civil conflict break down the area into zones of 
control. As originally described by Kalyvas (2006), these range from those areas held 
securely by the state, to areas that are in contention and have active fighting, to areas that 
are held securely by rebels. If there is one-sided violence against civilians, it may be 
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confined only to areas of active conflict; if there are areas that are secure and free of 
active violence, it is possible that civilians will be able to move internally within the state 
instead of fleeing the state altogether. Indeed, internal displacement is far more common 
than seeking refugee status abroad (Norwegian Refugee Council 2017). While the 
internally displaced are outside of the scope of this project, which seeks to determine the 
impact of respect for – or abuse of – the rights of refugees, broadening the scope of exit 
quality to include viable internal displacement options would allow for a more refined 
understanding of the relationship between violence, displacement, and the role of 
civilians in armed internal conflicts. 
 Another geographic area for disaggregation is in the measurement of exit quality 
specific to outside states. Here, I have used the aggregation of all neighboring states, but 
if the model is measuring violence that occurs in only one small area of the state, it would 
make the most sense to focus on the exit quality of neighboring states that are proximate 
to that area. Particularly in large states, a neighboring state that borders a completely 
different area of the country may not actually be a relevant exit option. 
 Zones of control matter not only for geographic disaggregation, but also for a 
more micro-level investigation of the actors in civil conflicts. In this study I have focused 
on the overall threat to the lives of civilians, making no distinction between violence 
committed by rebels and violence committed by agents of the state. While this 
simplification was necessary at this stage, there is a rich area of study open to the impact 
of exit quality, conditional on which actor is actually using one-sided violence against 
civilians. This would be particularly fruitful in combination with examining which actor 
has control of the territory in which civilians are threatened; if the rebels are using 
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violence against civilians in government-held territory, that may have very different 
implications than rebels using this tactic in their own-territory, or in contested areas.  
Building on the disaggregation of geography and actors would also allow for 
exploration into the impact of changes in exit quality on whether armed actors choose to 
use violence against civilians in the first place. This may be the most exciting extension 
of this project: to determine if changing exit quality changes the strategic behavior of 
armed groups. Can closing borders around a conflict push soldiers to stop committing 
abuses against civilians? Or, will it encourage further abuses? Finding answers to these 
questions would have enormous implications for both the scholarly community and the 
policy community.  
At a time when internal conflict has increasing negative externalities, a more 
finite understanding of these types of conflict dynamics is vital. As this project has 
demonstrated, abuses of civilian populations have consequences that extend far beyond 
national borders. Even the most seemingly helpless civilians attempting to survive the 
violence of civil wars impact how conflicts develop, and how neighboring states and the 
international community choose to treat these civilians has serious geopolitical impacts. 
How states treat refugees and asylum-seekers may actually be one unanticipated way of 
shaping violent civil conflicts, and at the very least, neighboring states should consider 
this when deciding how to react when a wave of civilians fleeing conflict arrives at their 
doorstep.  
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Appendix A: Refugee Rights Coding Procedure and Summary Statistics 	
Coding Procedure from State Department Annual Report 
 
Legal System for Asylum & Protection of Refugees  
 
This variable is coded on policy ONLY, not practice. 
 
0: There is no legal system in place for asylum seekers/refugees. 
1: There is some legal system in place for asylum seekers/refugees, but it does not 
conform to the United Nations 1951 Convention on Refugees and the United Nations 
1967 Protocol. Safe country of origin/transit regulations will also downgrade a score of 2 
to a 1. 
2: There is a legal system in place for asylum seekers/refugees that conforms to the 
United Nations 1951 Convention on Refugees and the United Nations 1967 Protocol. 
Refoulement 
0: There is widespread/systematic refoulement, including closing borders to asylum 
seekers. Alternatively, the state will receive a zero score if there is a description of “no 
governmental protection from refoulement” in the year.  
1: There are isolated incidents of refoulement and/or border closures to asylum seekers. 
Alternatively, the state will receive a one if there is a description of “some protection 
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from refoulement” by the government in the year, but no indication of 
systematic/widespread refoulement. 
2: There are no reported incidents of refoulement and/or border closures to asylum 
seekers. Alternatively, the state will receive a score of two if there is a description of the 
government providing protection from refoulement, but no indication of any refoulement 
incidents. 
 
Government Abuse of Refugees/Asylum Seekers 
0: The government engages in widespread/systematic violence against refugees/asylum 
seekers, and harassment of refugees/asylum seekers. Widespread forced detention also 
qualifies for a score of zero. 
1: The government engages in isolated incidents of violence against refugees/asylum 
seekers, and harassment of refugees/asylum seekers. Isolated incidents of forced 
detention also qualify for a score of one. 
2: There are no reports of the government engaging in any type of violence, harassment, 
or forced detention of refugees/asylum seekers. 
Protection from Abuse by non-Governmental Actors 
0: Refugees and/or asylum-seekers are subject to widespread/systematic violence by non-
governmental actors; this can include native citizens, rebel forces, or governmental actors 
from other states that make incursions into the country’s borders to abuse refugees. 
1: Refugees and/or asylum-seekers are subject to isolated incidents of violence by non-
governmental actors; this can include native citizens, rebel forces, or governmental actors 
from other states that make incursions into the country’s borders to abuse refugees. 
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2: Refugees and/or asylum seekers are not subject to any incidents of violence by non-
governmental actors. 
Cooperation with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
0: The government does not cooperate with the UNHCR in most areas, and the UNHCR 
is generally restricted in carrying out its operations within the state. 
1: There is some major restriction on the UNHCR’s ability to operate within the country, 
but it still is able to conduct some operations. 
2: The report states that there is full or general cooperation with the UNHCR and makes 
no further note of any major restrictions by the government or its agents on UNHCR 
operations within the country. 																							
	 147 
Table 12: Summary Statistics for 1993-2011 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
      
Refoulement             3,227    1.53 0.78 0 2 
      
Refoulement (Safe Transit)  3,227 1.44 0.84 0 2 
      
Government Violence 3,227 1.58 0.79 0 2 
      
Protection from Violence 3,227 1.81 0.58 0 2 
      
Legal System - Asylum  3,227 1.25 0.88 0 2 
      
Cooperation with UNHCR 3,227 1.87 0.42 0 2 
      
Physical Integrity Rights (CIRI) 3,063 4.79 2.26 0 8 
      
Regime (Polity) 3,067 13.17 6.60 0 20 
      
Civil War 3,252 0.16 0.37 0 1 
      
Contiguous Civil Conflict (100 km) 3,252 0.51 0.50 0 1 
      
GDP t-1 (ln) 3,244 10.58 2.00 5.41 16.39 
      
Refugee Populationt-1 (ln) 3,244 6.05 4.43 0 15.24 
      
Population (ln) 3,252 9.02 1.65 5.34 14.10 
      
Total Borders (COW) 3,252 5.92 3.47 0 22 
      
Land Borders (COW) 3,252 3.56 2.52 0 14 
      
Sea Borders (COW) 3,252 2.36 2.51 0 11 
      
UNHCR 1951 3,252 0.74 0.44 0 1 
      
UNHCR 1967 3,252 0.75 0.43 0 1 
      
UNHCR Refugee Treaties 3,252 1.49 0.86 0 2 
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Appendix B: Methodology for Creating Destination Quality Measures 
	
Chapter 2 introduced original data on state practices towards refugees, or more 
concisely, refugee rights. This included five measures, coded on a 0-1-2 scale: (1) 
Refoulement, (2) Government Violence against Refugees/Asylum-Seekers,  (3) 
Cooperation with UNHCR, (4) Law on Refugees, and (5) Protection from Other 
Violence. However, to test the theory that the destination quality of neighboring states – 
aggregated to proxy the exit quality from a civil war state – has an interactive effect on 
the length and severity of the civil war, I need distinct unidimensional measures.  
The first step is to proxy the destination quality of each state/year in the dataset 
that could potentially neighbor a civil war. To adequately capture destination quality, 
however, requires considering both how the refugee/asylum-seeker population is treated 
and the overall state of human rights protection within the country. To this end, I consider 
not only refugee rights, but also general human rights as measured in the CIRI physical 
integrity rights scores, including (1) Torture, (2) Political Imprisonment, (3) Extrajudicial 
Killing, and (4) Disappearance. I also include the UCDP/PRIO measure of civil conflict 
within the country to proxy broader threats to well-being from general violence. 
I use three methods for reducing multiple outcome variables to unidimensional 
measures: Principal Component Analysis (PCA, Factor Analysis (FA), and Item 
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Response Theory (IRT). Two of these methods (PCA and FA) also allow for an 
exploratory test of the number of underlying dimensions within the data. IRT generates 
measures that show how well each variable discriminates between high and low 
destination quality states. I produce several scores that can be, in turn, tested within the 
models in the next chapter, in which I predict civil war duration and intensity.  
Principal Component Analysis  
 The first tool that I use to evaluate the dimensionality of the data is PCA. PCA is 
a primarily non-theoretical tool meant for condense collinear data into a reduced set of 
variables. This is distinct from Exploratory Factor Analysis because of the lack of 
theoretical reasoning. As Baglin (2014,2) describes: 
Factor analysis is concerned with identifying the underlying factor structure that 
explains the relationships between the observed variables. On the other hand, 
PCA is used to reduce a large number of interrelated variables into a smaller set 
of "components" with minimal loss of information. For example, a researcher 
with multicollinearity issues in a multiple regression model might use PCA to 
cluster highly related variables into a single predictor to avoid biased parameter 
estimates. PCA does not attempt to explain the underlying population factor 
structure of the data and makes the often, unrealistic, assumption that each 
variable is measured without error. EFA, on the other hand, is based on the 
common or shared variance between variables, which is partitioned from the left-
over variance unique to each variable and any error introduced by measurement. 
Hence, EFA is more theoretically aligned to the goals of exploring the 
dimensionality of a scale proposing to measure a latent variable. 
 
Since PCA is a non-theoretical strategy to condense variables into one component, it is a 
reasonable starting strategy to determine whether it makes sense extract a single 
unidimensional measure of destination quality. Initial PCA analysis suggests that while 
there is one overwhelming component within the data, there are still two additional 
components (the last of which is borderline at best per traditional Kaiser rules, with an 
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eigenvalue of 1.14). This suggests that two dimensions are present in the data. A scree 
plot of the eigenvalues is shown in Figure 18. 
Factor Analysis 
The next step is conducting exploratory factor analysis for three reasons: (1) to 
confirm two dimensions, as shown in the PCA results; (2) to determine whether the 
refugee rights scores are picking up on something different from the CIRI/civil war data – 
which also justifies my initial argument for considering these separately – and (3) to test 
whether using a unidimensional model could still make sense. 
Figure 18: Scree Plot from PCA Results 
 
The scree plot from PCA shows two component dimensions that are well above the 
minimum eigenvalue of one, and a third dimension that is borderline. 
 
 In the Factor Analysis models, I use a polychoric correlation matrix rather than a 
Pearson correlation matrix. This is appropriate because my data are all ordinal: “Pearson 
correlations assume data have been measured on, at least, an equal interval scale and a 
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linear relationship exists between the variables. These assumptions are typically violated 
in the case of variables measured using ordinal rating scales” (Baglin 2014, 2). Using the 
Pearson correlation matrix with ordinal data in Exploratory Factor Analysis causes 
spurious multidimensionality, biased factor loadings, and underestimated relationships 
between ordinal variables, which is why it is generally recommended to use the 
polychoric correlation matrix in EFA with ordinal data (Baglin 2014; Timmerman and 
Lorenzo-Seva 2011; Olsson 1979; Bernstein and Teng 1989; Garrido et al. 2013; 
Holgado–Tello et al. 2008). 
Once the factor analysis is run, it is preferable to rotate the factor loadings in 
order to better interpret them, and therefore to better interpret which variables are most 
associated with each factor (or dimension). Either orthogonal or oblique rotation can be 
used; orthogonal rotation constrains factors to be uncorrelated, facilitating the simplest 
interpretation, whereas oblique rotation allows correlation, thus allowing for a more 
realistic representation of the loadings. In practice, I ran both and the predicted scores are 
correlated at .97 for both the first and second factors, so it doesn’t seem to matter which 
method I use in this model. I therefore elect to use orthogonal rotations; the full set of the 
loadings from the orthogonal and normalized rotation is shown in Table 14. 
There is one factor that does seem to overwhelm the others (eigenvalue of 4.08), 
though there is a second that could be worth inclusion, as it does have an eigenvalue over 
1 (1.43). The remaining factors were well below 1. The first factor explains 72.6% of the 
variance in the data; the second factor explains 25.4% of the variation in the data; 
together they explain 98.1% of the variation.  
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Based on the exploratory factor analysis, it does appear that there are two distinct 
dimensions underlying the abuse of refugees’ rights and generalized violence within the 
country.  The first factor accounts for a much larger share of the variance, but there are 
clear patterns of each of the sets of data loading onto separate factors.  It is also worth 
noting – here and moving forward – that the greater variation in the CIRI data (due to 
more comprehensive and consistent reporting in the source material) is likely 
overwhelming the refugee rights data. 	  
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Table 14: Orthogonal Rotated Factor Loadings 
  Factor Loadings  
Item Source 
Factor 1 
(General 
Violence) 
Factor 2 
(Refugee 
Violence) 
 
Law 
 
Refugees 0.0691 0.3808 
Refoulement 
 Refugees 0.0600 0.7773 
Cooperation with UNHCR Refugees 0.2120 0.7353 
 
Government Violence 
 
Refugees 0.1626 0.5041 
Protection from non-State Violence Refugees 0.3363 0.5041 
 
Killing 
 
CIRI 0.8603 0.1239 
Disappearance 
 CIRI 0.8164 0.1989 
Torture 
 CIRI 0.7485 0.1429 
Political Prisoners 
 CIRI 0.6772 0.2747 
Civil War 
 
UCDP/PRIO 
 
0.8315 
 
0.1553 
 
 
Eigenvalue 
 
 4.0768 1.4277 
 
* N=3,535 
 
Item Response Theory 
 As discussed in the chapter, IRT is similar to factor analysis but it useful because 
it also allows for estimation of parameters evaluating the performance of the individual 
items used to estimate the underlying dimensions. This gives information on how well the 
variables distinguish between states at varying levels of refugee rights and general 
security. Stata 14 does not allow for multidimensional IRT estimation, so based on the 
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clear indication of two distinct dimensions at work from the factor analysis results, I run 
two separate unidimensional models. The first model, general security, includes the 
CIRI/CI-RIGHTS and UCDP/PRIO indicators that loaded onto the first factor. The 
second model, refugee rights, includes all of the new data on the treatment of refugees, all 
of which loaded onto the second factor.  
 All of the output from the two-parameter graded response IRT models, including 
the difficulty and discrimination parameters, is shown in Tables 15 and 16. The difficulty 
parameters show the theta score at which a state would have a 50% probability of scoring 
at or above the level listed. For example, in Table 15, a state with a refugee rights theta 
score of -1.0968 would have a 50% chance of receiving a score of 1 or higher for the 
Refoulement score, while a state with a refugee rights theta score of -0.6762 would have 
a 50% chance of receiving a Refoulement score of 2. The visual representations of the 
difficulty scores for each parameter are shown in Figures 20 and 21, which show the Item 
Characteristic Curves (ICC). The difficulty scores are the marked theta values on the x-
axis, which have a corresponding probability of 0.5. The discrimination parameter for 
each item is the second parameter displayed in the output in Tables 16 and 17. The 
discrimination shows how effectively the item differentiates between comparable levels 
of theta; in the ICC graphs in Figures 25 and 26, the discrimination is shown as the slope 
on each curve. Law has a discrimination score of 0.5284, and so has a relatively flat slope 
in Figure 25. At close levels of theta, the probability of reaching a given score will be 
very similar, so it does not discriminate well. Refoulement, however, has a discrimination 
score of 2.5409, and therefore has a very steep slope in Figure 25. Even at close levels of 
theta, there are distinctly different probabilities of getting a given score. 
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 The item information functions (IIF) shown in Figures 21 and 22 show how much 
information each item provides to estimate theta, or the latent trait – in Figure 21 this 
shows how much information each constituent item gives to estimate the refugee rights 
score, while in Figure 22 shows how much information each item gives to estimate the 
general security score. The unimodal IIFs for the refugee rights score are likely a 
reflection of how compressed the difficulty scores are for each item; the bimodal IIFs for 
the general security score are a reflection of the wider spread on the difficulty scores to 
reach a 1 and a 2 for each item. Refoulement by far offers the most information for 
estimating refugee rights, followed by Cooperation with UNHCR, and then by 
Government Abuse. Protection from Abuse offers a lower amount of information, and 
Law offers almost no information. It is also worth noting the levels of theta at which 
information is highest – Refoulement and Government Abuse peak at higher levels of 
theta than Cooperation with UNHCR and Protection from Abuse; however, all of the 
constituent items have information peaking well below theta scores of zero. On the other 
hand, the general security items offer higher levels of information, and do so at levels 
ranging from negative to positive values of theta. This suggests that the items making up 
the general security scores generally offer better information on and distinctions between 
states at different levels of the IRT general security score; this is consistent with my 
previous expectations, given the much greater variation in the CIRI/CI-RIGHTS scores, 
driven by the better and more comprehensive reporting on repression of native 
populations in the source materials. 
 The summed IIFs create the Test Information Function (TIF). Each TIF is plotted 
in Figures 23 and 24. As shown in Figure 23, the refugee rights data provide the most 
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information for states located at theta of about -1. Moving to theta scores above or below 
-1, the standard error increases, and the amount of information about the underlying 
dimension of refugee rights decreases. In Figure 24, the TIF shows that there is a similar 
maximum information peak at -1 for the general security score; however, the overall level 
of information provided across levels of theta is much higher than in the refugee rights 
TIF plot. 
 Finally, it is possible to evaluate how the theta scores derived for each dimension 
would perform if the items were instead measured in a simple additive index. The Test 
Characteristic Curves in Figures 19 and 20 how varying levels of theta would match to 
additive index scores. Based on the collapsing intervals on the y-axis at higher levels of 
the index score (and higher levels of theta), it is clear that particularly for the refugee 
rights scores, there would not be a true linear relationship between the underlying 
dimension of refugee rights and the score an additive index would generate. The one-unit 
interval changes at the highest (and also at the lowest) levels would be far less 
meaningful than the one-unit interval changes in the mid-levels of the index score. While 
this is not as strong a problem for the general security score, it is still a clear pattern, 
suggesting that using IRT estimation of the underlying dimensions was a better option for 
accurate measurement than adding the constituent scores into an index. 
 As a final method of comparing the IRT-generated theta scores of the underlying 
dimensions of refugee rights and general security, refer to the scatterplot of the two 
values in Figure 27. All parts of the plot are populated, suggesting that not only are these 
distinct, but it should be feasible to find most of the theoretically possible combinations 
of the two scores actually populated in the data. The straight vertical and horizontal lines 
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in the plot approaching the maximum values of each score are reflective of the collapsing 
and clustering of the scores at the highest levels, where they cannot score higher than the 
maximum value and thus end up appearing roughly the same. Selected country/year 
values from the full scatterplot are shown in Figure 7 within Chapter 3. 
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Table 16: IRT Graded Response Model - Refugee Rights 
 Coefficient Std. Error p < |z| 95% Confidence Intervals 
Law      
Discrimination 0.5284 0.0472 0.000 0.4360 0.6208 
Difficulty       
(>=1) -1.7697 0.1585 0.000 -2.0804 -0.4590 
(=2) -0.2357 0.0672 0.000 -0.3674 -0.1041 
Refoulement      
Discrimination 2.5409 0.2254 0.000 2.0990 2.9827 
Difficulty      
(>=1) -1.0968 0.0426 0.000 -1.1802 -1.0134 
(=2) -0.6762 0.0308 0.000 -0.7366 -0.6158 
Cooperation with 
UNCHR 
     
Discrimination 2.0086 0.1337 0.000 1.7465 2.2706 
Difficulty      
(>=1) -2.4919 0.0993 0.000 -2.6865 -2.2973 
(=2) -1.6886 0.0610 0.000 -1.8082 -1.5690 
Government Abuse      
Discrimination 1.6857 0.1164 0.000 1.4575 1.9138 
Difficulty      
(>=1) -1.2294 0.0549 0.000 -1.3369 -1.1219 
(=2) -1.0205 0.0472 0.000 -1.1130 -0.9281 
Protection from 
Violence 
     
Discrimination 1.2437 0.0961 0.000 1.0554 1.4321 
Difficulty      
(>=1) -2.2207 0.1245 0.000 -2.4648 -1.9767 
(=2) -2.0577 0.1143 0.000 -2.2818 -1.8335 
 
Observations: 3,834 
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Table 17: IRT Graded Response Model - General Security 
 Coefficient Std. Error p < |z| 95% Confidence Intervals 
Extrajudicial 
Killing 
     
Discrimination 3.0365 0.1339 0.000 2.7740 3.2987 
Difficulty       
(>=1) -1.0013 0.0307 0.000 -1.0615 -0.9441 
(=2) 0.0937 0.0237 0.000 0.0473 0.1402 
Disappearance      
Discrimination 3.0577 0.1491 0.000 2.7656 3.3499 
Difficulty      
(>=1) -1.5520 0.0419 0.000 -1.6342 -1.4698 
(=2) -0.8429 0.0279 0.000 -0.8975 -0.7882 
Torture      
Discrimination 2.3977 0.1009 0.000 2.1999 2.5955 
Difficulty      
(>=1) -0.1514 0.0254 0.000 -0.2012 -0.1016 
(=2) 1.3493 0.0396 0.000 1.2717 1.4268 
Political 
Imprisonment 
     
Discrimination 1.7822 0.0699 0.000 1.6463 1.9202 
Difficulty      
(>=1) -0.8731 0.0549 0.000 -0.9436 -0.8025 
(=2) 0.1022 0.0286 0.000 0.0463 0.1582 
Civil War      
Discrimination 3.1175 0.1772 0.000 2.7701 3.4649 
Difficulty      
(>=1) -2.0053 0.0560 0.000 -2.1150 -1.8955 
(=2) -1.1686 0.0327 0.000 -1.2326 -1.1045 
 
Observations: 3,851 
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Figure 19: Test Characteristic Curve for Refugee Rights 
 
Figure 20: Test Characteristic Curve for General Security 
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Figure 21: Item Information Function for Refugee Rights 
 
 
Figure 22: Item Information Functions for General Security 
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Figure 23: Test Information Function for Refugee Rights 
 
 
Figure 24: Test Information Function for General Security 
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Figure 25: Item Characteristic Curves for Refugee Rights 
 
 
Figure 26: Item Characteristic Curves for General Security 
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Figure 27: Scatterplot of IRT Theta Scores - Refugee Rights v. General Security 
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Appendix C: Additional Models of Civil Conflict Duration and Intensity 	
 The results from the various specifications of each dimension of exit quality are 
summarized below. There were four variations of each dimension (refugee rights and 
general security), based on the combination of taking either the maximum score of all 
neighbors within 950 km of a civil conflict state, or the mean of all these scores, and 
measuring this either in the current year t or the previous year t-1. Each cell indicates 
whether the results support the hypotheses. 
Table 18: Summary of Whether Results Support Initial Hypotheses 
  
Refugee Rights General Security 
 
Duration 
 
Battle Deaths 
 
Duration 
 
Battle Deaths 
 
Mean(t) 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Mean(t-1) Yes Yes Yes No 
Maximum(t) No Yes Yes Yes 
Maximum(t-1) No No Yes No 
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There is a fairly clear pattern that across various specifications, refugee rights best 
predicts conflict intensity (in annual battle deaths), while general security best predicts 
the duration of the conflict. What is perhaps more puzzling is that, while general security 
ceases to have any significant effect predicting battle deaths in specifications other than 
at the maximum of all neighboring states at year t-1, in the three specifications where 
refugee rights predicting duration does not perform as the theory would anticipate, 
refugee rights actually has the opposite effect: conflicts with higher levels of surrounding 
refugee rights last longer. 
Figures 28-33 rerun the models from the chapter predicting conflict duration and 
intensity using the current year (t) mean, rather than the lagged (t-1) mean. As in the 
original model, high civilian deaths are set at 2,000, and low civilian deaths are set at 10. 
Figure 28 shows the predicted the natural log of annual battle deaths across increasing 
levels of one-sided civilian deaths for high surrounding refugee rights and low 
surrounding refugee rights (high exit and low exit, respectively). In this model, it is 
actually much clearer that within “pressure cooker” states – those without viable exit 
options and with a great deal of pressure exerted by violence against civilians – conflicts 
become more intense as the pressure increases. Figure 29 again shows that general 
security in surrounding states has no discernable impact on the intensity of conflicts, 
regardless of the level of violence against civilians. 
Figures 30 and 31 show the expected duration of conflicts at high and low levels 
of surrounding general security, at high levels of one-sided violence against civilians 
(Figure 30) and at low levels of one-sided violence against civilians (Figure 31). 
Consistent with the models from the chapter using the lagged mean of general security 
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scores, at high levels of one-sided violence, low exit quality conflicts tend to last longer, 
while high and low exit quality conflicts are indistinguishable in duration where one-
sided violence is low. 
What is more interesting is the output in Figures 32 and 33. These figures show 
the expected duration of conflicts at high and low levels of refugee rights, within the 
context of either high levels of one-sided violence against civilians (Figure 32) or low 
levels of one-sided violence against civilians (Figure 33). In Figure 32, the results have 
actually flipped dramatically from the original hypothesis and the results presented in the 
chapter for the lagged mean of refugee rights. Here, at high levels of violence against 
civilians, low exit quality in refugee rights drives much shorter conflicts.  Turning to 
Figure 33, the results are once again flipped; at low levels of violence against civilians, 
low exit quality conflicts again last longer. 
The results from Figures 32 and 33 are actually consistent with the results from 
using the maximum score for refugee rights, either in the current year t or the previous 
year t-1. So, in three out of four specifications, it appears that trapping civilians in 
dangerously violent conditions drives conflicts that are both shorter and more intense. At 
first glance – as is clear from Table 18 – this is inconsistent with my initial hypotheses 
predicting longer and more violent conflicts. Instead, these are shorter and more violent 
conflicts. 
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Figure 28: Predicted Battle Deaths (ln) Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t) 
 
At low levels of one-sided civilian deaths, conflicts with high and low refugee rights have 
the same predicted annual battle deaths; as civilian deaths increase, low refugee rights 
conflicts are increasingly more intense. 
 
Figure 29: Predicted Battle Deaths (ln) Based on General Security Mean Score (t) 
 
There is no significant difference in predicted annual battle deaths between high and low 
general security conflicts across all levels of one-sided civilian deaths. 
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Figure 30: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score (t) 
and High Civilian Deaths 
 
Conflicts with low general security in surrounding states last significantly longer than 
conflicts with high general security in surrounding states at high levels of one-sided 
civilian violence (shown at 2,000 one-sided civilian deaths in the conflict-year). 
 
Figure 31: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score (t) 
and Low One-Sided Civilian Deaths 
 
Conflicts with low general security in surrounding states last the same amount of time as 
conflicts with high general security in surrounding states at low levels of one-sided 
violence (shown at 10 one-sided civilian deaths in the conflict-year). 
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Figure 32: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t) and 
High Civilian Deaths 
 
Conflicts with low refugee rights in surrounding states end significantly sooner than 
conflicts with high refugee rights in surrounding states at high levels of one-sided civilian 
violence (shown at 2,000 one-sided civilian deaths in the conflict-year). 
 
Figure 33: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t) and 
Low One-Sided Civilian Deaths 
 
Conflicts with low refugee rights in surrounding states last significantly longer than 
conflicts with high refugee rights in surrounding states at low levels of one-sided violence 
(shown at 10 one-sided civilian deaths in the conflict-year). 
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However, this is the theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state. A pressure 
cooker works by trapping heat and steam within a closed vessel in order to raise the 
temperature higher and heat the contents quicker. If civil conflict states without viable 
exit options trap civilians – and thus resources – within the state, increasing pressure on 
these civilians should drive more resources into the conflict quicker, creating conflicts 
that flare more intensely and then also end quicker. While this was not the original 
expectation of the theory, this outcome actually may make more sense; if all of the 
resources are driven into the conflict earlier, it should also burn out sooner. Thus, the 
naming of this theory as the “theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state” was perhaps 
more apt than even I anticipated at the outset.  
What is of equal importance is that, again, refugee rights and general security 
perform differently. Indeed, in this example they actually are cross-cutting; holding 
refugee rights constant, poorer general security in combination with high levels of 
civilian violence drives longer conflicts, which makes sense as this allows for continued 
resource flows into the conflict because of regional instability. On the other hand, holding 
general security constant, poorer refugee rights in combination with high levels of 
civilian violence drives shorter conflicts of higher intensity, because civilians – as 
resources for combatants – are trapped inside the conflict. This drives conflicts that flare 
and come to a head rapidly, but also burn out sooner.  
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Table 19: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Predicting  Civil Conflict Duration 
with Exit Quality Measures at Mean Score (t) 	 (1)	 (2)	
VARIABLES General 
Security  
Refugee 
Rights 
   
General Security (Mean) 0.0437 0.0955 
 (0.184) (0.185) 
Refugee Respect (Mean) 0.156 0.241 
 (0.169) (0.176) 
Civilian Deaths 9.40e-05 -0.0002** 
 (6.18e-05) (8.62e-05) 
General Security (Mean) * Civilian Deaths 0.000230  
 (0.000185)  
Refugee Respect (Mean) * Civilian Deaths  -0.0006** 
  (0.00028) 
Battle Deaths (ln) -0.272*** -0.278*** 
 (0.0707) (0.0703) 
Total Population (ln) -0.0369 -0.0462 
 (0.0683) (0.0672) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.0950 -0.0877 
 (0.0887) (0.0871) 
Regime -0.0166 -0.0210 
 (0.0145) (0.0147) 
Conflict over Territory 0.379** 0.382** 
 (0.187) (0.184) 
Intervention (Government) 0.261 0.245 
 (0.349) (0.354) 
Intervention (Rebels) 0.281 0.240 
 (0.441) (0.429) 
Intervention (Both) 0.238 0.217 
 (1.074) (1.042) 
Civil Wars 108 108 
Civil War Failures 161 161 
Observations 729 729 
Wald χ2(12, 12) 68.83 73.46 
Log pseudo likelihood -603.09 -602.27 
Coefficients are reported 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20: OLS Regression Predicting Annual Battle Deaths with Exit Quality 
Measures at Mean Score (t) 
 (3) (4) 
VARIABLES General 
Security 
Refugee  
Rights 
   
General Security (Mean) -0.139 -0.142 
 (0.136) (0.135) 
Refugee Respect (Mean) -0.213** -0.168* 
 (0.100) (0.100) 
Civilian Deaths -9.70e-06 -5.19e-05** 
 (2.15e-05) (2.07e-05) 
Refugee Respect (Mean) * Civilian Deaths  -0.000213*** 
  (7.58e-05) 
General Security  (Mean) * Civilian Deaths -3.32e-05  
 (5.15e-05)  
Total Population (ln) -0.0578* -0.0557* 
 (0.0339) (0.0338) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.203*** 0.203*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0431) 
Conflict over Territory -0.741*** -0.747*** 
 (0.115) (0.114) 
Intervention (Government) 0.874*** 0.868*** 
 (0.187) (0.187) 
Intervention (Rebels) 0.662 0.771 
 (0.492) (0.487) 
Intervention (Both) 0.684 0.614 
 (0.607) (0.617) 
Constant 4.886*** 4.858*** 
 (0.631) (0.628) 
   
Observations 765 765 
R-squared 0.175 0.179 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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